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Summary
This thesis offers a critique of the normative assumptions of the concept of civil 
society and an evaluation of its relationship to democracy in contemporary 
political discourse. The proposition is that civil society represents the only 
feasible aspect of society that can maintain any democratic expansion. But I will 
argue that civil society must first of all detach itself from liberal theory. To this 
end, a number of reconstructions of the ‘assumed norms’ of what constitutes 
democracy will be made. Democracy is in crisis, but the legitimacy of political 
systems remains. The purpose of the reconstructions in this thesis is to assess the 
factors that contribute to democratic development and those that mitigate 
against it. The method employed is an immanent critique of the normative bases 
of civil society -  privacy, publicity, plurality and legality -  and their 
reconsideration. Two sets of criteria must be met in these reconstructions: those 
required by democracy (as an empowerment in society), and those that maintain 
the connections between theory and the actual. Each of these norms contains a 
number of principles and assumptions, axiomatic in liberal theory but 
problematic for civil society, and so for democracy. When subjected to critical 
enquiry, some of these references to political and social freedoms are antithetical 
to the conditions of democratic development. The conclusions arrived at point to 
the reconstruction of the concept of privacy, and how this relates to what is 
understood to be ‘private’ is basic to democracy. The factors that contribute 
toward this legitimacy (privatism) impedes civil society, and consequently the 
development of democracy.
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Introductory chapter
Dismissal of the emancipatory potential of civil society theory as romantic illusion or idealist 
impracticability could be grounded empirically without too much reference to its theoretical 
antinomies. The collapse of the communist states in Eastern Europe gave rise to an 
opportunity for ‘civil society’ to seize, and realise the ideals of the various ‘movements’ that 
had loosely comprised the democratic opposition. But as G.M.Tamas writes in his essay 
‘Victory Defeated’, “ ... what we did was to do away with the remnants of the old regime -  
and what happened to us, in the absence of a new social order of our own, was capitalism”.1 
There are two important points to highlight at the outset, ones which can be extracted from 
Tamas’s lament. The first is explicit, that ‘civil society’ in its contemporary relevance is as 
‘anti-capitalist’ as it is ‘anti-state’, it refers to an analytical identification of a sphere of social 
relations that correspond to neither state nor economy. The second point refers to the ‘absence 
of a new social order of our own’ and concerns the problematic of ‘self-limitation’. A 
principled adoption, rather than political strategy subverts the will to become democratic, 
concluding with the veiled domination of capitalism 'replacing' the more explicit domination 
of the state. The two are interrelated and reflect ‘civil society’s’ neglect of the power of the 
culture of capitalism to transform, or rather divert, civil society (as ‘presented’ by the 
dissident opposition in the East) into one in which its leading figurehead, in this instance a 
former electrician from Gdansk, can proclaim that ‘There is no freedom in solidarity’ (Lech 
Walesa). The failure to assert the normative bases of civil society to politics in what would 
have appeared to be its optimal nursery, the vacuum left by the state in communist Europe,
1 G.M.Tamas ‘Victory Defeated’ in R.Andorka, R.Kolosi, & G.M.Tamas (eds.) A Society Transformed:Hungary 
in Time-Space Perspective Central European University Press 1999
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demands a closer look at the agency of civil society with specific attention being paid to this 
principle of self-limitation as opposed to a strategy.
The imagined societies of the democratic opposition in eastern Europe did not revolve 
around the establishment of free association through markets; indeed this conception of civil 
society is antithetical to the ‘solidarism’ that did provide the pivot for this ‘free association’. 
The absence of a ‘new social order of our own’ allowed for the hegemony of, as would one of 
the latest cliches to enter political theoretical debate describe, ‘the only game in town’ to 
quickly establish itself in the inseparable form of democracy and capitalism. On a perilous 
course through the Charybdis of the state and the Scylla of the market, the idea of civil society 
steered by goodwill and ‘living in truth’ alone was always likely to founder on the latter. The 
‘institutionalised lie’ of the state2 has been replaced by the global trend of private 
accumulation in increasingly privatised societies. The process of absorption of the private into 
the public of state communism has been reversed into the privatisation of the public, and of 
the self. Where Tamas only intimated the ‘anti-capitalist’ element of civil society above, he is
more explicit elsewhere, asking whether it is “  possible to argue that what we now see, ten
years after 1989, the annus mirablis, is the moral exhaustion of liberal capitalism brought 
about by its global victory?”3
A look towards Eastern Europe then gives little cause for optimism, and the more difficult 
search for sociological moorings in ‘western society’ for similar emancipatory lead is 
considered by many commentators to be a vain one. The question that now begs is why bother 
to continue with a concept that is theoretically vague and open to contradictory interpretation. 
Its historical demise after 1989 should be reason enough for regarding the idea of civil society 
as having little or no substance to it.
2 V.Havel ‘The Power o f the Powerless’ in Open Letters:Selected Writing 1965-1990  New York. Vintage Books. 
1992
3 G.M.Tamas op.cit p.63
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The foremost justification for its continued theorising is that it can provide a conceptual 
language for democratic struggle and discontent on a universal basis once shorn of its 
commonsensical assumptions. In more prosaic terms, ‘civil society’ can begin to define these 
struggles in their real and global conditions. It is only through the development of civil 
society, as an ethical composition, that democracy has any chance of becoming anything more 
meaningful than the fa?ade of representation that is the political aspect of the developed 
capitalist world.
Broadly, civil society represents a radically democratic social order whose fluidity can 
border on dis-order, and whose plurality (as forms of social relations) can play an effective 
part in the shaping of its own environment and the meeting of its needs. Its utopia is a 
radically democratic social order whose plurality plays an effective part in the shaping of the 
environment and the meeting of its needs. It is a society which is voluntaristic, implying 
determination as both cause in the reproduction of a social order, and ‘faith’ in the capacity to 
determine the nature of that order. Adam Michnik stresses the importance of this latter form of 
determination: “Faith in one’s ability to exert influence on the fate of society is an absolute 
pre-requisite for political activity”. 4
Cohen and Arato put it thus: “ ... a society without political projects is [...] undesirable, 
for the civil privatism or ‘realism’ that would result would really be just another name for 
egoism, and the corresponding political culture would lack sufficient motivation to maintain, 
much less expand, existing rights, democratic institutions, social solidarity, or justice”.5 
Wisely they keep these projects vague, but the shortcomings or defects of their theory cannot, 
in light of the normative demands of these themes, become an adequate vehicle for the project 
of radical, or revolutionary, democratisation (although it might be more amenable to the 
balance of rights they attach to democracy).
4 A.Michnik Letters from  Prison and Other Essays trans. M. Latynski) Berkeley University o f California Press 
1985 p. 137
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The method of this critique is an examination of civil society's claims to support an 
expanded and deepened democracy through the lenses of four core normative categories, with 
Cohen and Arato’s tri-partite model of civil society as a focal point of analysis. These core 
categories are the subject matter of the four main chapters of this thesis. They comprise:
(1) Plurality: families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and 
autonomy allow for a variety of forms of life; (2) Publicity: institutions of culture and 
communication; (3) Privacy: a domain of individual self-development and moral choice; 
and (4) Legality: structures of general laws and basic rights needed to demarcate plurality, 
privacy, and publicity from at least the state and, tendentially, the economy. Together 
these structures secure the institutional existence of a modem differentiated civil society. 6
The approach to these normative categories will be as literal as possible. That is, not taken in 
their usual sense but in their ‘primary’ sense -  without the cultural assumptions and 
mystification that define them as normative ‘givens’. The intention is to elaborate the idea of 
civil society in terms of normative necessity and sociological reality. A requirement of this is 
some significant revision to the central concepts of civil society theory and academic 
discourses. I will outline these re-definitions, re-considerations, and re-interpretations here in 
glossary form.
The first, and in super-ordinate terms also perhaps, is the term privacy vis-a-vis ‘the 
private’. The common synonymy belies the antagonism and contradiction between the two. 
Much of the first chapter is given to elaborating this, for civil society crucial, difference. The 
terms are never here used interchangeably. Privacy refers to a development and, following a 
lengthy discussion of the se//7subject in Chapter 1, one dependent on ‘public’ processes. ‘The 
private’ on the other hand represents the deepest rooted obstacle to the development of a 
democratised civil society. The second reconsideration is more a clarification and re-focusing 
of the relevant aspects of publicity to civil society. Publicity refers to the wider cultural and
5 J.L.Cohen & A. Arato Civil Society and Political Theory Cambridge Mass. The MIT Press 1997 p.33
6 ibid.p.346
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communicative aspects of society -  almost a definition of society itself. From this, two 
reductions are then required to identify an ethical kernel to these aspects of publicity. The first 
is the ‘public domain’ as the primary source of self- and societal-perception. It provides the 
content of that part of society as it exists in our consciousness. The condition of this public 
domain, however, does not reflect the normative expectations of a public realm. For this 
reflection of the idea there must be a further reduction to a normatively constructed ‘public 
sphere’. Moreover, this ‘sphere’ must not be construed as a particular sphere rather it is the 
communicative aspect of countless forms of social movement and plurality. The public 
sphere, heavily laden with normative criteria, represents a form of discourse rather than a site.
The reference here to plurality as social movement is an indication of the re-adjustment to 
the understanding of ‘social movement’ in the context of a developing civil society in 
universal terms, as well as the basis of civil society in the advanced capitalist world. The shift 
in focus from social movements to social movement reflects the revised understanding of 
‘freedom of association’. This association, forms of social relations or plurality, is, in Chapter 
3, considered as subject rather than object in relation to freedom. In other words, it is the 
association itself to which the freedom must be ascribed or attached and not the individual 
exercising a freedom ‘to associate’.
I have also used two methodological divisions taken directly from other theorists that 
provide the analytical framework for a higher level of abstraction: George Schopflin’s 
‘developed political systems’ vis-a-vis ‘undeveloped’ systems,7 and Gramsci’s ‘economic- 
corporate’ and ‘ethico-political’ categories. According to Schopflin, ‘developed political 
systems’ are characterised by their primarily economic political agenda and priority, and 
references in this thesis to such a system have in mind the liberal democracies of North 
America and Western Europe. Systems that are ‘undeveloped’ are based more on ethnic and
7 G. Schopflin ‘Post-Communism’ in International Affairs 67 1991
5
moral identity of ‘non-material interest’. The systems to which Schopflin specifically refers 
are those of eastern Europe where former communist rule had homogenised and atomised 
economic interests. His division is too clear-cut, even the questions concerning ethnicity do 
not exclude economic factors and ‘material interests’. His contrasting of the ‘robust 
democracies’ of developed political systems and their unstable counterparts (in the East -and 
South?) is not, of course, unproblematic. First it should be pointed out that formal political 
exclusion is not only determined by ‘non-material’ interests, but is also the outcome of a 
politics based on private (material) interest. The link between enfranchisement and property 
still exists in ‘developed political systems’, albeit in a much weaker and seemingly 
unimportant form; that between the homeless (propertyless) and their denial of the right to 
vote. This formal ‘material exclusion’ may affect a minority (although this is no defence 
against consideration) but is only the sharply identifiable end of political exclusion.8 More 
importantly for the wider argument, the conception of democracy must involve considerably 
more than exercising a periodical right to vote. Otherwise the less obviously brutal and 
exclusionary nature of ‘developed’ systems will continue to operate without democratic 
interference, unless we are to be content with a limited notion of democracy that is confined to 
formal political representation. Questionable ‘development’ notwithstanding, if we follow 
Schopflin’s analysis we can then question the differences and similarities between the two 
types of politics, and whether at a fundamental level, that is crucial to the development of civil 
society, this differentiation becomes invalid. Throughout, I will make use of Gramsci’s 
concepts of ‘economic-corporate’ and ‘ethico-political’ categories of political consciousness 
as identifications of political development. Thus ‘civil society’ is not re-defined, indeed 
consistency with the idea is maintained throughout, rather it is a re-clarification of its ethical 
bases as the development/realisation of this ‘ethical society’. In its composition of the re­
8 The link between property-ownership and political exclusion shows a negative correlation with less than 3% of  
those who own property missing from the electoral register, whereas 38.2% of those who rent furnished
6
considered elements of some of the core categories of its theory, civil society amounts to the 
‘ethico-political’ practical discourse of social movement.
I take civil society to mean a sphere of social relations which are not derived from the 
demands of economic or bureaucratic efficiency but which are vulnerable to the logic of these 
demands. It implies a democratic immanence that assumes, as a common feature, protest 
against the systems of domination that are received as a graspable issue. But these relations do 
not correspond readily to identifiable institutions. Gramsci’s recognition of civil society’s 
limits to an methodological device, rather than analytical, still applies to a developed form of 
what is essentially the same concept - that is, recognisably distinct from both the economic 
infrastructure of society and the political society of its 'superstructure'. One need look no 
further than ‘the university’ as an example of an institution which, although (historically and 
inevitably) contains elements of civil society, cannot be excluded from the functions of 
‘economy’ or ‘state’. A clear demarcation between civil society and the state, based on a 
separation of the institutions of a ‘developed political system’ does not hold. Only when 
(civil) society has found its political (democratic) voice can a substantive differentiation be 
made. Thus civil society as a tangible category of political sociology is peripheral. It is better 
understood as the convergence of protest formations and democratic struggles, albeit in 
inchoate form. Despite this plurality of objectives, civil-political activity of a non-articulated 
mass are struggles, protests, and campaigns which nevertheless focus on the same objects -  
domination by the state and the increasing command of ‘globalised capital’. A cautionary note 
must be made here however; an implication of this is that all social movement and campaigns 
are normatively desirable. This is not the case. Reactionary elements in society do not meet 
the 'norm' of a civil society whose discourse is conducted at an ethico-political level. The 
economic-corporate level of particularism that is the discursive mode of these elements
accommodation have never bothered to vote. Source: Democratic Audit Charter 88 1997
7
differentiates them from ethico-political social movement which, rather than pointing inwards 
and toward exclusion, has a universal orientation of inclusiveness. Furthermore, the discourses 
of the reactionary elements are more amenable to accommodation with the state. Civil society 
is the crystallisation of the normative components -  re-assessed.
Cohen and Arato’s model of civil society has the merit that the dualistic models lack in 
that it retains an awareness of the difference between ‘bourgeois society’ and ‘civil society’, 
even if it falls well short of theorising it adequately. A state-civil society distinction is 
fundamentally flawed if it proceeds from the premise of the wholly inadequate and outmoded 
concepts of ‘private’ and ‘public’ as bipolar distinctions. Pre-requisite of a radically 
democratised society are levels of political activity that go beyond those required of a ‘realist’ 
driven ‘economic theory’ of democracy; in other words the faith that Michnik talks of as pre­
conditional. The ‘faith’ that does seem to exist in 'developed political systems' however, is tied 
up with the identity of ‘consumer’ rather than 'producer' and the power, real or otherwise, that 
goes with it. The great problem for civil society theory is that the ‘faith’ in the capacity to 
change society, becomes in effect a faith in one’s capacity to change one’s position in society, 
or the conditions of ones own existence into a ‘privatised’ consciousness that, I shall argue, 
cannot support the ethic of civil society. It reproduces a culture that throttles civil society, a 
culture that Cohen and Arato consider the ‘undesirable’ antithesis to their project. This 
democratic promise will be lost, however, if civil society is to be misinterpreted and then 
hamstrung by its own submission within the realist frame of reference. In order that their 
‘model’ can become an intelligible whole as a theoretical reference, it is appropriate that a 
more generalised account of Cohen and Arato’s civil society, its philosophical grounding and 
its theoretical claims, is offered. It is to this task that I shall turn first.
The thesis of Cohen and Arato is developed from the proposition that the safeguarding of 
liberties, and their expansion, depends upon the democratisation of institutions within civil
society. Their method is an exploration of rights and democratic legitimacy within a 
framework of discourse ethics and a conception of civil society (with a revised meaning of 
‘private’)- Before turning to these two processes, I will first look at their balancing of the two 
principles of rights and democratic legitimacy against a background of three current and 
dominant debates in political theory.
There is the debate around concepts of democracy, realist and normative, in which we 
have listened to, at the one pole, the followers of Schumpeter’s lead and, at the other, those 
who criticise the realist extraction of so many of its core principles that it no longer retains any 
resemblance to its original meaning. The second of these dominant issues is that between 
rights-oriented liberalism and communitarianism. The strength of this debate underlines the 
(theoretically speaking) ascendancy of the ‘normativists’ over the ‘realists’ in the first 
argument, thereby signalling perhaps a none too soon end to the ideologically professed 
priority of stability and efficiency as the essential features of democracy. In amongst the 
intricacies of this second debate, conducted at variously ontological and political levels, is the 
issue of greatest concern: “ ... whether the idea of freedom should be explicated primarily 
from the standpoint of individual rights or the community’s shared norms”.9 Is the irreducible 
ethical entity individual or social? Or is it some combination of both? The third debate 
concerns the state, and its role (if any) in the provision of welfare. This last can claim some 
merit over the other two in that, as far as Cohen and Arato are concerned, it has not been 
going around in circles for so long. This particular concern has two entrances, economic and 
political. The protagonists have come up with variations on two broad positions: either “more 
social engineering, more paternalism and levelling, in short, more statism”10 or a free market 
perhaps coupled with an authoritarian social and political organisation.
9 J.L.Cohen & A Arato op.cit p23
10 ibid. p.27
9
Initial criticisms to make are that their thesis of a ‘politics of influence’, emanating from 
civil society, does not offer an alternative to the dualist orthodoxy; but its dependence on 
liberal concepts ultimately reduced to ‘private individuals’ prevents this. Another fundamental 
problem of their thesis is their application of ‘self-limitation’ as a principle. The principle of 
self-limitation, that has become a principled attachment to civil society, is extremely 
problematic. Cohen and Arato’s application of it ties up social movement theory in ‘identity 
politics’ and sectional (private) interest. The term is used in civil society theory as if there is 
some firm understanding of where these limits are supposed to be applied. The strictly 
bounded communicative action of the 'lifeworld', as we shall see below, offers conceptual 
definition for self-limitation, but it inevitably limits the development of democracy when 
efficiency dictates the limits of the democratic project. Democracy is subordinated to the 
demands of efficiency, whether they are economic or bureaucratic.
The problem of limiting democracy was recognised by the civil society of Poland in the 
1980s. It was aware that the democratisation of ‘the economy’ is an integral part of the 
democratisation of society as a whole; at the very least it cannot remain immune to it if 
democracy is to be a radical current that, by its very normative demands of self-governance, 
should have no limit. In Poland, democratisation of the economy was very much a part of the 
vision of society that the Solidarity Congress of October 1981 put forward. The ‘self- 
governing republic’ enshrined in the programme of that congress was founded on such 
principles as “self-management ... (advocating) ... transferring the control of factories ... to 
democratically elected workers’ councils”.11 The democratic opposition’s drive was not 
limited, or limiting; it demanded power (in this case in the economy) formerly wielded by the 
state. But the democratic objectives of Solidarity were pushed off the agenda by the ‘realism’ 
of the market creed, and its ideologically constructed intrinsic relation to democracy in the
11 Z.A.Pelczynski ‘Solidarity and ‘The Rebirth o f Civil Society” in J.Keane Civil Society and the State New  
European Perspectives London. University o f Westminster Press 1999
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1990s. So complete was the transition from solidarity to market individualism that the latter 
became identified with freedom and incompatible with the former. As the outcome was a neo­
conservative politics and economics, the danger of over-estimating the influence that ‘civil 
society’ brings to bear on society as a whole serves as a reminder that civil society is a 
vulnerable enough proposition without the self imposition of limitation. This fracturing of 
civil society in Poland highlights the fragility of the necessary solidarity of civil society when 
subjected to the privatising effects of the market. It demonstrates with stark clarity the shifting 
foundations of ‘moral choice and self-development’, the notion of privacy that anchors a 
normatively necessary civil society.
A major problem for Cohen and Arato’s thesis is that a culture of privatism is not the 
‘most appropriate’ to a modem civil society; even if such a culture makes no difference to the 
liberal conception. But a culture of privatism is endemic in Western societies, indeed it is the 
defining social phenomenon of a ‘developed political system’. If this liberation from the state 
can be achieved ‘without it necessarily becoming bourgeois’, then it ought to be a matter of 
far greater concern as to what it is dependent upon, and how the obstacles to these conditions 
can be addressed. The implication of ‘self-limitation’ is that the mere detailing away of 
capitalist economy into some category not amenable to a hermeneutic understanding does not 
address the problem of civil society becoming ‘bourgeois’. However, Cohen and Arato 
maintain that their version of civil society can offer some lead out of the impasse of the 
debates that dominate political theory. I will turn briefly to look at the validity of these claims.
The first task for Cohen and Arato here is the synthesis of the normative core of 
participatory models of democracy with the institutional requirements of modem complex 
societies. But this amalgam will only reproduce a vitiated expression of its core, subsumed 
under the 'realist' accommodation of the demands of efficiency. Although ‘conceding some 
terms to the pluralist school of elite democratic theory’, they reject their own inclusion on the
grounds of differences in key areas: “[they] do not accept the view that the ‘civic culture’ 
most appropriate to a modem civil society is one based on civil privatism and political 
apathy”.12 However, their claims that their ‘revision of the private’ can avoid the dangers 
inherent in neo-conservatism and the fragmentation of civil society are ill-founded. Their 
revision of ‘the private’ is more a relocation of it from institutions to the human 
consciousness. “The two sets of public and private dichotomies, one at the level of subsystems 
(state/economy), allow a distinction between two meanings of privatization and 
‘publicization’”,13 and one of the consequences of this distinction is that “ ... economic 
liberalization [does not] logically mean the erosion of public and private spheres”14. But if we 
understand the notion of ‘private’ in Cohen and Arato’s model as privacy in the civil society 
theme of individual self-development and moral choice, and take Poland again as the test case, 
we can see that this erosion is very much a consequence. The most obvious criticism to make 
is that little consideration of some of the most hierarchically structured and discreet systems of 
authority within ‘the economy’ as part of the democratic project inevitably means less 
participation; consequently there is less of the normative component of the participatory 
models, and more the efficiency of the realist model. Any immanently derived will to 
democracy becomes stifled and substituted with an emphasis on legality and 'rights' that, in 
their privatistic exercise, subvert the whole democratic project that motivates civil society.
The second of the perennial problems of political theory with which civil society has to 
contend is the matter of whether freedom is to be pursued from an individually or a socially 
located starting point of analysis. The argument that Cohen and Arato offer is that the political 
implications, of rights-based liberalism and democratic forms of communitarianism, are not 
antithetical even though their philosophical origins are very distinct. They contend that “what 
is best in rights-oriented liberalism and democratically oriented communitarianism constitutes
12 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p.35
13 ibid.p.430
12
two mutually reinforcing and partly overlapping sets of principles”.15 Their theory claims a 
subscription to universal principles, which underpin rights discourse, without having to 
subscribe to an individualist ontology. I will dispute this claim in chapter 1 by arguing that 
their idea of ‘moral consciousness’ is just that. Their universality rests on the regulative 
principles of rational public debate.
What we have then is an embedded individual rights bearer whose capacity to rationally 
communicate with others makes good his or her claim to the validity of those rights. But their 
theory rests on the ability of an individual to transcend its environment and recognise the 
unconscionable in its conflict with law. The ‘politics of influence’ of Cohen and Arato’s civil 
society has to depend on similar assumptions made, more explicitly, by those who advocated a 
‘politics of conscience’.16 Their argument rests on two assumptions: the existence of an aspect 
of consciousness that ‘independently’ reflects on law, or more complete, on social norm and 
the foundation of tradition; and that there is sociological means for sufficient democratic 
counterweight to a proliferation of ‘rights’ that is characteristic of the privatised societies of 
‘developed political systems’. But one only has to look as far as the ‘first generation” of the 
United Nations charter to see how the ‘hidden positive duties’ attached to rights of the 
‘freedom from’ variety are barely given an acknowledgement. Or to Poland to see how an 
‘escalation’ of rights within a society can erode the necessary democratic 'overlap' that might 
arise from a discourse of rights that emphasises ‘freedom to’.
Their claim to some reconciliation of the third pre-occupying debate in political theory is 
not well founded either. This involves the relatively new antinomies of the statist/neo­
conservative debate. They are keen to distance themselves from the neo-conservative 
argument by stressing their objections in two key areas. Firstly, they agree that “certain 
features of the welfare state fragment collectivities, destroy horizontal solidarities, isolate and
14 ibid.
15 ibid. p.27
13
render private individuals dependent on state apparatuses”17 but they also recognise that
1Runrestrained capitalist expansion has the same destructive consequences . The second key 
difference refers to ‘tradition’ and its central role in the political dimension of the neo­
conservative remedy. They refer in their thesis to a ‘post-traditional civil society’ that is 
founded on a ‘post-traditional relation to tradition’, but never elaborate this, what sounds like 
a post-modernist, relation.
Problematically for Cohen and Arato, in the first key difference, their conceptual 
framework cannot challenge the direction towards the market that their model would 
inevitably take. These limitations will become implicitly as well as explicitly clear during the 
course of this thesis. But broadly, their reliance on legally enshrined rights as the basis of their 
understanding of civil society provides the conceptual foundations for ‘the market’, and its 
maintenance in ‘developed political systems’.
In their second objection to the ‘neo-conservative remedy’ Cohen and Arato are altering 
the very conception of tradition and how we relate to it. Instead of ‘bowing’ to it as a 
legitimating principle of stability and ‘govemability’ in the neo-conservative prescripton, 
there emerges, in Cohen and Arato’s civil society, a ‘critical and reflective relation to 
tradition’. Habermas’s rationalised lifeworld, a product of the modernisation process, has by 
communicatively grounded interaction opened up the ‘sacred core’ of traditions, norms, and 
authorities. It is true to say that parts of this ‘sacred core’ are not intrinsic or peculiar to 
capitalist economy. Indeed, the idea that patriarchy, for example, as a structure of power 
integral to capitalist power structures is no longer, if it ever was, tenable. But this fails to 
recognise capitalist-consumer economy as part of this ‘sacred core’; it comes to be seen as a 
mechanism for a critical and reflective relation to tradition, rather than a subject for critical 
reflection.
16 V.Havel ‘Politics and Conscience’ in Open Letters op.cit
17 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p.25
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Cohen and Arato offer a prescription before identifying the hegemonic culture of 
consumer-capitalism that is easily accommodated by and indeed provides the conditions for 
the application of the neo-conservative remedy. Their solution is founded on legality: to
guarantee the autonomy of the modem state and economy while simultaneously protecting 
civil society from destructive penetration and functionalisation by the imperatives of these two 
spheres”.19 The maintenance of ‘society’ (that is its defence not the control of) by legal means 
runs counter to the development of civil society as radically democratic idea. Legality is the 
discursive legitimating mechanism of the state in ‘developed political systems’. The 
discourses of legality contribute to the political alienation of ‘developed political systems’. It 
is problematic for democracy in a number of ways including its replacement as the means of 
accountability of government, and moral underwriting of action at the levels of both the state 
and the self.
The revised theory of civil society that Cohen and Arato offer is likely to contribute little 
to radical democratic extension through the institutions of civil society. This revision 
establishes a philosophical framework to provide a political ethic that can articulate the claims 
of rights oriented liberalism and of radical democracy. It then revises the conception of civil 
society as the private sphere, so that the implications of such an ethic can materialise. The 
framework is constructed from a defence of discourse ethics “as a political ethic and as a 
theory of democratic legitimacy and basic rights”20, the only means available to reconcile, 
they argue, the claims of rights-based and democratic discourses. Its purpose is to complement 
already existing forms of democracy and not to replace them; to apply the idea of the public 
sphere to (influential) political effect. Where civil society refers to rights, of privacy, publicity 
(free expression), and (formal-legal) equality, the role of discourse ethics is to provide the 
counterweight of legitimate democratic principles. As Cohen and Arato put it “ the
18 ibid.
19 ibid  p.25
15
rediscovery of the key components of civil society by contemporary collective actors, 
however, does not in itself imply its normative justification. The projects of social movements 
are hardly self-validating”.21 ‘Discourse ethics’ is, then, pivotal in its task of limiting the 
tyrannies that develop in the power structures of society itself, particularly those aspects of 
publicity that fuel them.
The peculiarity claimed by discourse ethics as a political ethic that distinguishes itself 
from other forms of political legitimation is that it focuses on “the normative necessity and 
empirical possibility of democratisation in civil society”22. Here Cohen and Arato defend 
representative democracy as the most accommodating model for the democratisation of civil 
society as ‘the only feasible means of will formation’. All existing forms of democratic 
procedure can be complemented, and in themselves democratised further, when subject to 
discourse ethics but they are not replaced by the outcome. There are two links between 
discourse ethics and its supplementing of ‘existing democracy’, and civil society. Firstly, 
“civil society and the existing forms of representative democracy politically and juridically 
presuppose one another”23, and secondly, an “institutionalised plurality of democracies”24 can 
only be conceived in civil society. Characteristic of modem civil societies and representative 
democracies is a ‘political society’ that mediates between the two by means of principally the 
public sphere and voluntary associations.
Representative democracy may be the most effective framework of settling disputes that 
arise within society, although the authority of this representation is legally rather than 
democratically grounded. The whole process of reaching a consensus is dependent on the 
‘condition’ of the public domain whose channels of communication determine the agendas to 
be settled. This is clearly problematic for ethical- discourse. Moreover, self-limitation means
20 ibid
21 ib id  p.428
22 ibid  p. 103
23 ibid  p.23
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that it cannot, as can the steering mechanism of money, issue enough momentum in the public 
domain for its proposed actions to make a necessary transition to a 'politics of influence'. 
Coupled to this claim is that modem civil society potentially democratises representative 
democracy itself: “This is in line with the tendency of discourse ethics to defend existing 
forms of democracy while simultaneously demanding further democratisation” . But this 
tendency must hold up against the ‘logical’ power behind the intellectually accessible appeals 
of the ‘cultural production’ of the public domain. The political implications of this production 
will be examined in Chapter 2, and seen as an impediment to any developing ethical discourse 
in the ‘public sphere’ (reconsidered), and further elaborated in Chapter 3 as the impediment to 
its expression in ‘social movement’. A criticism to make here of discourse-ethics, so applied, 
is that the political legitimacy Cohen and Arato seek for their model externalises its 
democratic element. It sets the terms upon which an abstracted rational agreement can be 
reached. This position neglects the democratic component of solidarity that inheres in civil 
society itself. It becomes effectively the legitimating ethic of a ‘politics of influence’ that can 
only reflect the divisions of society based on a politics of identity. This particular problem is 
an important part of the argument of Chapter 3, where I will critically examine the concept of 
‘identity’ as part of the overall critique of the paradigm of the ‘new social movement’ 
(N.S.M.).
Democratisation in terms of civil society sets up two points of concern for Cohen and 
Arato: what the structural possibilities of and limits to democratisation are, specific to each 
space (political, economic, and civil society); and the pluralisation of democratic forms within 
each space. ‘Direct’ democratic models are rejected as incapable of allowing the steering 
mechanisms of the state and the economy to function effectively. Direct participation at the 
state level is precluded by the requirements of due process and efficiency (“at most,
24 ibid
25 ibid  p.97
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participants can work at this level indirectly through party and parliamentary supervision, 
control, and publicity -  in other words, through the institutions of political society”. Here the 
principle of self-limitation must be applied, and the tendency of discourse ethics toward 
further democratisation must be curbed. Similarly with the economic system; the 
democratising process must be self-limiting as Cohen and Arato warn that “ ... the 
requirements of efficiency and market rationality can be disregarded in the name of 
democracy only at the cost of both”27. The institutionalisation of various forms of democracy 
within the economic sphere ought not go beyond the point at which “efficient steering is 
threatened”28. Democracy itself becomes subject to the demands of the efficiency of material 
accumulation. The efficiency required for the meeting of needs becomes indistinguishable 
from the efficiency of the production of choice. It is to the institutions of culture and 
communication (publicity) and its dominant cultural norms that we must look to ascertain the 
sorts of levels of importance attached to ‘efficiency’, and at what it is we want to be 
‘efficient’. Of concern is ‘the uncontrollable economy’ (of economic globalisation and 
expansion of the market into all aspects of life); it comes to be perceived as a ‘mechanism for 
democratisation’. This problem of ‘economy’ for civil society is dealt with in Chapter 2 in the 
discussions on ‘the public domain’ and the narrowing of the democratic vision by confining 
terms of reference to material access to it. These limits to the democratisation of the economy 
(and state), however, “would be partly compensated for by the democratisation of social 
associations that can indirectly influence the state and economy as well”29. Constant rational 
scrutiny of these associations can promote not only a more democratic local government, but 
can also nurture a wider ‘democratic political culture’. But apart from anything else, this
26 ibid  p.365
27 ibid
28 ibid
29 ibid  p.372
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culture is an inseparable question from determining a ‘more democratic government’ at any 
level.
Their revised model of civil society, Cohen and Arato claim, is capable of addressing 
number of crucial theoretical problems. Its claims, for instance, as a product of modernity, to a 
‘post-traditional relation to tradition’ stems from a rationalised lifeworld which subjects 
traditional norms to rational scrutiny on variously reflexive levels. The democratic revolution 
‘goes on’ and is deepened in this fashion. Certainly the breaking down of cultural and social 
‘standards’ is characteristic of the ‘crisis of absolutes’ in modem capitalist societies, but the 
inroads made in the different spheres by democracy is asymmetrical. The most salient instance 
of this is the emancipation of women, where the pace of change varies from the rapidity and 
successes of the ongoing sexual revolution at the social level to the glacial speed of change in 
the political and economic spheres. (This point will be returned to in more detail in chapter 3 
on Plurality).
Cohen and Arato’s thesis seriously underestimates the effect that ‘the economy’ has on 
civil society, or can have on its possible development. It matters little that the problem (of 
‘economy’) can be abstractly set aside when:
... the danger lies in the fact that the totalising logic and the coercive power of 
capitalism become invisible, when the whole social system of capitalism is reduced to 
one set of institutions and relations among many others, on a conceptual par with 
households or voluntary associations. Such a reduction is, in fact, the principle 
distinctive feature of ‘civil society’ in its new incarnation. Its effect is to conceptualise 
away the problem of capitalism, by disaggregating society into fragments, with no 
overarching power structure, no totalising unity, no systemic coercions -  in other words, 
no capitalist system, with its expansionary drive and its capacity to penetrate every 
aspect of social life.30
This point is well made. Although there is a tendency in it to reduce the analysis of power 
structures to ‘the economy’ even if we can find in E.M. Wood’s comments a tendency toward
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an economistic analysis of power structures. The threat to civil society (at least the kind that 
Cohen and Arato envisage) from the culture of the market as an inevitable product of 
‘capitalist democracies’ is nonetheless well summed up in the phrases ‘expansionary drive’ 
and ‘capacity to penetrate every aspect of social life’
The aim of Chapter 1 is to reconstruct the understanding of privacy; or perhaps re-affirm 
its literal translation of self-development and moral choice. The chapter will begin by 
assessing the legitimacy, both substantive and normative, of the concept of ‘the private’. The 
argument then goes on to show how this complex, and sometimes contradictory, concept of 
property ownership, underlines the condition of the intimate sphere, and ultimately the course 
of self-development. I will develop the critique of ‘the private’ by following its logical course 
of sociological and political development. The notion of ‘the private’, as Salvador Giner 
points out, “ ... becomes the most characteristic achievement of a sound and strong civil 
society” yet an excess of it ‘depoliticizes democracy’.31 This ‘excess of privacy’ will be 
considered here as a ‘privatism’. The question cannot be addressed fully without proper 
assessment of the public domain, and the discussion overlaps with that of chapter 2. It may be 
more logical to examine the public domain before presenting ‘privatism’ as an obstacle to 
democratic expansion; either cause, if they are wholly separable, originates there.
The manifold processes of ‘privatism’, form one of the more formidable ‘enemies’ of civil 
society’.32 They are the basic cultural currents and practices of ‘developed political systems’ 
in effecting the idea of the development of the self as a ‘private affair’. A fetishised 
conception of ‘the private’ has enveloped privacy and effectively prevented its development 
both ontologically and politically. Stripped of its reified status the concepts ‘the private’ is on 
a different trajectory to self-development, if they are not entirely contradictory. Politically,
30 E.Meiksins W ood D em ocracy Against Capitalism  Cambridge University Press 1995 p.241
31 S.Giner Mass Society London. Martin Robertson. 1976 p.47
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and in terms conducive to civil society -  that is ‘ethico-politically’, ‘the private’ de-politicises 
society, thus denying the possibility of retaining anything much of the normative core of 
democratic theory.
There are questions to be asked of privacy that can only be raised at an abstracted level: Is 
there any validity attached to a concept of ‘the private’ that can withstand a critical inquiry 
into the substantiveness ascribed to it? Or put another way, can there be, as an actual sphere of 
social relations, an objectivity from which to claim rights? If the answer is ‘no’, then the other 
objection to raise against ‘the private’, on the normative grounds of its desirability, would then 
seem redundant. But this is not the case. Even if there is no objective foundation to ‘the 
private’, it commands a ‘reality’ in ‘developed political systems’ that requires examination for 
its fitness for an application of the idea of civil society. Included in this critique of ‘the 
private’ are references to feminist perspectives, which highlight some of its more the 
repressive effects.
The definition of ‘the private’ is revised in Cohen and Arato’s model rejects the 
‘oppositional’ perspective. The more orthodox bifurcation of public and private is a ‘spatial 
metaphor from which we cannot reason’,”[i]nstead, we must start from the assumption that 
privacy attaches to the individual in certain capacities (as an autonomous moral subject”.33 
But this is a mistaken assumption of ontology that afflicts the development of civil society 
theories like theirs from ‘moving beyond’ the kind of ‘reformism’ they condemn,34 (and to 
whose discourses they can only contribute).
By way of introducing ‘the subject’/se//into the discussion, I will look at this question of 
ontology from a discussion of conscience to underline the problematic nature of ‘the self’ in 
academic civil society discourse. The notion of ‘conscience’ is varyingly explicit in some of 
the earlier East European discourses on civil society as basic to the opposing the ‘The
32 See J.A.Hall (ed.) Civil Society-.Theory,History and Comparison Cambridge. Polity 1995
33 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p.430
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Method’35 of the communist state, and developing a kind of politics qualitatively different 
from the liberal representative variety in the ‘developed political systems’ of the West.
The argument will develop in Chapter 1 by examining the distortion of privacy as 
‘privatism’. The roots of this development lie in the philosophical heritage of conjoining 
property (as ‘private’) and self-development (as freedom). I will look at Hegel’s doctrine of 
property to establish this link, and argue that this ‘embodiment of external objects’ (as part of 
an ethical process, originating in ‘the family’ and resurrected by ‘corporations’ and ‘estates’) 
cannot provide the foundation for the development of civil society as an ethical ideal. There is 
a general division among the studies of the phenomenon of privatism. There are those that see 
it from an ideological perspective, and those who see it as a retreat from the loss of public 
spaces and institutions. But I find no reason why the two perspectives cannot be drawn from 
simultaneously to clarify what is in fact a ‘symbiotic’ relation. In Chapter 2 I will approach 
this problem from the perspective of the domination of the public domain by the state and, 
particularly, ‘the market’.
In the latter part of Chapter 1 I will employ the Gramscian concept of ‘intellectual and 
moral reform’.37 This ‘reform’ is representational of ‘an autonomous moral subject’ but it is 
not conceptually and actually dependent upon this individualist account of agency. It 
represents what the psychiatrist Victor E. Frankl describes as being the ‘last of the human 
freedoms’ -  that is, a change of one’s own attitude. Intellectual and moral reform must entail 
receptivity to (public) discourses that reflect the contingent nature of social formations (and 
‘who we are’). An awareness of the possibility of such reform may be experienced as a 
cognitive dissonance regarding one’s own position in society, or of the necessity of one’s own
34 ibid  p.26
35 This is how Czeslaw M iloscz refers to dialectical materialism and its omniscience in all matters on human 
inquiry. C.M ilosz The Captive Mind London. Vintage Books. 1988
36 Proponents o f the former view would include Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci; o f the latter, Jurgen 
Habermas and Andre Gorz.
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actions, or the value of one’s own priorities. Thus a ‘change in attitude’ is not by course an 
ethical progression. Certain ‘directions’ to this re-form must be taken if its to be the 
‘consciousness’ of applied, or ‘living the life espoused by the idea of’, civil society. 
Unequivocally this reform must direct itself away from ‘the private’ as the primary informant 
of a socio-cultural base to society, and embrace a ‘public’ conception of self and development.
The concern of Chapter 2 is essentially this public domain. I will try to theorise the 
normative elements of publicity as the required condition of ‘the public sphere’. This sphere 
reflects the ethico-political discourse of civil society, as social movement. It is not, therefore, a 
site, but is, rather, a ‘content’ of specific tendencies. It is important to distinguish such a mode 
of discourse from the entanglement of publicity in its wider sense. The hegemonic culture and 
communication of the public domain retains elementary features of ‘the private’: from the 
ownership of media as private property to the ‘privacy ’ of culturally constructed conducts that 
manifest in privatism. The first part of the Chapter dissociates the term ‘publicity’ from the 
notion of ‘political publicness’, and certainly from what the ‘public sphere’ requires as a 
normative understanding. The ‘public sphere’ must reach a certain level of normative criteria if 
it is to be conceptually lifted from the wider public domain. Once the concept of the ‘public 
sphere’ has been established, the Chapter will go on to consider its political application. Some 
of the points raised here concern themselves directly with the question of the relation between 
civil society and the state, and so overlap onto the subject of Chapter 4 on legality.
I will consider Habermas’s ‘core-periphery’ model of democracy that provides a 
framework for a ‘politics of influence’, but it is flawed before any criticism regarding the 
‘state-civil society’ relation can be mounted. A ‘crisis of conscience’ at the ‘periphery’ 
translates as political apathy and disinterest that denies any pretensions to a participatory form 
of democracy. It reduces its ‘core’ to the ‘limit’ of democracy as a realist model, such as is the
37 A.Gramsci Selections from  Prison Notebooks Q.Hoare and G.Nowell-Smith (eds and trans.) London. Lawrence
& Wishart. 1971
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established institution of ‘developed political systems’. Attempted up-dating of Habermas’s 
public sphere, following developments in information and communication technology fails to 
understand the democratic idea inherent in civil society discourse. It may extend the (political) 
choices available to the subject as voter (or consumer), but it does not, in this narrow fashion at 
least, deepen the idea of democracy as something to be assumed rather than consumed. It must 
be clear, however, that these technological advances are not, for the sake of the idea of civil 
society, to be dismissed as the product of an ‘alien’ or ‘inhuman’ rationality and therefore 
antipathetic to civil society. Indeed they are essential to its realisation. Ambivalence over the 
development of public communications is nothing new. The political implications of the 
development of cinematography caused a divide in the prognoses for democratic development.
Parallels must be made concerning the contemporary development of communications and 
media cartels. A substantial part of the Chapter is given to focusing on the communication and 
cultural production of the ‘public domain’, in the condition of ‘developed political systems’, 
and its implications for democracy, and so for civil society. The conclusions reached on 
discussions of ‘cultural production’ and access to it in the public domain does not, however, 
provide much of an optimistic platform from which to herald the development of civil society. 
Whilst interests remain at the ‘economic-corporate’ level of consciousness, the ‘ethico- 
political’ foundations of a ‘normatively necessary’38 civil society cannot be laid.
Any prescriptive political theory must include an assessment of what is feasible 
sociologically, according to its own normative criteria. Cohen and Arato identify this element 
in their own theory thus: “Social movements constitute the dynamic element in processes that
O Q
might realise the positive potentials of modem civil societies”. Chapter 3, on plurality, will 
examine this dynamic and argue it is better understood as social, or democratic, movement 
rather than as specified social movements based on ‘economic-corporate’ categories of
38 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p.23
39 ibid  p.492
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‘identity’. To this end, the Chapter begins with an examination of the social relations as 
described in the category of Plurality (families, informal associations ...). ‘The family’ is of 
particular importance here as it is, as the ‘intimate sphere’, the source of communicatively 
based desirable ethical relations. But it is not just its patriarchal or bourgeois form that is 
problematic here (for Hegel this formation was ‘the ideal’ anyway), it is the privatisation, 
rather than an ethical grounding, of social relations that this intimate sphere effects. A critical 
assessment of the relations of the ‘intimate sphere’ shorn of all ‘traditional’ connotation, 
shows it to be antithetical to the public nature of privacy.
The ‘ethical root’ of civil society must be sought elsewhere; in social relations that are 
‘public’ in their origin and identifiably ‘ethico-political’. The Chapter will move on to 
establish the important differentiation of social movement and social movements. With 
reference to the New Social Movement paradigm, I will first differentiate between freedom o f 
association and freedom to associate. The development of the freedom o f association reflects 
the development of social movement into an ‘ethico-political’ category. Following a brief 
overview of social movement theory, I will focus on Cohen and Arato’s analysis of the ‘dual- 
organisational logic’ of new social movements. It is their view that the relation of ‘new’ 
movements to their predecessors is of less importance to our understanding of them than their 
relation to contemporary civil (and political) society. Their treading of a fine line may 
recognise the tensions between ‘the political’ and ‘the cultural’ but does little to resolve them. 
The principal lesson from any historical link with ‘old’ movements (and here we/they are 
talking about the labour movement) is that the political process of mediation failed the 
aspirations of the original movement, a point completely missed it seems by Cohen and 
Arato’s ‘politics of influence’. This in mind, the hierarchical and bureaucratic inevitability 
that stage theory pessimistically resigns itself to appears to be accurate. ‘Movement
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development’ is denied by the consolidation of its own (‘economic-corporate’) identity within 
the established and formal political framework, however much its influence might be.
Much of the literature on this ‘secondary’ question tends toward the view that the social 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s were in a number of ways qualitatively different - a new 
phenomenon. Against this current, Craig Calhoun argues that the links have not been given 
due recognition, nor has the importance of more peripheral movements (religious; 
abolitionists; women’s) been adequately stressed.40 There is, I shall maintain in this part of the 
chapter, a link, although differing in identity and context, which represents an ethical lineage 
in the form of democratic struggle.
But even if we eschew this relation with the ‘old’, the relation of social movements to civil 
society in the framework of Cohen and Arato is still problematic, for two reasons. First, (in 
their own terms of reference) it does not allow for social movements to ‘cross over’ from the 
lifeworlct1 and subsequently does not make clear what the civil/political society ‘mediating’ 
link is. The second problem, a corollary of the first, is the estrangement of civil society actors 
from their political representatives. The strategy, or rather principle, of ‘dual-logic’, principle 
that inheres in the N.S.M.’s ‘thematization of their own newness’42 is, according to Cohen and 
Arato, the resolution to this problem, or at its least is a significant advance towards it. Their 
claim is that the N.S.M.s (and here they are talking about the American feminist movement) 
have provided the analytical basis for rejecting the linear development of stage theory. But 
where this ‘thematization’ is supposed to involve a ‘fluidity of labour’ (actors crossing the 
civil/political divide) that prevents the fatal hierarchy of stage theory, it is a matter of 
empirical accuracy that political representation of civil society actors is viewed as being one
40 C.Calhoun ‘ ‘New Social M ovem ents’ o f the Early Nineteenth Century’ in K.Nash (ed.) Readings in 
Contem porary P olitical Sociology Oxford. Blackwell. 2000.
41 J.L.Cohen & A. Arato op.cit p.354
42 ibid.
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of estrangement, and the only feasible conception of a ‘politics of influence’ is the one that fits 
‘developed political systems’.
The Chapter will conclude with perhaps its most difficult task, that of grasping the ‘ethico- 
political’. The difficulty is compounded by its essential quality of being without definition by 
way of any formalised ideologies. Its terms of reference demand that core categories of moral 
political theory are ‘turned inside out’ so that any normative elements can be discerned 
properly. Defining the term negatively against the category of the ‘economic-corporate’ is 
obviously a first step by forming at least an impression of what it is not. I will offer a 
theoretical interpretation of this Gramscian concept that offers a more accurate normative 
requirement of social movement than the N.S.M. paradigm, and reflects more accurately the 
forms of social movement in ascendance at the beginning of the 21st century.
The critique of legality in Chapter 4 must not be confined and subsequently confused as a 
critique of law and the practices and institutions of the state legal order in ‘developed political 
systems’. Legality involves discourses that go beyond the precision of the positivist and 
rational form of law it represents. The legal language of objectivity and authority is 
transformed into a language of moral justification and guideline to conscionable action. The 
very concept of legality can ensure a political allegiance as well as democracy. The Bush 
presidency is legitimate because of legality rather than democracy even as an attenuated 
quantifiable system of voting. In this particular instance, the legal ‘precision’ may not have 
been fully understood by the majority of the electorate but its verdict was to enough legitimise 
a government in the ‘most developed’ of all political systems. Such a mystification cannot be 
accommodated by the transparency demanded by the idea of civil society.
The chapter will start by establishing an understanding of ‘law’, to ascertain what, if 
anything, sets it apart from rules. For insight into the role that ‘law’ (as legality) plays in the 
lives of subjects of ‘developed political systems’. Preliminary to an investigation of ‘law’ is
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the question of ‘the subject of law’. The ‘subject of law’ is not necessarily a human person. It 
can include impersonal categories such as corporations, and factional groups and identities in 
society such as recognised minorities who are ascribed specific legal rights as categories of 
‘the subject of law’. ‘The family’ is another subject of law; indeed, in its bourgeois form, 
founded on a marriage recognised by the public power (God, legal statute, etc.), is an 
institution created by law. But, for a critique of law that is interested in its impact on social 
i relations, the investigation of ‘the subject of law’ must be focused on the self.
A materialist theory of law that can account for the authority it holds as part of the
i
j consciousness is required. Legality is a discursive authority that provides the state legal 
apparatus its legitimacy as ‘public power’. This is where ‘law’ departs from ‘rules’, but not in 
an inherently different or qualitative way. It is more a superiority of authority in its extent than 
an intrinsic differentiation. A substantial part of the Chapter is given to a critical analysis of 
the discourses of legality. Rights, justice, neutrality etc. are all presented as incorporated in the 
‘legal-ideal’. The Chapter will then examine the problematic relation between civil society (as 
ethico-political social movement) and legality (as form of public power or authority).
It is on the question of the self that a critique of the normative assumptions of civil society 
begins and ends. The future development of democracy, if there is to be any, depends on this 
question. Democratic theory and civil society theory are being forced by the conditions of 
politics in ‘developed political systems’ to converge. The political alienation that characterises
I
these systems at the beginning of the 21st century suggests that we need to reconsider and re- 
conceive much of what is thought to be the footings of ‘democracy’ -  in generic categories: 
privacy, publicity, plurality, and legality. But many of these conceptions, inherited from the 
| liberal tradition are, in their actuality, limiting to the expansion of democracy. Civil society, in 
all its variegated forms of contextual specificity, the only possible aspect of society that can
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accommodate a radical form of democracy that is an assumption of power in society, and not 
merely expanded in ‘political society’. A democratic civil society becomes political society.
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Chapter 1
Privacy
(A Domain of Self-Development and Moral Choice)
The definition of privacy in civil society theories as the domain of individual self­
development and moral choice is scant as a justification of the concept as a normative element 
of a radically democratised and ‘post-traditional civil society’.1 A more thoroughgoing 
understanding of its constitution is required if it is to provide this society with one of its 
ethical bases. First and foremost, it is important to distinguish the concept of privacy from ‘the 
private’. The latter is common currency in social and political theory but is an anachronistic 
and inapplicable concept that cannot reflect the reality it claims, neither can it withstand a 
critical inquiry into its desirability. Cohen and Arato concur with the first part at least; they 
correctly point out that: “One cannot reason from a spatial metaphor or division among 
institutions to designate the boundary between private and public, between what should be left 
to the moral choice or personal judgement of individuals and what should be legally 
regulated”.2
However, the attachment to individuals, that is this interpretation, is not unproblematic. 
Firstly, the proposition that we must start from the assumption that privacy attaches to the 
‘individual as an autonomous moral subject’ presumes an autonomy that is derived from an 
individualist ontology (that Cohen and Arato claim to reject) and condemns civil society 
theories to an idiosyncratic version of liberalism. I will consider the problematic notion of 
moral autonomy as a critique of the concept of ‘conscience’ that was an important original 
element of civil society theories, but its political application is/was negligible since this ethical
1 J.L. Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p. 14
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dimension has been inadequately theorised. Any political application of such 'agency' is 
doomed by the very nature of its ontological misrepresentation; the subsequent neglect of 'the 
subject' consequently overlooks the cultural conditions that are either 'appropriate'3 or 
otherwise.
The reconstruction of 1privacy in this chapter challenges fundamentally the notion of 
moral autonomy. First, I will show that 'privacy' viewed as an objective and substantive 
category is unsustainable; that there is no basis to what is traditionally considered to be 
'private', and then go on to show that its 'reality' exists only as a part of a reified 
consciousness. The second important consideration of 'privacy' (as interpreted/translated as 
'the private') is its 'negativity' from a political perspective of furthering the cause of 
democracy. Indeed it could be the arbiter of action that is neither sympathetic nor conducive 
to a society that has radically democratic aspirations. Secondly, legal demarcation is not 
equipped to counter the threat to civil society posed by a deformed version of privacy 
(certainly an 'inadequate' one) in the form of privatism. If privacy is to serve as a core 
normative category of civil society then there are interpretations of its precise meaning to be 
reviewed, some of which lend themselves to a political application that has no part to play in 
the ‘ongoing project of democratisation’, and some of whose distortions will actively prevent 
the necessary ‘political culture’ for such a vision.
The development of the space for the ‘exercise’ of a 'reconsidered' privacy is not within 
some ‘private sphere’, but is in the social milieu: the realm of moral ‘choice’ and self­
development. But this requirement is undermined by two interlocking processes that form 
‘privatism’. To claim that privatism is a deformation of privacy is not only an 
acknowledgement of the conceptual legitimacy of the latter, but also requires some definition 
from which to measure the legitimacy of the claim. In other words, rather than a diversion
2 Ibid  p.352
31
from some ontology that is 'natural' or 'correct' for human being, it is a development away from 
the necessary conditions of a radical democracy, although it would be fair to say that these are 
inextricable. As privacy has been allocated a subjective category, rather than as a term that 
applies, as in its common understanding, to objective sociological spheres and relations, a 
critique of this common understanding will be followed by a contribution toward its 
reformulation and reconstruction. From this a working definition of privacy will be deployed 
as a means of analysing privatism as a deformation. An unavoidable task in the compilation of 
this definition is an exposition of ‘the self’, or ‘the subject’ of what it is that is being developed 
and making moral ‘choices’ (and the ramifications for morality, or ‘a moral tendency’).
If privacy is to lock the compound normative unity that civil society theories point to, 
then its precise meaning must be identified. For this it is necessary to debunk some of the 
'givens', that are in fact confusions of self-identity, associated with the contingent categories 
of 'the private'. The main proposition of this chapter, following the conclusions reached on 
the initial investigation of 'the private'/privacy, is then that civil society as a radical political 
project must dispense with the notion of 'the private' as idealised in liberal theory. It can only 
command a normative basis if it is understood as (part of the) consciousness, and then 
measured in terms of the extent of its (public) resistance to reification and assimilation.
To establish this end, the chapter is split roughly into three parts. The first part deals 
with the question of 'the private' (privacy) in its un-reconsidered form and questions first its 
substantiveness, and then its desirability. Despite the former proving to be without foundation, 
the latter part of the question is still of critical relevance to civil society. I will look at the 
philosophical legacy of 'the private' paying particular attention to the inextricable links it has 
with property and 'the self. The focus here will be on Hegel's doctrine of property which gives 
insight into the contemporary 'reality' of 'the private' and its ideological/cultural impact on 'the
3 ibid
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self. Following this, I will offer an understanding of privacy that is actually inseparable from 
its conceptual antithesis of 'publicness'. Such an interpretation is the only feasible condition 
for the development of civil society and the radical democracy it promises.
I will, by way of examining the (in)adequacy and (in)accuracy of more ‘objective’ 
interpretations of privacy, try to establish that privacy can only conceptualise the narrow 
definition that relates to consciousness (offered by Cohen and Arato). But I will argue that 
consciousness in this context is a construct, and that the ‘individualist ontology’ that civil 
society theories (including Cohen and Arato’s contribution) tend to rely on is neither an 
accurate ontology nor could it be the basis of a radically democratic ‘post-traditional civil 
society’.
An extensive discussion of 'the self, the subject of development as coterminous with 
privacy then follows. Individual moral autonomy is undermined. Without such a basis of 
normative agency, the whole notion of civil society based onb the public nature of the 
reconstructed concept of privacy itself as a political idea is put into doubt. I will go on to 
consider the public 'construction' of 'the self and, crucial cultural development for the political 
development of 'civil society'. The self is an amalgam of cognitive processes whose 
incompatible fixture presents an inconsistent, contradictory, and distorted 'world-view' and 
self-identification. Privacy as reconsidered must entail certain 'ethico-political' developments 
to support the ethic of civil society and commitment to democracy. I will consider Gramsci's 
under-considered concept of 'intellectual and moral reform' as a necessary process toward 
ethico-political development, and offer a specific application of it to 'the self.
The final part of the chapter ties together the conclusions reached on the question of 
'the private' and its relation to 'the self. It deals with the social process or phenomenon that is 
‘privatism’, ultimately leading to political and social exclusion rather than a deepening of 
democracy. It may be that the existential security found in privatism is a frustrated reaction to
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the loss of public space in which to offer this resistance; the spaces required for self­
development and moral choice. This will provide a starting point for the approach to privatism 
in the next chapter. Or it may be that because moral choice and self-development are elastic 
concepts, the effects of certain choices and certain developments are ‘autonomous’ but 
incompatible with public or civic participation, only this time rather than frustratingly 
embraced are ideologically chosen. The latter analysis would at first glance indicate a capacity 
for resistance whose development is beset with difficulties harder to tackle than the more 
structural obstacles to public expression and participation. The differentiation is, I believe, at 
the same time a misplaced yet necessary line of enquiry if the normative status of privacy is to 
be determined and the ‘enemies’ of its (unimpeded) development identified. It is misplaced in 
its oppositional analyses insofar as it misses their symbiotic processes, but, on the other hand, 
an exposition and 'synthesis' of these two perspectives is necessary in providing the means of 
clarifying the links between 'agency' and 'consciousness'. If the ‘autonomy of privacy’ itself is 
to be rejected then an examination of privacy requires an explanation of the dominant forces 
that shape its development, and specifically those which lead to its deformed ‘sanctuary’ or 
‘conclusion’, rather than civil society.
There are two basic questions to ask of 'the private': is it substantive? and is it desirable? 
The general response to these would be in the affirmative on both counts. However, in trying 
to answer them I will establish that substantiveness in terms of objectivity is unsustainable, 
but as a 'reified' concept it commands a 'reality' and then that it is normatively undesirable in a 
number of respects - all of which have direct implications for a radical conception of 
democracy. The concept of 'the private' is not universally recognised; it is specifically related 
to 'developed political systems' - at least it is in these systems that it is itself most developed. 
But we need not declare that 'the private' is a deviation from an ideal ontology; only that it is a 
deviation from a democratic course and as such must have a negative impact on human being.
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There is an understanding of democracy that supports the claim that 'the private' is detrimental 
to the development of democracy.4 Not only is democracy of instrumental value but has an 
intrinsic value. The claim is that to be prevented from participation in political life is a major 
deprivation (the cultural prevention that is privatism would qualify as a means of this 
deprivation). Political and social participation is a crucial component of political freedom, and 
therefore freedom in its wider understanding. I will elaborate this 'participation' further into
i
| the Chapter, for the time being it is enough to propose that social and political participation
j  are one and the same thing and cannot be separable issues of choice for the subject of
! 'developed political systems'.
A serious challenge to the concept of 'private' has been mounted from a number of 
different perspectives, whether it is valid regardless of any possible moral content attached, 
i The obvious point from which analyses of 'the private' (or privacy) start is that which is
opposed to 'the public'; functioning as a form of separation of the individual - by means of 
i restricted access - from others, in the 'public domain'. Privacy claims a realm that is 'shut off
from the rest of the world'. But this claim has little substance to it; such a strictly demarcated 
area does not (and cannot) exist. Any value that is placed on privacy must be reducible to 
| other values which are enabled by it - such as property rights and claims to liberty from state 
regulation. Even in this legalistic reduction of it, 'the private' cannot retain a strict objectivity. 
But more importantly 'the private' has become ideologically ingrained on the consciousness of 
| the subject of a 'developed political system'; fetishised as the protector of these liberties and so
'freedom' itself. It is in this respect that 'the private' can claim its reality.
| Two areas that have been identified as fundamental to an analysis of privacy (‘the
I
private’) are: control over information about oneself; and access to information about oneself.5 
But the feasibility of either is questionable. Moreover there are normative concerns over any
4 Amartya Sen Developm ent as Freedom  Oxford University Press 2001
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control over information about oneself, which I shall come to below. Any objectivity attached 
to 'the private' cannot be constructed from either basis of access or control. It is more likely 
that the value that is attached to it is instrumental, because it enjoins 
legally/culturally/traditionally the exercise of other values. The most obvious of these is the 
exercise of property rights in 'developed political systems', but there are 'privately informed' 
values whose exercise is less obvious, and which is anti-pathetic to any will to become 
democratic.
The restraints placed on sexuality may not have an obvious connection with 
democracy. If this is the case then the conception of democracy that one has in mind has little 
in common with the conception of democracy as an assumption of power from the formal 
political processes of the state. Nor is there much of a link with any notion of democracy 
meaning something like exercising the will to form the conditions of the subject's existence. 
By confining sexuality to the realm of 'the private', the development of an awareness of a 
'public self (a public conception of privacy necessary for a democracy grounded strongly in its 
'core values') is disallowed. Sexuality is perhaps the most responsive aspect of human 
existence that enables the self to accommodate the processes of intellectual moral reform. I 
shall discuss this reform at the end of the Chapter. For now though, this receptivity to the 
possibility of fluidity to all cultural norms is negated. Self-development is severely impeded by 
sexuality being essentially the most 'private' aspect of the self in 'developed political systems'. 
The value of 'the private' in this instance is especially dubious. There is no persuasive 
argument that sexuality is a matter of the utmost private concern. Unless it is instrumental in 
its necessity to the reproduction of certain political values that uphold anti-democratic forms of 
patriarchy in religion, tradition, and 'the family'.
5 J.Innes Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. Oxford University Press 1992
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With regard to access, it is not sustainable as a support for the (objectivity of) 'the 
private'. There is more than a suggestion of contradiction to a need for access in the first place; 
for this the (private) information must have been determined 'publicly'. The most obvious 
example of this is access to medical information about ‘the self’ that must have been diagnosed 
and compiled 'publicly'. A further complication, to the whole question of there being any 
substance to the concept of the 'private' as being defined as something ‘autonomously’ 
accessed and not controlled 'publicly', comes from a recently developed global computer 
surveillance network. (Development of this 'total information awareness' through 
communications technology comes predictably from the U.S. military). Just as the internet was 
the product of American military technological developments in the years of the Cold War, the 
Pentagon has developed a system of ‘Total Information Awareness'.6 What is ironic about this 
development with all its sinister implications is that it intrudes upon 1privacy' that is not subject 
to the power of disclosure by the individual, but 'private' information controlled by government 
(state) and commercial/(economic) databases.7
The second aspect fundamental to privacy!the private is the control over information 
about 'the self. The implication here is that this information is derived from the self, and not 
externally - which makes the question of access irrelevant. However, as it already been shown 
above, the question of access to information about the self (by the self alone) underlines the 
spurious nature of ‘the private’. The ‘fact’ of an exclusive access brings to the fore the 
questions surrounding the desirability of this idea of ‘the private’. The 'information' that could
6 Source: http://www.epic.org
7 Contracts are being offered to private communications industries to research and develop the technological 
capacity to store countless pieces o f information about individuals ( such as lending library records, personal bank 
transactions, and travel records). This development is beyond any pretence o f 'legality'; no search warrants are 
required (the control over which is not held by the individual anyway but by the state). The justification for this is 
predictable in the light o f current American foreign policy. The argument runs: the war against terrorism is global 
therefore the data used in its combat must be 'global' too. It may be the case that such a policy will be given a tacit 
public acceptance given the 'uncertainty' that now prevails as the justification for this war (which beyond the 
largely rhetorical ‘war against terrorism’, is an attack on the individual subject o f society itself). The Guardian 
8/2/01
be so derived is extremely minimal; it could only amount to a 'cognitive-rational' reflection of 
consciousness, whether this reflection is critical or otherwise.
'The private' occupies more than merely an instrumental space, however, in the social 
imaginary; it is an 'end in itself. Its existence is objectified and becomes intrinsic to the 
conditions of self-development. A private realm 'closed off is the theoretical realm of absolute 
negative liberty - the domain of the freedom of the individual, the only agency of 'freedom'. 
But this offers nothing to the furtherance of democracy through civil society - indeed it is a 
philosophy that runs counter to it. The reconsideration of privacy will show that fo r1privacy' to 
fulfil its normative claims, it must be thought of as 'subject' and not 'object'.
The question of whether 'the private' is normatively desirable might now seem 
redundant. But this is not the case. This form of control may appear beyond the reach of 
critical inquiry; its condition of moral ambiguity is not immediately apparent. If we ask the 
question: how much control ought we have over this aspect of privacy (understood as 
information about oneself)? then the answer would likely be 'complete control'. But feasibility 
aside, this is fraught with difficulties. Its 'undesirability' in this case is illustrated by an 
example of 'complete control' where an individual is HIV positive. Does this individual have 
the (moral) right to withhold this information (from a prospective sexual partner)? Or does the 
prospective sexual partner have a (moral) right to access to this information? There must 
surely be a moral case for the prospective partner in this instance, where information about 
another individual could make a claim that would appear to have the same moral footings 
which underpin the argument for the right of control over disclosure. If this access is to refer to 
a domain that, 'by right', automatically commands respect for its inherent moral nature, then 
we can dismiss it. A further cause for its undesirability is to be found in domestic violence. 
This was for a long time (and still is) testimony to the fact of a private realm.
If we recognise the 'publicly' derived information about a 'self as becoming private 
then the question of its desirability remains relevant. The example above concerning medical 
information about the self, and how access gives it then a 'private' nature in the 'cognitive- 
rational' processes then the moral implications about its control become more apparent. The 
objectivity of 'the private' may have been shown to be unsustainable as a category, but as a 
reified element of consciousness its substantiveness should be in no doubt. By looking at
i
| different aspects of the pervasive culture of 'the private', I will show that this culture provides 
j  an ontology that is at the same time politically alienated and politically 'convenient'.
 ^ There are three main areas of concern although it is impossible to separate them and
look at them in isolation, they are: 'the self; 'the social'; and 'the political'. The function that 
'the private' plays in these aspects of society regarding the furtherance of democracy, it seems 
to me, is wholly negative. The question: How does ‘the private’ affect 'the self’?’ might be 
better put thus: How does the private effect 'the self? (This is an important point in 
determining its desirability). When this question is applied to the second aspect -  ‘the social’ 
i  -  the immediate problem is recognisable enough as the differentiation between ‘bourgeois’
I and ‘civil’ societies. ‘The private’, at a fundamental level, shapes ‘self-development’ and 
‘moral choice’ and subsequently the very cultural condition that civil society theory is at great 
effort to condemn when it is not focusing exclusively on the state (and in some versions its 
distinct separation from society). The effect that ‘the private’ has on social relations is, in a 
simplified way, ‘separation’ from the political, the social, and, ultimately, the self.
The effect that ‘the private’ has then on the political is to support (political) systems 
whose democratic accountability exists only in the flimsy suggestions of it in their own self­
ascribed titles of ‘democracies’. Consequently, the political alienation takes different forms. 
More directly it disenfranchises significant numbers of their populations and, less obviously, 
the understanding of democracy becomes so confused that it is perceived as real and exercised
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in the pursuit of ‘the private life’. That governance which then supports these conditions most 
favourably then becomes accepted as the institutionalised political framework of democracy.
Material interests, the salient feature of developed political systems, ultimately narrow 
the conception of the political through a process of privatism supported by such axiomatic 
props as the identification of self-development with property accumulation. In the unfolding of 
self-consciousness, to use Hegelian language, the human capacity for acquisition has been 
firmly entrenched as rational, inevitable, and right. ‘Ownership’ and ‘identity’ are deeply 
embedded as a conjoined relation; one acquires identity through ownership, where the 
accumulation of property and social status become indistinguishable from the process of self­
development. This relation is perhaps the most deeply rooted ‘given’ in our consciousness, and 
rarely subject to critical questioning. It is in this sense that aspects of our consciousness can be 
said to be ‘false’, because it is recognised as otherwise, that is -  true and immutable. This is 
not to argue that there is a definitively ‘true’ consciousness, rather a consciousness that is not 
false can only be true in the recognition of its own contingency. The ‘givens’ of our 
consciousness present a ‘politics of the achievable’, amounting to a limited political objective 
determined by ‘realism’. Their sturdiness can be illustrated in a ‘non-material’ way also. The 
limitations of concern within a privatised view of life are extended to wider categories whose 
interests can be threatened externally. It describes and explains the potency of national- 
consciousness, inextricably bound up with a (privatised) self-consciousness, and the 
willingness of the subject to submit to certain self-imposed abrogation in the cause of that 
significant and powerful part of its identity. Consider the paradox that is the pride of the 
professed ‘internationalist’ in a fellow national who made enormous personal sacrifice for a 
principled internationalist cause in Spain in 1936. A rational admiration is swollen by a pride 
effected by causes that the rational admiration is there to condemn, in this case ‘national
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identity’ and an awareness of the self as part of an exclusive group (whose retention denies 
4 internationalism ’).
In similar fashion, but in a sense reversed, is the occasional defiance of ‘cultural 
rationality’ by the consciousness in racial and sexual terms. Few would admit to race based 
pre-conceived notions, but perhaps fewer are the number who have not internalised various 
myths and lies about different races and cultures. Again, arguments that attempt to maintain 
what are patriarchal assumptions by ‘reason’ are not listened to; they can only be maintained 
by some sort of appeal to ‘the affective’ (however inadequately it may be dressed up as 
‘reason’). That these imperatives are defensible only in terms that are non-rational, insofar as 
their foundational principles are culturally exposed to be illusory, underlines the power of 
ideology and the strength of ‘privatised’ identities that it creates in its informing role of 
constructing worldviews, consciousness, and who we are in what kind of society.
Far from being that aspect of consciousness that can be identified with its ‘conflict with 
law, it can through political manipulation effectively uphold the law through its vulnerability 
to misplaced (or perhaps contingently placed) indignation and protest. This aspect of 
consciousness as that which ‘the private can only be interpreted’8 is contingent upon the 
strength of its own identities, and how the interests of these are threatened externally -  i.e. 
another ‘identity’. Examples of this kind of political manipulation could be seen fairly clearly 
in the discourses of the public domain of the Thatcher reign in the 1980s. To counter the 
social consequences of her governments’ incomes policy of unemployment, the political 
rhetoric of the public domain pointed to the demands of a flexible labour market and who, or 
rather which social groups, were fulfilling those roles and consequently seriously undermining 
the social position of the identity of ‘white male worker’. The requirement of ‘more flexible 
labour’ was provided predominantly by women, ethnic minorities, and disaffected/displaced
8 Cohen and Arato op.cit. p.64
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youth; providing also a misplaced object of ‘protest’/blame against the rapid increase in male 
unemployment in the early 1980s. The blame for unemployment was therefore laid at social 
groups whose ‘primary identity’ posed an external threat to the interests of another more 
powerful economic-corporate identity; that of the ‘white male worker’. For the political 
purposes of Thatcherism the demise of this latter was to be welcomed and encouraged, and the 
distraction of other groups to be promoted and articulated politically as the cause of 
unemployment. The problem for the governments was that many of the cultural assumptions 
that provided the bedrock of their conservative ‘common sense’ also threatened to collapse. It 
was not just the identity derived from a ‘full-time job for life’ culture that was at stake, but 
some of the very foundations of sexual and racial assumptions that culturally fitted better the 
‘more paternal political application’ of capitalism. Its ‘more uncloaked’ version was, 
paradoxically, also dependent on the same assumptions for its ideological supports. Thus the 
contradictions of Thatcherism were exposed by the ‘ongoing cultural revolution’9 for which it 
acted as an economic accelerator.
The important point in this is that, whilst the cultural dominance of an ‘identity’, in this 
case white male worker, proves to be contingent -  the idea of ‘identity’ itself remains. But the 
identity itself of any social movement developing from collective identity locks it into an 
economic-corporate political realm of bargaining where any potential for an ethico-political 
democratic development within civil society is lost. It is not necessarily the law that becomes 
the object of attack from that aspect of consciousness that Cohen and Arato rely on so much. 
Resistance and protest is contingent upon the discourses to which the subject is predominantly 
exposed and receptive, not dependent on a legal affront to a moral consciousness.
To avoid the assumptions made from an ontologically individualist position, as Cohen and 
Arato claim they manage, it is necessary to consider the ‘subject’ or ‘the self’ as a social
9 Ibid p 3 \
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construction. I share the proposition made by Chantal Mouffe that: “A person’s subjectivity 
is itself the locus of multiple possible constructions, according to the different discourses that 
can construct that [social] position”.10 But as this subjectivity is only ‘precariously’ and 
‘provisionally’ fixed, it then follows that the ‘subject’ who is ‘sutured’, to use her Lacanian 
term, at the ‘intersection of various discourses’ will inevitably and primarily become the 
identity of the dominant discourse.
The vulnerability of identities to other more ‘powerful’ discourses is shown by the 
ascendance of ‘consumer identity’ over ‘national identity’, for instance. The universal 
pretensions of consumerism de-stabilises identities based on dubiously moral and mythical 
foundations (like national-consciousness) but they also undermine the cultural context of 
democratic possibility and its development accordingly. For the purposes o f democracy, the 
concept of 'identity' is disfiguring. This disfigurement relates specifically to 'developed 
political systems' where an economic-corporate consciousness of the 'subject'/se// has already 
been established by the rationalising processes that are the regulating effects of legality. (These 
effects will be the greater subject matter of Chapter 4).
The cultural logic of privatism develops the dominant (individuated) identity of 'private 
accumulator', more recognisably 'consumer'. In this way, the consolidation and expansion of 
'consumer' (into areas including those designated by legality such as 'patient' and 'client') as the 
dominant identity of 'developed political systems' is a consolidation and expansion of 'the 
private' itself. The greater the accumulation, the greater is 'the private' condition of existence.
This progression mitigates against the conditions for the development of social relations 
whose orientation is (for the purposes o f democracy) necessarily public, and which are 
regarded as the subject of freedom. (This last condition is raised in Chapter 3 - Plurality - 
where I shall show that it is an important consideration of social relations generally, and social
10 C.Mouffe 'Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy' in K.Nash (ed)
movement as (ethical) agency particularly). Democratic development requires resistance to this 
(or indeed any other) identity consolidation. The boundaries of exclusion to this are at two 
different levels: the exclusion of those denied the private accumulation that founds the identity 
of the self in 'developed political systems; and, by way of defining these systems as 'politically 
developed', the exclusion of political concern to that which promotes 'the private'.
|
The question of why the identity of consumer/private property owning individual is more 
durable, or deeper-rooted, than are other identities must be addressed. It may be the case that a 
person’s subjectivity is not constructed only on the basis of his or her position in the relations 
of production, but it is also the case that the primary ‘subject position’ is materially 
constructed in a society whose organisational principle revolves around consumption rather 
than production.11 Consumption rather than production has become the organising principle 
both of society and individual life. According to Zygmunt Baumann the principle relates to 
moral and functional aspects of society: ‘... individuals are engaged (morally by society, 
functionally by the social system) first and foremost as consumers rather than producers’.12 
The identity of ‘consumer’ is readily assumed in the more affluent capitalist societies of 
‘developed political systems’; certainly this identity would be more recognisable than 
‘producer*. In a ‘consumer society’ by definition, our participation revolves around 
consumption. This corresponds to the main body of the political agenda in the ‘developed’ 
political systems of Western Europe, as opposed to the ‘fledgling democracies’ of the east. 
Where the electoral stakes in western Europe revolve around issues of ‘who gets what’ and 
ultimately levels of taxation, political battle lines in eastern Europe are drawn around issues of 
‘non-material’ interest (such as ethnicity).
Contem porary Readings in Political Sociology Oxford Blackwell 2000 p.296
11 Ibid  p.296
12 Z.Baumann Intimations ofPostmodernity London Routledge 1992 p.49
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The depth of the problem of ‘the private’ and its particular relation with property 
should not be left in doubt. The contemporary public domain is dominated by discourses of 
property, the sovereignty of the consumer (the contemporary ‘property owner’ as enfranchised 
citizen), and wealth accumulation. The private-property relation has weighty philosophical 
pedigree in the Western tradition: normative claims of 'natural right' (Locke); an instrumental 
attribute of 'making for social utility and harmony' (Hume).13 Relations within society are 
geared by the status of property, and Hegel affords it a degree of eminence that gives it a 
central role; possession of a thing does not, in itself, mean that the object has become property. 
For Hegel, its ‘internalisation’ is sine qua non for property status, and thus for the self- 
emancipatory process. Equally important, or more so as I shall attempt to highlight, is the role 
of labour in this process, which he illustrates with the master-slave relation. But there appears 
here a suggestion of incongruence concerning this external realm, where the Idea is given 
‘being’. Through labour, theoretically, the self-emancipatory process is furthered by the will 
externalising the idea without ‘internalising’ a dead object that holds any significance in this 
process other than a means to a creative end. Property, on the other hand, in the Hegelian 
system, by the very fact that it is external to the mind of the individual in its origin must in 
some part determine. This may not compromise freewill in the Hegelian sense. That is, when 
an individual conceives an object he is depriving it of its quality that makes it stand opposed to 
the individual. Hegel says that when he thinks of an object, “I make it into a thought and 
deprive it of its sensuous quality; I make it into something which is essentially and 
immediately mine.”14 But by the very act of depriving, or abstracting, the individual is 
confronted with an object that is already ‘fetishistic’ in containing that quality.
13 J.Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding R W oolhouse (ed.) London. Penguin 1997; D.Hume An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding T.L.Beauchamp Oxford University Press 1999
14 G.W.F.Hegel Elements o f  the Philosophy o f Right A.W .W ood (ed.) H.B.Nisbet (trans.) Cambridge University 
Press. 1991. Section 4
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The inherent egoism of civil society makes it impossible, in Hegel’s account, for it to 
overcome its own antagonism. His insight into the negativity of the ‘achievement of 
modernity’ takes Adam Smith’s descriptions of the social division of labour, production and 
exchange further, highlighting their contradictions which themselves create poverty, a 
condition which precludes the ethical dispensation of an estate. The complexity of the 
Hegelian dialectic within civil society is evident in this passage from The Philosophy o f Right:
I
j Particularity in itself, on the one hand indulging itself in all directions as it satisfies its
needs, contingent arbitrariness, and subjective caprice, destroys itself and its substantial 
| concept in the net of enjoyment; on the other hand, as infinitely agitated and continually
| dependent on external contingency and arbitrariness and at the same time limited by the
power of universality, the satisfaction of both necessary and contingent needs is itself 
contingent. In these opposites and their complexity, civil society affords a spectacle of 
extravagance and misery as well as of physical and ethical corruption common to both.15
The contingency to which particularity is susceptible makes it potentially limitless, and 
in the same section of Philosophy of Right Hegel accounts for the demise of pre-modem states 
as the uncontrollable expansion of self-consciousness. The division between the disposition 
towards and actualising of this expansion can only be rectified by the universality embodied in 
the modem state. But Hegel ties up the principle of subjective freedom with property. Earlier 
in the text, Hegel makes explicit the importance of the latter to the former: “In property, my 
will is personal, but the person is a specific entity; thus property becomes the personal aspect 
of this specific will. Since I give my will existence through property, property must also have 
the determination of being this specific entity, of being mine. This is the important doctrine of 
| the necessity of private property. ... a community does not ultimately have the same right to 
j property as a person does.”16 The positive role of property in the development of personality is 
accentuated in Hegel’s writing, yet property is central to the dialectic within civil society 
which is its negative aspect.
15 Ibid.
16
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To understand Hegel’s view of the role and effect of property, it is important to clarify 
a fundamental distinction he makes, that between property and possession. As part of the 
realisation of self-consciousness, the individual internalises his property and objectifies his 
subjectivity. This linkage is also the consequence of labour, but is impelled from the opposite 
direction. Before elaborating this proposition, I will concentrate first on the concept of 
property vis-a-vis possession in Hegel’s philosophy. The extent to which property becomes a 
part of the individual is illustrated in the union of two people, as in marriage. The union, 
according to Hegel, can only be complete when their respective relationships with external 
objects also becomes united. If one is to retain possession of property without this union of 
objects then a certain independence, or separate individuality, is retained and the union cannot 
be complete. This identification with property goes beyond possession:
To have even external power over something constitutes possession, just as the 
particular circumstance that I make something my own out of natural need, drive, and 
arbitrary will is the particular interest of possession. But the circumstance that I, as ffee 
will, am an object to myself in what I possess and only because an actual will by this 
means constitutes the genuine and rightful element in possession, the determination of 
property.17
Hegel seems to be constructing a doctrine of property here based on the premise that 
an individual, as will, owns himself, as being. To say that ‘I own my own body’ seems otiose 
when we consider the possessive language used to refer to parts of the body or the body as a 
whole. But to follow on from this that ownership is therefore a ‘natural’ phenomenon of an 
individual, a sort of ‘homo owner’, is to assume an innate acquisitiveness. The property and 
the person are one and the same as the embodiment of personality; having had conferred upon 
it a soul by the will of the individual, the property already fetishised becomes internalised. But 
from where does the mind derive its conception of the value of a particular object as to want
17 Ibid.
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to ‘internalise’ it and abstract its essence and accommodate it as personal embodiment? The 
value of an object becomes relevant in terms of exchange rather than use-value and is 
determined by a stability set by culture and custom. But because this stability is vulnerable to 
fluctuation and crises, the value of the object that has become internalised by the Hegelian 
individual is subject to factors external to and beyond the control of that individual. Hegel 
does include ‘recognition’ as a criterion for the status of property, but it is his view that it is 
the embodiment of personality that causes problems in that the individual’s being at a 
fundamental level becomes subject to the vagaries of the market. If the object in question is 
part of the natural world, i.e. objective, then the will, the subjective, is transferred or linked to 
objectivity. But this appropriation particularises part of the objective world. The 
internalisation of property becomes an important aspect in the transition from property to 
contract where the recognition of one’s property by another is the relation of one will to 
another, the sphere of contract, on the terrain of freedom. If an individual wills that something 
should become his then this alone is not enough to make this something property, the 
existence of personality in the thing is when it becomes property and is recognised by another 
will. Without recognition of possession of a thing, the property in question is not yet identical 
with freedom, it is a matter of arbitrariness and external circumstances and “what and how 
much I possess is therefore purely contingent as far as right is concerned.”18 However, the 
problem is that even if this possession becomes property, the ‘value’, or worth of the 
individual then becomes a matter of the ‘stability’ of that individual’s internalised objects; in 
other words his material assets.19
18 Ibid
19 Any dispute over the right to property is in essence a recognition o f this right. Superficially it may appear as the 
squabble over the possession o f an object, but the reality for Hegel, is the struggle between two (or more) wills, 
which, on the terrain o f civil society alone is a potentially dangerous and violent struggle, without legal recourse or 
political institution to check this potential. It may be that the struggle becomes internecine, or it may be that a 
master-slave relationship results. Either way, the dispute is resolved by risk where the goal is to establish oneself 
as master rather than slave; to achieve one’s ends and desires through the subordination o f another. This latter 
outcome is conceived by Hegel in Phenomenology o f  M ind , where the dialectic o f this relationship illustrates the
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The seemingly inextricable relation between the self and property makes the prospects 
of the 'reforms' of consciousness (intellectual and moral), necessary for civil society look 
' indeed bleak and remote. When the abstracted Hegelian analysis of property relations is set in 
the context of 'developed political systems', the cultural obstacles become complex variations 
recognised essentially as private (from the privatisation of public institutions to the 
I privatisation of social relations) and whose value is measured by accumulations of wealth.
| The political implications of a 'privatised society' - i.e. one that has imprinted on its 'collective 
consciousness' that property accumulation and self-development is an inseparable process that 
privatises life itself - are self-evidently anti-democratic. Political concern itself is 'privatised' 
in the sense that what becomes important politically is that which promotes a 'private life'. 
Where capitalism has reached its geographical limits, there is still the unexhausted 
consciousness of human being on which to further promulgate its logic through a fetishistic 
notion and applications of 'the private'.
A 'privatised existence' is in a strong sense false in its claims to ontological certainties. 
This falsity is not to suggest that there is a true or a specific and authentic mode of existence, 
but that this 'privatised existence' is 'inauthentic' insofar as it is based on 'givens' and 'truths' - 
such as the conjunction of self-development and property accumulation. It is, as Cohen and 
Arato recognise, an 'inappropriate' political culture. 'The private1 contributes to the 
estrangement of the self from political freedom through the cultural processes of privatism. It
relation between freewill and property, and the role o f labour in the unfolding o f freedom. The coupling of 
| recognition and a potentially boundless self-consciousness is the source o f conflict, and the expansion o f self- 
consciousness (freedom) is attained through risking life itself. . ..  references/sections etc} A successful outcome to 
such risk is, in the words o f  H egel, “the consciousness that exists for itself; but consciousness ‘for itself’ is 
mediated with itself through an other consciousness” (10) which it dominates (the slave). But there is a problem 
for the master here, and it is here that we can see quite clearly that labour is more important, less problematic at 
least, than property in the emancipation (or development) o f the self. Although the relationship is self-evidently 
one o f domination, it is the dominant party who is trapped by his dependence on the slave. It is through labour 
(that o f the slave) that the consciousness o f the slave develops, “ ...in  fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to 
be felt explicitly as his own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he him self exists in and for 
h im self... . Thus precisely in labour where there seem to be merely some outsider’s mind and ideas involved, the 
slave becomes aware, through this rediscovery o f him self by himself o f having and being ‘a mind o f his ow n’” 
(Hegel Phenomenology o f  M ind  J.B.Baillie (trans.) George Allen and Unwin 1910 p. 188)
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also contributes to social estrangement in its translation of what are human conditions into 
conditions of personal idiosyncrasy. Defenders of privacy as a private moral category point to 
its loss as a violation or loss of agency. Its detractors describe it more as a condition from 
which we should flee, a condition which separates human being from 'the social', 'the 
political', and ultimately its 'self.
| An individualist ontology is explicitly rejected by Cohen and Arato. However, the
i
conception of privacy that they employ in their thesis is one that implicitly recognises it:
we must start from the assumption that privacy attaches to the individual in certain 
capacities (as an autonomous moral subject), regarding certain relations (those impinging 
on identity needs), and within the framework of certain relations (friendship, intimacy) 
that we must be ready to analyse and give arguments for.20
Privacy attaches to our very consciousness; the ‘sphere’ in which autonomy is 
adjudged to be exercised. However, Cohen and Arato's agent of consciousness draws on a 
moral resource that is not fully explained by them. It encounters the same problematic 
I questions that face the idea of 'conscience', a concept that has little obvious distinction with 
the 'moral resistance to law' that provides their basis for understanding of ‘private’. But for it 
to be a praxis for a post-traditional civil society this resistance must be expressed publicly.
However, the identification of privacy with consciousness is conceptually wrong; our 
consciousness is a reflection, however nuanced, of the external world. That aspect that 
concerns itself with privacy, our self-development and moral choice, is a capacity for 
autonomous judgement that may be of a critical rather than passive reflection. It is that critical 
part of our consciousness that can infuse the 'subjective' into democracy; that challenges, 
j either notionally or actively, alien or external control, whether it is legal or cultural, state
I
enforced or marketing techniques.
20 Cohen and Arato op.cit. p. 352
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A comprehensive revision of privacy is required then if the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ 
are not going to collapse into meaningless concepts. The ‘private’ realm of a liberal polity, 
when subjected to certain enquiry, is a fiction. Moreover, the more the concept of ‘the private’ 
is retained, the greater is the process of privatism which gives the illusion of privacy (and self­
development and moral choice) as bound up with rights discourse. If nothing else, the 
normative core of democratic theory (its socially based principles of participation) requires 
that the development of the self and moral choices are in accordance with this core, and not 
‘separated off’ into fragmented ‘consumer protest’ which alarmingly appears to be filling the 
‘democratic deficit’ in the West. Privacy must be understood as the development of the self, 
and not exclusively as an umbrella term for rights of intimacy and confidentiality etc. By 
identifying privacy with ‘the private’, as the space beyond intrusion by state (and society), the 
‘continuation of the democratic revolution’ will be impeded by a diversion into 'privatism' and 
its sufficient political framework of a 'realist' and formalistic democracy.
But this aspect cannot be taken as ‘given’. It is necessary to determine the source and 
role of this part of our consciousness that ‘comes into conflict with law’. Their attempts at 
synthesising the demands of reality, through parliamentary representation, and the 
participatory elements of democratic theory, through associational life in society, are 
threatened by a misunderstanding, or inadequate account, of privacy. That part they call 
‘private’ will perceive society accordingly. The area of conflict (where ‘morality questions 
legality’) will not be roused sufficiently to support the normative pillars of their model. More 
obstructively, if privacy maintains a translation as an exclusively ‘private’ sphere (in the sense 
of the dubiously private spheres of family and contract etc) then privacy is understood not 
only as a right of retreat from the state, but also from society -  developing into the very 
privatism that maintains an ‘inappropriate’ political culture.21 Rather, privacy must be
21 Ibid. p354
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perceived as part of the maintenance of a democratic and just polity, and not merely as one of 
the fruits of its outcome. If retention of self-development and moral choice from the 
; potentially totalitarian intrusion of the state is the fundamental objective of civil society then
i
what is being defended must be clearly defined, and part of that definition cannot not be one 
that conceives of ‘private’ as the antithesis of ‘public’.
| The reconsideration of privacy must be premised on it being 'subject' rather than
'object'. The very conception of privacy is interwoven with the idea of the construction of 'the 
self, and not as an objective, much less tangible, space in which this construction (and
i
development) takes place. This part of the chapter looks at the subject of 'the subject'. Civil 
society theories ignore this problematic at the risk of obsolescence. The aim here will be to 
identify the subject of civil society from a reconstruction of privacy as part of the construction 
of 'the self. A cursory view of 'the subject of civil society' as employed by civil society 
theories is one of: a social ontology of the self, but at the same time a self that involves an 
individual agency that if not rationally transcends its contextual 'common sense' totally as 
liberal theory would have it, but an agency that is nevertheless at least separated from the 
condition of its own development (either as conscience, or an aspect of moral consciousness 
that comes into conflict with law, if indeed there is a substantial difference between the two). It 
is a convenient view of 'the self from which to begin to articulate the kind of 'ethical' 
democratic society that civil society has in mind as 'the idea'. But the latter part of the above
i
definition of the self is problematic.
| First of all, the term 'social being' is a fact of the human condition. To support this, we
I can say that it is within 'systems of need' that humans exist, however primitive these systems 
may be compared to those of 'developed political systems'. But a claim of 'social-being' based 
on crude relations of contract and expediency is not enough. It may be sufficient for liberalism, 
but for civil society, if it is to detach itself from the philosophy of the individual, must
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recognise that this 'social-being' must itself recognise the importance of the prefix and so 
exercise its agency in accordance with changing politico-cultural conditions. In other words, 
rather than rationally transcending its cultural milieu, or drawing upon that aspect of moral 
consciousness that comes into conflict with law, it must sink the foundations of its rationality 
(its categorical imperatives and givens) into amorphous cultural forms that cannot be 
accommodated or made sense of by its existing 'rational framework'.
The subject of civil society is privacy itself; that is, a developmental conception of the 
self. Arguments about whether this development of the self is best achieved 'privately' or 
'publicly' are a matter of persuasion. The undesirability of 'the private' as a cultural foundation 
for civil society(established above) should indicate that if civil society is to be persuasive then 
this development must be perceived as better facilitated 'publicly'. But persuasive arguments 
about optimal conditions for self-development that contain a positive stipulation (that they are 
'public') would sound like too much of a prescription for the 'good life' for one whose world 
view is shaped by the philosophy of the individual (even if the latter is no less prescriptive - or 
ideological - for its claim that conditions must be 'privately' considered). To an 'autonomous 
individual' such prescriptions, however 'thin', contradict the logic and central tenets of the 
philosophy from which the illusion of the autonomy of that individual is woven and fabricated. 
They 'impinge' upon rights discourses that underpin the 'autonomy' of the individual who sees 
itself as, by way of 'free-will', the arbiter of these conditions and, by logical corollary, culpable 
| absolutely for the consequences. 'Common sense' then guides the individual onto a privatised 
^course of (self-) development that consequentially reinforces the structural conditions that 
maintain 'privatised' development through the 'moral choices' made.
In his essay on the hypnotic effects of communist state ideology, Czeslaw Milosz writes 
that: "Whoever truly creates is alone"22. He does not mean here a subjective matter where, for
22 C.M ilosz op.cit p.217
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instance, the artist or creator who works alone reproduces or objectifies his/herself, or part of it. 
But he is wrong to make this claim on the basis that all creativity and expression is solitary. On 
the contrary, it requires recognition, in much the same way as Hegel's doctrine of property. 
(Few artists have been known to actively prevent the 'publicising' of their work (Kafka? 
Orwell?). Milosz's statement sounds like the affected condition of an artist who, by publicly 
expressing the 'private' condition of creativity, disqualifies any authenticity, or 'true creativity', 
attached to its own maxim. The reality is that without the reception of expression (an audience) 
the creative act is incomplete. The necessarily public expression of any creative act can be 
supported at a personal level, in the catharsis of human emotion, and at the social and political 
level, in the public development of social movement as opposed to the 'inward-looking' 
commercial processes of 'private expression'. Albert Camus observed that the democratic will 
and impulse of creativity is subordinated, in 'developed political systems', to production: "The 
society based on production is only productive, not creative."23
Without 'reception', the creativity or expression cannot in any significant (and certainly 
'positive') way become a means for the development of 'the self. This requirement is perhaps 
better illustrated in the emotional expression per se of the self. Any human emotion, if it is to 
become contributory to the development of the self must be recognised by at least one other if it 
is to be expressed and not merely acknowledged or 'owned' by the self. Milosz would have it 
that no such recognition is necessary, and that the self only truly expresses itself 'privately', 'art 
needs no audience' and the self does not need public recognition for its development. But a 
creative or cathartic act can only be complete when the expression of the self is ‘made public’. 
This is the essence of the public nature of privacy. Indeed, if there is to be a development it is 
| inescapable.
23 A.Camus The Rebel (A.Bower trans.) London. Penguin. 1977 p.237
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To give this 'public condition' greater definition, I will apply it to the question of 'social 
and political participation' and its division into two aspects (political and social), and argue 
that it is an impossible separation. At least, it is conceptually impossible to maintain, and can 
only claim some credibility in the illusion of a privatised society that political and/or social 
participation is a matter of choice. It can only be conceived if the social aspect is perceived as 
j removed in reality from well-defined political processes, and is regarded as the whole of 
; autonomous social relations constructed from rational (individual) agency. If the social aspect
i
is considered in more functionalist terms, the ideological (political) dimension to 
'participation' becomes more apparent.
In an (ideological) functionalist analysis, political and social participation is one and the 
same thing. Social participation would extend its limits as reproductive of the dominant form 
of social relations. In other words, there is a social participation as a form of consent to the 
political structure and the moral and cultural values that reflect the 'participation'. 'Social' 
participation is not an option; there cannot be complete estrangement from 'society' in either 
the form of economic necessity or (paradoxically) privacy (as a development of the self).
; Acquiescence and consent is the active legitimating consequence of the 'passive activity' of 
cultural production in the public domain. (I will argue in Chapter 2, using these terms of 
reference, that this analysis of 'passive activity' is contradictory in socio-political terms). The 
acquiescent racist is a social participant of a racist society; similarly, there is the 'private 
individual' whose defining actions 'participate' in, if it is not too much of an oxymoron, a 
| 'society of private individuals'. The 'passivity' of the action characteristic of developed 
political systems is simply wrong.
The classical liberal reply to the argument for social (as political) participation is that 
freedom must necessarily entail the liberty to 'abstain'. There are two responses to this. The first 
is that the premises of the philosophy of the individual are fundamentally at odds with the
reality o f society. If one lives within the recognised boundaries of a society, then a contribution 
is made to the kind of society it will become even if it is in the unrecognisable form of 'opting 
out'. The second reply to this powerful discourse of the 'freedom of the individual' that 
predominates the public domains of 'developed (and developing) political systems' is that this 
j individual pursuit of freedom can only be achieved through the (illusory) sphere of 'the private'. 
It is a more pointed reply given the urgency around the question of democracy, and whether it 
has any possible future. It is these processes of privatism that provide a far greater threat to the 
development of democracy than the state-oriented and overtly political (as any form of 
fundamentalism) anti-democratic forms so readily identified by academic civil society 
discourse.
The division between political and social participation is only defensible if there is first 
in place a common-sense of (the implausible sociology of) the confinement of politics to a 
formal and institutionalised realm, and, by way of corollary, the only conscious political action 
or 'participation' is then restricted to periodical voting for politicians. It remains a 'matter of 
choice' if the individual exercises his or her right to vote, and whether he or she wants to 
become a politician^].24 But it may be argued that even the minimal input of the endorsement 
of politicians through the voting systems of (inappropriately named) representative 
democracies is motivated by a will to form the conditions of ones own existence. The 'vote' is 
symbolic, if not the exercise, of this will.
‘Public’ and ‘private’ are not separable in civil society discourse, certainly not as with 
the case of liberal philosophy. Whereas for a liberal political system the private components of 
moral choice and self-development are an irrelevance as long as they do not impinge upon law, 
jthey are crucial to the kind of polity they underwrite in civil society theory. The liberal 
conception of private (broadly speaking) is one of a sphere that must be protected from
i
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encroachment of the political into the moral domain. This sounds very much like the origins of 
civil society in the former communist bloc, where it arose as a struggle against the destruction 
of the private by the public. But the meaning of privacy in civil society goes beyond its own
I
self-protection; it connotes an understanding that its role or its exercise is essentially public. 
The subjectivity of privacy, rather than something to be shielded from the political, is the basis
i
, of the public or political participation required of a radically democratised civil society.
| Privacy links to questions of identity, and how full membership of a polity is
conceived. Whatever this and self-development entails will be contextually/'publicly' 
determined. It questions the ‘individual’ qualification of self-development in the ‘theme’ of 
privacy; moral choice and self-development are gauged against the dominant culture and 
‘folkloric philosophy’. Just as we cannot take the moral component as 'given', we cannot 
accept prima facie the ‘individual qualification’, and that the development of the self is 
exclusively, or even predominantly, autonomous. We may question: how free am I? Have my 
objectives and goals in life really been questioned at a fundamental level? And, am I in control 
over my own self-development? As Conrad Lodz states: ‘Autonomous individuals are not 
1 bom autonomous. Rather the autonomous person is an achievement, it is a product of how we 
develop’.25 Autonomy is something to be gained. The autonomous human subject in civil 
society discourses is the basis of a public life that is not driven by institutions, ideologies, and 
private interests, because it offers political resistance to the impersonal logic of the system, or 
the ‘institutionalised lie’, but is not an individual autonomy.
I It may be that the existential security found in privatism is a frustrated reaction to the
loss of public spaces in which to offer this resistance. Or, it may be that, because moral choice 
and self-development are extremely elastic concepts, the effects of specific choices and certain
24 This is, o f course, only the formal equality to which this 'choice1 refers, Presidential/electoral funding 
requirements make the reality very different.
25 K.Lodziak Manipulating Needs: Capitalism and Culture New York. Pluto Press 1995 p.85
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developments are ‘autonomous’ but incompatible with public or civic participation, but 
instead parallel the privatism effected by the domination of the public domain by private 
interest, but this time rather than ‘frustratingly embraced’ is ideologically chosen. Adoption of 
either of these two positions does not contradict the argument that there is some domain of 
moral, and subsequently political, resistance. But when exercised from the particularistic
j  realm of privatism, its greatest perceived clout comes in the form of consumer power.
i
The 'subject of civil society' is not then a 'private individual' but a 'public subject'. This 
much is established. But a self that can provide the necessary social bases for furthering 
democracy must be one that has dispensed with the concept and self-perception of 'autonomous 
individual being', and (as will be made clear below) certainly with the notion of conscience as 
its moral rudder. Paradoxically, the 'public subject' embodies the reconsideration of 1privacy' - 
as 'self-development and moral choice', the impact of the latter having a considerable bearing 
on the possibilities of civil society itself, and which is consequential of the former -  and is 
therefore 'the subject of civil society'. The public development of the self is the cultural praxis 
i of the necessary political conditions for civil society to become an effective means of radical 
democratisation.
The voluntarism, or will, of 'the subject of civil society' is inadequately theorised when 
left as a kind of hard-wired moral dimension of 'protest' to consciousness or as an innate but 
little articulated experience of conscience. In fact there is little difference between the two 
approaches; both ultimately rely on a human essence that is autonomous from its material and 
I ideological conditions. But neither formulation can be presumed on the basis of a prior human
i
! faculty of (specific) moral disposition, although this human 'resource' has become a 'given' in 
the discourses of the public domains of 'developed political systems'.
26 V.Havel ‘Power of the Powerless’ in Open Letters op.cit
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There is a tension between individual agency and the requirement of solidarity that 
must somehow be resolved if civil society is to avoid fragmentation and degeneration into 
'bourgeois' society. Havel describes this tension as "the 'cruel paradox' of the dissident ... 
labelled as something apart from 'other citizens'"27. His attempt to get around this paradox is by 
describing the action of the dissident as an expression of solidarity but only with those whom 
; "his conscience commands him to support".28 The efforts to distance civil society theory from 
the philosophy of the individual are concentrated on emphasising the element of solidarity. 
This is true of Cohen and Arato's more analytic treatment, as it is of other writers on civil 
society.29 Most notable and influential among these is Vaclav Havel who envisaged a 
solidaristic 'politics of conscience': "It is becoming evident that truth and morality can provide 
a starting point for politics and can, even today, have an undeniable political power".30 The 
implicit assumption of such a politics is that there is a 'natural solidarity of morality' insofar as 
others hold, or will adopt, your own moral standpoint.
But before this 'moral convergence' can be accepted, it is necessary to account for it. In 
other words, the concept of 'conscience', or 'moral resistance', must be given due attention if it 
is to be identified as the source, or point, of this convergence. I will approach this by first of 
all outlining some destabilising accounts of conscience. Such an approach is appropriate to the 
reified and largely unquestioned moral 'given', apparently innate to human being, that 
'conscience' has become. As part of the case for a public conception of privacy, I will argue 
that 'conscience' rather than necessarily supporting the Havelian vision of civil society can 
actually impede a developmental conception of democracy. Cast as the basis of a legitimating 
political ethic, I will argue that this 'moral resistance', or 'conscience', offers little substance, at
27 ibid.p. 146
28 ibid.
29 V.Havel; A.Michnik Letters from  Prison and Other Essays University o f California Press 1985; G.M.Tamas 
op.cit; G.Konrad Antipolitics: An Essay  San D iego Harcourt 1984; et.al
30 V.Havel 'Politics and Conscience1 in Open Letters op.cit p.270
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best reflecting a largely guilt motivated action that is, in the language of the philosophy of the 
individual, 'superogatory'. ‘Conscience’ in Havel’s understanding must be read within its 
historical context. The connotation of conscience in this discourse reflects a 'wider' or even 
solidaristic meaning. It is more a politically motivated dissidence than the 'superogatory 
actions' it is associated with in 'developed political systems' where the ultimate arbiter is the 
individual.
A fitting reference at this point would be Nietzsche, not simply because there are few 
better sources to provide some philosophical support to unsettle a 'given' (such as 'conscience'), 
but there are certain comparisons to be made between related aspects of his thought and the 
notion of 'intellectual and moral reform' (which I shall come to further on in the chapter). With 
regard to 'conscience', Nietzsche's verdict is damning, maintaining that human being (in the 
'unreconstructed sense') has little sense of responsibility - and no conscience at all.31
The problematic ambivalence of civil society theories regarding the 'social nature of the 
individual' is to the fore when 'the subject of civil society' is examined. The moral pre­
suppositions made throughout this discourse make it vulnerable to a collapse into a philosophy 
of the individual. Despite the rhetorical emphasis placed on solidarity and society, 
characteristic of all sympathetic writing on civil society, the source of this social ethic relies 
ultimately on the beneficence of (an autonomous) individual. There are two basic questions 
that must be posed if sympathetic writing is to avoid outright apology. The first is: what is 
required of 'the subject' of civil society?; and second: can this subject's 'construction' facilitate 
the reforms of consciousness that are the cultural preconditions of an assumption of 
democracy? One basic requirement is that the subject be 'modular'.32 A self that has a moral 
willingness and an intellectual ability to separate issues rather than conflate them, is, according 
to Gellner, the necessary capacity of this 'modular' subject of civil society. This separation, his
31 F.W. Nietzsche Twilight o f the Idols. The Antichrist (RJ.H ollingdale transjl London Penguin 1968 p.86
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argument goes on, then leads to a more fluid and less rigid society. This 'modularity' will be 
considered later in this chapter as a subjective fluidity realised by the processes of intellectual 
and moral reform. A more explicit reference to the 'moral autonomy' of the subject of civil 
society comes from Tismaneanu; with specific reference to the states of the former soviet bloc, 
he says that civil societies "cannot be separated from the existence of autonomous centres of 
independent thought."33 It becomes obvious through a reading of 'the subject' in different 
perspectives of civil society that there is a tension between this independently thinking 
individual and the strong solidaristic conception of society of which s/he is the subject. Havel, 
upon whose work I will concentrate for much of the discussion of 'the self in this part of the 
chapter, stresses his antipathy toward apathy, and his belief in a strong concept of citizenship: 
"If everyone doesn't take an interest in politics, it will become the domain of those least suited 
to it."34
To suggest that politics attracts those least suited to it can mean at least two things. 
Either politics itself (and not just the soviet political system) is unreformable, which roughly 
I corresponds to his position when he championed 'anti-politics'. Or it means that a moral pre­
disposition exists in certain individuals, the lack of which characterises those who 'enter 
politics'. Havel's own political biography rules out the latter possibility, and suggests that he 
was right in his original condemnation of political systems including the parliamentary kind. It 
is noticeable that Havel becomes ‘progressively less radical’ in his writing on civil society and 
democracy. In Open Letters Havel initially showed little or no faith in parliamentary 
[democracy, he criticised it for its failure to confront the corrupting effects of consumer 
j society.35 Indeed, at times his criticism was based as much on an ineptitude of the system as it
32 E.Gellner 'Modular Man' in J.A.Hall (ed) op.cit p.43
33 V.Tismaneanu Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from  Stalin to H avel New York. The Free Press. 1992
P,’153
V.Havel Summer M editations London. Random House. 1992 p. 128 
35 V.Havel Open Letters op.cit pp.l61& 208
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was on the insidiousness of its appearance of democracy that masks more subtle forms of 
domination and control than did the 'ideological lie' of the soviet system. However, in later 
writing he subscribes to the Western parliamentary democracies.37 The important point for the 
argument here, regardless of his positional changes on political institutions, is that Havel sees
i
the 'subject of civil society' as one who in no way fits the description of 'the consumer of inane 
television series' that generally populate the West.
The 'subject of civil society' is then an imprecise figure of 'mental independence' 
(Tismaneanu), whose self-perception as social-being, 'finding solidarity with those whom his 
or her 'conscience' allows for' (Havel), is despite this independence. What becomes evident in 
unravelling the confusions and contradictions is that the emphasis on the 'public' aspect of 'the 
self is an attempt at theoretical departure from the philosophy of the individual but retains 
many of the assumptions of this philosophy.38 Central to the workings of Havel is the elusive 
notion of 'conscience'. But its etymology of being without (against) knowledge contributes to 
the idea of an essentially human moral intuition as an unlearned and more or less fixed moral 
compass. If this is a less than convincing argument then 'conscience', or that aspect of 
consciousness that ‘comes into conflict with law’, must be given some sort of materialist 
explanation. If an action is seen as morally obligatory (or reprehensible) then ‘conscience’ 
becomes either an innate sense of justice that can stand apart from the mores of its
36 When Havel said that “it is becoming evident that truth and morality can provide a new starting point for politics 
and can, even today, have an undeniable political power”. {Politics and Conscience. P .270} He was not talking 
about the ‘Westernisation o f the East’; such a starting point cannot be found on the left-right political spectrum (at 
least not as has been the practice in the West).
37 With Vaclav Klaus, his prime minister in the Czech Republic, Havel wrote with regret that "instead o f learning 
from the W est about civic and political culture, we have been quick to acquaint ourselves with the empty world o f  
inane commercials and even more inane television series, allowing them to plunder . . .  our lives and souls." V. 
Havel and V. Klaus 'Civil society after communism: Rival Visions' in Journal o f  D em ocracy 7:1 (Jan 1996)
38 The stress on public participation in 'political matters', lest it they become the exclusive concern of those 'least 
suited to deal with them', points to the strong strand o f republican thinking in civil society theory. But it differs 
significantly from the participatory democracy o f  Arendt's republicanism, for instance. Her notion o f a 
commitment to a singular public political sphere contrasts with Havel's vision o f  a plurality o f spheres.
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environment or is, conversely, a reflection of the established constraints in society on the one 
hand, and a highly variable degree of recognition of self as social being on the other.
There are apparently 'negative* and 'positive' aspects to conscience; the former 
representing the 'policeman in our head' which prevents us form acting on something, and the 
latter more subtle restraint of ‘the pastor’ that prevents us from not acting on something. If 
.'conscience' or 'moral protest' is to provide the critical faculty for a civil society cohered by 
solidarity, then a materialist account will provide some insight into the obstacles to any 
politically significant formation, and therefore the obstacles to the development of democracy 
as conceived by civil society. How (and how much) this critical faculty is expressed is 
dependent upon the cultural conditions of 'the self. Self-development and moral choice are 
variables that make this faculty, or expression of 'conscience', subject to external factors - and 
are not the effects of a 'pure' introspection.
Conscience is either an unsubstantiated inner ‘truth’ (such as ‘the word of god’), or, 
more likely, it is a reflection of the established constraints that form the bases of norms in any 
given society. The former conception of conscience, whether theist, pantheist, or humanist, 
appears to correspond to the Havelian notion of it. The guidance given a seemingly powerless 
person who dares to cry out the word of truth .. .”39 in opposition to the communist system 
could not have come from the empirically informed ideal-typical observer that is prominent in 
Adam Smith’s moral theory in which it is derived dualistically. Here, on the one hand, there is
| the ‘internal voice’ of the agent (the self ‘proper’) and on the other, the spectator. The former
ji
\ corresponds to the subjective in Havel’s notion of it, which proved inadequate as the basis of a 
‘new order’. However, Smith’s ‘spectator’ is the aspect of conscience which originates
39 V.Havel 'The Power o f the Powerless' op.cit
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externally, that is to say, it is the checking of unsocialised impulses and tendencies by the 
constraining influences of 'internalised imperatives'.40
The caricature of modernity that the soviet system became, in its manipulation of 
reality to meet the demands of theory, gives the Havelian ‘dissident’ an apparently atavistic 
yearning to his discourse. But this would be misleading; Havel was not an anti-modernist orj
obscurantist. The possibility of the Havelian vision of the politics growing out of civil society 
could only come out of modernity. What then becomes overlooked to a great extent is that, in 
its Eastern European cradle, the condensation of ‘dissident’ discourses of 'conscience' into civil 
society was essentially a form of praxis.
The origin of conscience as the author of ‘dissidence’, however, cannot be an inner 
sensitivity to right and wrong; but the retort of a creative being whose capacities and potential, 
j  far from being extended and fulfilled as promised by communism, were denied any 
developmental space, (i.e. space in the real sense of institutions of a ‘public sphere’ that 
; optimally facilitates privacy) It is more the protest against the retardation of human being, a 
dis-illusionment that is the source of enquiry and creativity. This does not deny a sense of 
justice, such a denial would prevent the necessary solidarism, but problematically it could not 
I establish itself as superordinate to the (economic/'self-regarding1) demands of a 'developed (or 
developing) political system' that in its post-communist example lost the creative foundations 
of its embryonic civil society to another form of ‘retardation’.
j But the problem of an individual moral intuition still lurks in the background as the
' catalyst of protestation. Existence can be understood by the individual in grasping it in terms 
only of subjective experience, according to the philosophical influence on Havel41, ‘living in 
truth’ can only be comprehended phenomenologically. The ‘dissident’ is one who realises the 
compulsion to make choices and take responsibility; but his arrival at this realisation is
40 A.Smith The Theory o f  M oral Sentiments London. Prometheus Books 2000
64
unaccounted for. If existence is then conceived of only in terms of the effect that 
circumstances have on individual existence then it is very much a subjective category. But 
Havel’s moral and social reconstruction incorporates a strong solidarity: “Time and time 
again”, he has been persuaded that “a huge potential of goodwill is slumbering within our 
society"42 and that this “dormant goodwill in people needs to be stirred”.43. The expression of 
; solidarity with others who similarly dissent is motivated still by individual conscience, but 
importantly, “ ... he [the dissident] even finds the strength in himself to express solidarity with 
those whom his conscience allows him to support”.44 But despite the inclusion of ‘solidarity’ 
in ‘expression of support’ for other dissidents, the ‘individual conscience’ remains the final 
arbiter in deciding who or what forms of dissidence are worthy of support, and the real 
obstacles to ethico-political formation are subsequently overlooked.
‘Conscience’ cannot be some unchanging metaphysical core that ‘independently’ steers 
actions; it is an aspect of a socially and culturally constructed consciousness. So if 
‘conscience’ is not fixed, then it is possible that this peculiarly human capacity has developed 
as a ‘felt’ or experienced amalgam of internalised norms. In this case, conscience can be 
described in certain areas as a dogmatised sub-conscious. And it is in this form that it is 
I effectively antipathetic to civil society. It could be applied to personal relationships that can 
then be extended to social relationships. By way of an example, we might claim that 
‘infidelity’ in marriage would be beyond our scope because our conscience might not allow it. 
(Whether or not conscience would be overridden in this instance is not the issue at hand). The 
; important point is that the guilt that may arise from our conscience, when involved in such 
action, is ‘constructed’ (and can therefore be deconstructed) from unquestioned experiences 
and values. To hold to the conception of conscience as inherent and unchanging would, in this
41 Havel's acknowledged influences include Edmund Husserl, Jan Patocka and Heidegger
42 V.Havel 'Politics, Morality and Civility' in Summer M editations op.cit p.3
43 Ibid.
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instance, suggests that ‘fidelity’ in the institution of marriage is inviolable according to some 
law other than institutionalised vows; anything other than monogamy must therefore be 
‘unnatural’ (according to a fixed bearing set by conscience).
To further illustrate the point, the subject of abortion is one among a number that
i
places a big question mark as to the real nature of conscience. If a woman who had an 
; abortion in a society where it was freely available and common then she may ‘experience’ her 
conscience much less (if at all) than she might have had she acted so in a society where the 
subject of abortion had been internalised as a moral stigma. Again, but with respect to the 
‘sense of justice’ rather than primarily guilt, we may experience our conscience when dealing 
(or rather, not having anything to do with) the ‘deserving poor’, for example, but feel nothing 
if we do not assist (where we could) the ‘undeserving poor’.45
Any 'sense of justice’ or 'solidarity' that may, in varying degrees, lie dormant among 
people would be called up less to arbitrate the more society moves toward the promotion of the 
individual as the agent of freedom through choices available to him. As the individual in a 
‘developed political system’ of a culture of consumer-capitalism becomes more egocentric, the 
more he is removed from political concerns that might arouse any empirically acquired 
conscience. This condition becomes the protection of privacy as privatism in the form of the 
protection of private property, and not, as the normative theme of privacy suggests, a property 
that is both necessarily private and public, and in the sense that it could support a ‘politics of 
conscience’.
| The moral assumptions made of privacy in civil society theories cannot be taken as
j  ‘given’, and as such it cannot serve as an unconditional founding normative principle of a
[
society aspiring to the radical extension of democracy. Its misinterpretation directs society
44 V.Havel 'The Power of the Powerless' in Open Letters op.cit p. 146
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toward a liberal conception of the private that in its application becomes the kind of 
‘bourgeois society’ that Cohen and Arato optimistically believe to be avoidable. (The social 
and economic conditions of the former communist states that have festered for more than a 
decade should tell us to be wary of such unqualified optimism).
i
i
j  The 'obstacles to conscience' or 'moral resistance' in its solidaristic conception cannot be
I surmounted without the recognition of and action upon the contextual and concrete conditions
i
i
that create them. In other words, self-perception must be located as essentially a product of 
these conditions and not as being 'separated from the rest of the world' capable of rationally 
transcending the contradictions of it. What is required of 'the subject' of civil society is a 
reform of consciousness so that the contingency of its identity and the totality of its relations 
can be grasped; then possibilities of re-form, i.e. actual reform, may be realised.
The question: 'what is 'the self (of development)?' goes unasked in civil society theories. 
The consequence is an assumption of favourable political effects from an assumed ethical 
dispensation inherent in ‘the individual’ that is itself very much an effect of public domain 
discourses over which it then sits in critical judgement. The receptivity to the ethical 
discourses of the public sphere is the determinant of ‘conscience’ and its application.
! The 'self must stress those elements of consciousness that are capable of (ethico-
political) development, and for which the understanding of privacy is recognised as, at the 
same time, both stif-identification and public. 'The self must be able to grasp the contingent 
nature of its own consciousness and become capable of political development. It is important 
to make clear here the distinction between the self as 'subject' and social movement as agency. 
There is no 'collective subject'; this would trap 'the subject' of civil society within the political 
confines of 'the economic-corporate). Through the recognition of its own contingency, 'the
45 Such phrases are apposite to the discussion in hand, though they may seem anachronistic. Various groups in 
modem societies could lay unwanted and undeserving claim to the latter category by being, say, HIV positive and 
homosexual, but would fit more easily into the former if they were HIV positive and haemophiliac.
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self does not then anchor its ontology on the basis of 'identity' but is open to the possibility of 
its own development and progression from it. (The problem of 'identity' is considered further 
in chapter 3 with regard to social movement).
From writers as diverse as Marx and Havel, the idea of an 'authentic existence' or
i
'undivided essence' is a recurrent theme in the humanist tradition. They both recognise a 
fundamental split in 'the self; a reflection of the self as two incompatible (but neither 
irredeemable) images. The difference between Marx and Havel on this point of course is that 
for Marx this schism is an effect of civil society but for Havel civil society represents its 
reconciliation. Their arrival at the division of the self from very different sources serves to 
mask a basic point of similarity.
In the Marxian analysis the political identity of individuals is severed from their civil 
identity by their role in the system of production; political status as opposed to social status. A 
politically alienated society comes to be accepted as if not a 'natural' condition then, one that 
is basically unchangeable. All matters of social and economic enquiry are premised on 
i philosophical, or ideological, 'givens' concerning the individual as a universal abstraction from 
its environment. The sovereignty of individual rational agency evolves as an illusory 
(ideological) attribute of the self. The self is therefore estranged from the very (public) 
conditions of its formation and development. In Marx's terms, a dual-identity evolves: the 
public existence of citizenship, and the private member of society. If the state is separated 
from the citizen as member of civil society, then "it follows therefore, that the citizen of the 
state is separated from the citizen as a member of civil society. He must therefore divide up 
his own essence” 46
From a very different philosophical and literary tradition, Havel sees the fault line 
between 'authentic' and inauthentic' existence. Fundamentally the problem lies in the
46 K.Marx 'Critique o f Hegel's Doctrine o f the State' in Early Writings London. Penguin. 1972 p. 143
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technological societies that are the product of modernity, but this is not to claim, on the basis 
of the points made on this subject above, that Havel is 'anti-modernist', as is often his (mis-) 
representation. The discussion above on the public nature of privacy already alludes to this; as 
civil society is a product of modernity, and an integral part of the 'continuing democratic 
revolution' it is impossible to place Havel's conception of politics in some obscurantist 
category And although Havel accepted the Heideggerian analysis of modem technology 
imprisoning individuals, he saw their escape through the 'anti-political' institutions of civil 
society. In this he rejects the fatalistic course of Heidegger's pessimism that there is no 
political cause capable of resolving it.47
The problem of the 'divided essence' is that our own inauthenticity is complicit in our 
own domination: "The line of distinction between ruler and ruled runs de facto through each 
person".48 The differences between Marx, on one hand, and Havel on the other, are not so 
great in that the political emancipation both seek cannot be achieved prior to 'social' 
emancipation from the external apparatus of state or the 'ideological lie', from the fetishism of 
commodities and the ‘consumption of inanity’.
The question that must be raised is what is 'social emancipation'? It is more than a 
' freedom from 'the social';49 it is a freedom of 'the social', with the self as contributor and not 
passive subject to it. How this is to be achieved is of course where Marx and Havel diverge. 
Social emancipation can only be identified in how the self resists pressures from the social,
| and develop (publicly) the cultural conditions for (political) resistance. Milosz says that: "The 
J resistance against the new set of values is [ ...] emotional. It survives, but it is beaten back 
«whenever it has to explain itself in rational terms".50 Within the context of Milosz's wider
I
analysis of 'the captive mind', this resistance is unavoidably read as 'positive' - meaning that
47 M.Heidegger Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York Harper Torchbooks 1977
48 V.Havel 'Power o f the Powerless' in Open Letters op.cit p. 144
49 H.Arendt Origins o f  Totalitarianism  London Penguin 1958; J.S.Mill On Liberty  London Penguin 19778.
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the new set of values were authorised by the total rationalisation of society. Such values 
sought to eliminate (pace Marx. It needs to be reminded) all semblance of what could be 
! reasonably described as humanism. All explanations of human life became subsumed by 'the 
Method' of dialectical materialism. This dialectical course of history is charted to the 
extraction of humanism (however construed) out of society and therefore extracts society out 
of life.
Taken out of its context, the 'emotional' nature of resistance still applies. The subjective 
protest is still 'emotional' whether the object of protest is rationalist or non-rational in its 
deployment of power mechanisms. The former dismisses all 'humanist' trace as a moribund 
legacy of idealist philosophy; the latter characteristically pacifies, and therefore impedes the 
development of the self, by means of such cultural constructions as 'guilt' and 'shame'. It is not 
a simple matter of 'emotional', or affective, resistance deploying itself against rationalist 
subjection.
All resistance is of emotional origin but its development is a cognitive process. The 
motivation for resistance can be explained in no other way. It is a form of indignation 
(however received) reducible to a protest by the subject against the impediment of its will to 
determine its own social conditions/environment (and importantly - not just its position within 
them/it). It can go no further, and certainly not to 'conscience' as the expression of an 
inherently moral indignation as the explanation of the motivation of resistance or protest. A 
caged animal will resist its entrapment. It does not know why, neither has it reasoned that it is 
I in its own interests are better served in resisting (there is another rationale that could dictate
i
|the opposite of this conclusion of course). Neither is the protest about the position within the 
entrapment. This is an important point if resistance is to become sufficiently radical for a 
democratised civil society. (Reflecting the ethico-political characteristics of social movement).
50 C.M ilosz op.cit. p.201
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The notion of 'intellectual and moral reform' is conceptualised by Gramsci with 
reference to the material base (as the organising principle of society) for the necessary 
conditions for its effect. He poses the question: "Can there be cultural reform, and can the 
position of the depressed strata of society be improved culturally, without a previous economic 
reform and a change in their position in the social and economic fields?" 51. Gramsci was 
Marxian enough to answer this question in the negative. He describes economic reform as the 
" ... concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itse lf '.^2 The nature of 
this reform becomes clearer within the wider Gramscian concepts of 'economic-corporate' and 
'ethico-political'; for there to have been a social development from the former to the latter, 
there must first have been active the processes of intellectual and moral reform.
Little or inadequate attention has been paid to the meaning of this reform, however. It 
refers to more than a mere change in political view or position representing a subjective or 
corporate (economic) interest. It must be made clear that 'intellectual and moral reform' is not 
the action of transcendence expected of an exclusively rational agency. Neither is it an 
assumption of some 'original position' in an abstracted void where individuals, as rational 
agents, calculate self-interest from an understanding of their own social contingency and an 
ignorance of the their own personal out come in life (leading to a rationally calculated political 
framework). Even if the abstraction were possible it would be an exercise in pure thought 
whose only conceivable conclusion would be the kind of 'soulless reformism' that civil 
society, according to Cohen and Arato, can surpass. Anything less than a change that is 
fundamentally attitudinal, and not merely an adjustment of politics, cannot provide for the 
conditions for a democracy that aspires to retain its core normative values.
The processes of reform come from experiences of cognitive dissonance as points of 
crises of consciousness; where the contradictions in an unreconstructed world-view become
51 A.Gramsci op.cit p. 133. M y emphasis
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glaring. Only then does 'reform' (as re-form) become actual, or 'real' as opposed to an 
instrumental politics of expedient imagining. Where intellectual and moral reform might be 
understood as, in part, an introspective fault-finding exercise, it does not entail the self- 
apportioning of 'blame' for any 'personal defects' as pure introspection, but are recognised as 
; the outcome of a contingent set of circumstances (social/economic/cultural/political) and so 
whose actions are not determined by a totally and 'freely-willed self. Insofar as an intellectual 
and moral reform recognises the contingency of its identity and position in society it cannot be 
dismissed as an exercise of Nietzsche's idea of 'bad conscience'. Here the 'slave morality', 
constructed by the priesthood, determines a sense of guilt that declares the self as the absolute 
bearer of responsibility for such defects. According to Nietzsche this is man's will to power, 
the aspirational master within, turned inward and forming the self-tyranny of 'bad conscience'. 
(A mechanism of maintaining the cultural hegemony of 'the individual' as autonomous and 
moral agency). Nietzsche's philosophy declares 'bad conscience' (in other words 'conscience') 
as the suppression of 'the will to life itself. An intellectual reform is the overcoming of 'self­
tyranny' - and what is ideologically imposed passivity - through the public action of privacy. 
A receptivity to and engagement with the discourses of the public sphere and social 
movement, and with the almost imperceptible cultural changes within the subject's 
environment or more explicitly political social movement that confronts 'political society' as
I
well as society itself.
Intellectual and moral reform follows Gramsci's critique of 'common sense'. He was 
well aware of the contradictions within this unreflective 'everyday view of the world', and the 
perception of 'common-sense' as something beyond critical question. But such a rigidity of 
view precludes critical reflection as a necessary element of praxis. As Gramsci's historicism 
precludes the idea of absolute truth, a philosophy of praxis must rest upon an immanent
52Ibid.
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disposition towards question, and not an introduction of 'truth' from some external oracle. An 
intellectual and moral reform is not, then, a quest for a 'truth' that can withstand 'scientific' 
rigour, but the arousal and actualisation of a critical faculty. Intellectual and moral reform is 
intended to question the coherence of a largely dislocated view of the world that is sutured by 
the traditions of 'common sense'. It refers to a reform that is essentially philosophical; a radical 
reform that opens to cultural and cognitive scrutiny the very position and identity of the self 
and its place in a world largely alien to it. It entails a confrontation between critique and the 
emotionally internalised imperatives (the 'givens') of 'common sense', and recognition of the 
contingent nature of consciousness. It recognises antagonistic logics and dissociates the 
internalised non-rational aspects of a particular world-view from the cognitive and intellectual 
justifications therein, and can consequently no longer accommodate those positions. The de­
estrangement of the affective and cognitive aspects of the self is therefore the achievement of 
this reform; the substitution of 'common sense' with that which makes ('good') sense. If 
common sense tells you that 'moral' is what 'moral' says what 'moral' is, then 'good' sense 
points to 'moral' as subject for cultural and critical reflection.
The problem facing this re-form is that at one level there is the 'cognitive-rational' 
view. That is to say, we may argue with impeccable logic within an abstracted frame of 
reference that all ought to be entitled to exercise their will as freely as possible conditional 
upon tolerance of those who are tolerant, or some such guiding moral formula (the 
transcendence of liberal rationalism). But at another, deeper, level there is the 'ideologised' 
attitude derived from 'non-rational' construction culturally grafted onto the consciousness. For 
example, the rationally granted concession of equality does not necessarily correspond to the 
more 'emotional' world-view and its appraisal of the worth o f equality. Such values as national 
identity, religion, the status of property, patriarchy, the bases of self esteem as 'received' all 
complicate and effectively prevent any significant political application to the abstracted notion
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of equality. We can think one thing and feel another; we may accept the abstracted liberal 
arguments of universal (political/moral) equality, but it might not be so easy to 'digest' that an 
Iraqi or Palestinian life, for instance, is of equal worth to perhaps a British or American one. 
Similarly, the liberating of women necessarily involves dispensing with learned patriarchal
i
assumptions and norms (by women as well as men). This (liberation) can be championed by 
those who stand to 'lose' (men) at the rational-cognitive level, but the ideologised attitude to 
' the same point may be less responsive, making adaptation/reform more difficult. Rather than a 
'transcendence of the cognitive-rational', intellectual and moral reform requires that the self 
'sinks' itself into the cultural life of 'public' privacy.
However, when the self is 'sutured together by different discourses (of identity)'53 it is 
the dominant discourses that then construct the self; in the case of 'developed political 
systems' (particularly) reforms and developments of the self are conducted 'privately'. For the 
'reform of the self to facilitate the degree of (public) development necessary for the civil 
society vision of democracy, the self must be receptive to the 'ethico-political' discourses of 
the public sphere; allowing for a greater possibility of the fundamental reform required. The 
diversion of privacy into privatism, however is more problematic than a reflective 
confrontation of the self with its identities. The cognitive and intellectual justifications for 
property as the key to self-development are more than merely well versed, they are apparently 
ineluctable. Indeed, the rational utitlity maximiser would not recognise such a diversion; 
privacy, it would be argued, has become democratic through the greater capacity of 
individuals in 'developed political systems' to choose (i.e. to develop a choice rather than 
choose to develop). But the utility maximiser's argument is flawed. On its own logical 
grounding it, i.e. the idea of maximising private accumulation, is a short term expedient in 
terms of stability (personal/social/political), moreover it is of doubtful use to a 'progressive'
53 C.Mouffe op.cit. p.304
I
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development of the self as part of the human condition when that condition is denied any 
development 'as a whole' through an assumption of democracy. But the idea of an 'empirically 
possible' (and 'normatively necessary') civil society54 cannot be upheld in a culture of 
privatism -  of which the practice of rational utility maximisation is its logical apogee. To use 
the terms of rational utility to turn the argument around, it can be said that the most 'rational' 
form of 'utility maximisation' is not always the most obvious. Critical deliberation would 
extend beyond the individual 'for itself as (private) subject to the inclusion of 'ethico-political'
I matters. Inclusion would come from recognition of political matters as inextricably linked to 
the social position of the self, however distant a privatised existence may make them appear. 
The 'common sense' of private accumulation may then be (critically) addressed.
Civil society must be conceived partly as the realisation that any steps toward the 
emancipation of the self will be taken as social-being, and not with the notion of ‘social-being’ 
as diametrically opposed to the emancipation of the individual. The predominant values of 
'developed political systems' are the accumulation of wealth and the extension of 'the private', 
shaping an understanding of privacy very different to the theme that civil society discourse 
presents. Finding some sort of ontological refuge within the confines of small social units and 
particularist and ‘private’ concerns denies the development of 'social-being'. Certainly the 
possibilities of self-development and moral choice are effectively limited.
The paradox of privacy in civil society discourses is that it must be construed as an 
essentially ‘public’ construction and engagement. The recession from consciousness of the 
notion of 'the private' is crucial to the development of civil society. There can be no 'ethically 
disposed' society in the manner of the idea of civil society, whilst it is still conceived as a 
defence of 'the private' against (public) intrusion by the state. The focus on the state as the 
primary antagonism of democratic development and empowerment of society serves to neglect
54 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit. p. 453
what is as great a threat in the form of the reification of 'the private' in 'developed political 
systems'. Enhancement and consolidation of the 'private' realm is axiomatic in liberal theory, 
and it is on this specific point that civil society theory must decisively depart from it.
j
i
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Chapter 2
Publicity
(Institutions of Culture and Communication)
Without vibrant, receptive and accessible publicity there can be no 'democracy' worthy of the 
name. Here the reference to 'publicity' is as institutions of culture and communication; and not 
as the vague overall that operates as the necessary antithesis of an obscured and fetishised 
conception of 'the private'. A well-defined (however arrived at) bifurcation of public/private is 
one of the defining features of civil society theory. Its political goal of the defence of society 
against the state is, as far as is possible, through 'mediation' from a self-imposed limitation 
rather than a wholesale assumption of power in securing the functions of state, or even its 
absorption into society. But this application is problematic for democracy.
As it stands, the definition of publicity (as with the other 'normative given' of privacy) is 
flawed and susceptible to basic criticisms. One is that it degenerates civil society into a 
version of liberal theory, by not paying adequate attention to the intrinsic relation between 
what is deemed 'private' and what subsequently becomes all else as 'public'. Objective 
categories proved unfounded in the previous chapter; and the legitimacy of this argument, 
grounded in the discussion on 'the self in chapter 1, will be furthered in this one. Civil society 
theory is beset with the problem of conceiving of publicity in reified vein. Invariably 
conducted within a framework that accommodates capitalism (by the acceptance of its 
inevitability), it displays either a naivety, or at least an excessive optimism, regarding the
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condition of the public domain; the most politically relevant sphere of society for a normative 
conception of 'mediated' democracy.1
The previous chapter's attempts to establish the necessary ‘cultural elimination’ of the 
fetishism of 'the private' (however difficult this may be) with regard to the normative 
implications of self-development and moral choice, was pivotal in theorising the grounding 
for the 'normative necessity' of 'civil society'. This chapter reinforces this argument. Recurring
!l|
reference to the 'agenda' of 'developed political systems' helps to maintain a necessary 
mindfulness of the link between consciousness and political legitimacy. The arguments that 
(implicitly) depend on a traditionally conceived notion of the private (pertaining to 'rights of 
privacy' and the correlative understanding of 'self-development and moral choice') were 
refuted. The radical (but theoretically possible) recession from the (political) consciousness of 
'the self, (but not from the state) was first proposed in Chapter 1 .1 will maintain the argument 
by first offering a definition of culture as the wider category of publicity. Then a theoretical 
s exposition of the socio-political role/fimction of its sub-categories of political significance to 
civil society: the public domain; and, in the discursive forms of its ethico-political elements, 
the 'public sphere'.
! The primary task is to make some definitional points of clarification. The first part of the 
chapter consists of a review of the meanings of publicity: a full and extensive enquiry of 
publicity as its widely defined category would require a fairly comprehensive theory of 
society. For reasons of focus then, it requires certain reductions (that are of direct relevance to 
civil society). If the normative pillar that publicity represents is not to be left as some 
untheorised 'virtue' (as was privacy), then, for a 'politics of influence' to effect itself, mediated 
by aspects of publicity, the 'public domain' and the 'public sphere' must be theorised as related 
yet separate concepts. I will propose in this chapter that the public sphere not only requires
J.Keane; J.Habermas; J.L.Cohen & A.Arato
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distinction within its wider category of publicity but also a considerable conceptual separation 
from 'the public domain'. The latter represents asymmetrical discursive contest, whilst the 
normative implications of the 'public sphere' represent a development from contesting more or 
less ‘private’ interests into discourses whose antagonisms are directed toward the perceived 
threats to society in the 'systems' forms of state and capital. Where the ‘public domain’ is 
internally antagonistic, the public sphere exhibits a ‘solidarity’, contesting external forms of 
domination (of state and capital). The implication of this is that the content of culture and 
communication is decisive as well as is the mode. Publicity can only serve as a politically 
normative channel in a radically democratised society once it has been subject, as part of the 
'sacred core' of values, to critical attack. It cannot be assumed as the means in itself toward a 
'normatively necessary' society that is based on the democratic institutions of civil society 
(and if it is to avoid the ultimately empty baggage of the vague notion of privacy).
‘The public domain’ refers to a communication (and culture) that suggests a more or less 
accessible distribution to 'cultural production'. Where publicity at its widest incorporates 
institutions that are beyond the scope of the most elastic and realist conception of a 'public 
sphere' stripped of any normative pretensions, the public domain concerns the concrete 
condition of democratic potential outlined below. As a sub-category of publicity, the public 
domain is considered in its actual condition; a condition that mitigates against the optimism 
that colours the rhetoric that comes from the most unlikely sources.2 The free-flow of 
communication to which Murdoch refers, and which would make him redundant, are however 
optimistically premature. The analysis of his own fate is “attractive but deeply flawed [...]. In 
the emerging environment, power will lie with those who own the key building blocks of new 
communications systems, the rights to key pieces of technology. [In] the battle for command 
over intellectual properties, the media moguls have a sizeable advantage since they already
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own a formidable range of the expressive assets that are central to public culture, and this 
range is steadily increasing through acquisitions, mergers and new partnerships”.
I will pay particular regard to developments that are not short of alarming for democracy, 
even when conceived in its most 'realist' and attenuated forms. The focus will first be on the 
I systems of news media in ‘developed political systems’, and then on to structural 
developments of the media and cultural production and their implications for civil society. 
Developments in the transmission of communication and culture have inspired many and 
; varied optimistic prognoses for democracy.4 But a look at the conditions these developments 
have effected shows 'undemocratic' tendencies of monopolisation, or 'convergence' of 
production and the ‘homogenisation of product’ (‘vertical integration’).
It is the further abstraction from the public domain of a normatively identifiable 'public 
sphere', amid the discursive dominance of competition and acquisition of the wider category 
that is crucial to the development of civil society. Its establishment is essential if any 
sympathy for the application of the idea of civil society is to be retained. If the 
'deconstruction' of 'the private' was the pivotal aim of the first chapter, then the next problem 
for civil society lies in a normatively acceptable extraction from the public domain. The 
| difficult search for answers to this question points toward the essential subject matter of the 
next chapter where 'social movement' will be considered as articulated (democratic) struggle 
that (although not of necessity) could meet the normative demands as idealised below, and 
provide the necessary sociological root of civil society. Here, as an analytical device, I shall 
employ the Gramscian categories of 'economic-corporate' and 'ethico-political' to aid the 
identification and extraction of 'public sphere discourses'.
P.Golding and G.Murdock ‘Culture, Communications and Political Econom y’ in M ass M edia and Society. J.
Curran & M.Gurevitch (eds) Arnold, London. 2000 p.79 Here they refer to Rupert Murdoch ‘writing his own 
usiness obituary’.
Ibid. pp.79-80
H.Rheingold The Virtual Community -  Surfing the Internet. London. Seeker and Warburg. 1994 p.29
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The concluding paragraphs of the chapter will summarise the problems posed and 
questions raised above, and consider the implications for 'civil society democracy' of an 
uncritical embrace of publicity. For greater clarity on what ethico-political discourses sound 
like in the public domain, and how they can be identified, we must look to civil society itself:
! its social relations and democratic (ethico-political) discourses as praxis. (In the next chapter I 
will try to identify these ethico-political elements as ‘social movement’ in the democratic 
desertification of the public domain.)
Following the discussions in the previous chapter of ‘the subject7se//and the question of 
consciousness, the institutions of publicity must be viewed as the corresponding tangible 
reality that is at the same time cause and effect of this consciousness. Not as a separated 
‘objective reality’ that is above and beyond the human will, and certainly not as an 
unchallenged facilitator of ‘transparent’ democracy. By way of illustrating my understanding 
of publicity, and the 'deeper' levels of culture to which its institutions refer, I will use the 
expressed fundamental differences between ecologism and environmentalism.5 These 
differences, emphatic enough in some of the theoretical discourse on Green politics are at 
similar level of paradigmatic thought as the instrumental rationality that underpins an 
economic-corporate consciousness. 'Environmentalism', in the radical green analysis, is a 
mere managerial reformism that rectifies problems from a perspective of the inevitability or 
| 'certainties' of the very systems that pose them. By adopting a 'perspectival multiculturalist' 
approach6 the fundamental differences become more obvious than the similarities, which are 
sometimes merely political or even coincidental.
The target of radical green attack is the subsequent anthropocentrism of early 
Enlightenment thought which, largely thanks to Descartes, created a paradigmatic shift in the
A.Dobson Green Political Thought London Routledge 1992. esp.pp.37-9
This is a term Parekh uses to describe a 'plurality o f world view' rather than the more 'superficial' levels of 
mlticulturalism. B.Parkekh ‘Non-Ethnocentric Universalism’ in T.Dunne & N.J.Wheeler (eds.) Human Rights in 
'lobal Politics  Cambridge University Press 1999
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way of thinking about the world and our place in it. From thereon, the development of the 
belief that all knowledge and basic truths could be understood, and grasped only by a rational 
mind, became axiomatic.7 Whether the methodological route taken to these 'certainties' is 
rationalist or empiricist, the presumption (necessary for the conclusion) is that scientific 
! knowledge can be grounded on an immutable foundation of truths. This position is at odds 
with the basic principles of ecologism (or green radicalism), but not so with 
environmentalism. Indeed, the 'managerial' approach, apart from not recognising totality and 
linkages, must retain some faith in the system or paradigm of thought that proclaims that 
nature can, and for the benefit of 'man' must, be dominated.
The inheritance of an economic-corporate consciousness comes (ultimately?) from later 
philosophical discourses that ascribed rights to 'rational' minds and effectively set the 
conditions of their optimal development through property and its acquisition (within 'private' 
spheres: individual, family, nation, corporation; state). The exercise of these 'rights of 
freedom' came to be measured accordingly. For any serious claims to a practical development 
of the idea of civil society, the dominant discourses of the public domain must reflect a world­
view that has (shifted) from that of current, 'developed' political systems in the same 
| 'perspectival' manner and proportions that ecologism both condemns in the early 
Enlightenment and calls for today.
The fundamental flaw to civil society theories lies in their retention of the highly 
problematic principle of 'self-limitation'. I will discuss this ‘core idea’ of civil society in terms 
of social movement in Chapter 3 and a misplaced ‘extra-democratic’ embrace of legality in 
chapter 4. However, the 'core-values'8 that must become subject to critical attack, as well as 
having their retention considered as necessary etc, requires a radicalism that parallels the 
'perspectival' level of attack of ecologism, and consequently goes beyond the boundaries of a
R.Descartes Discourse on Method: M editations F.E.Sutcliffe (trans.) London. Penguin 1968
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sustainable principle of 'self-limitation'. Where Baconian proclamations of 'domination and 
mastery’ have become culturally implicit, and are the points of attack for radical green 
thinkers, so, similarly the commonsensical assumptions surrounding 'rights', property and, by 
corollary, the modem (legal) state must become the points of critique for civil society
I
discourse if it is to realise a radical democracy.
The conceptually unsustainable category of ‘private’, and its revised meaning according to 
civil society’s normative intent, effectively dissolves the oppositional division of
i
public/private. Without its antithetical identification of ‘private’, the defining of ‘public’ 
becomes all the more difficult. ‘Institutions o f Culture and Communication'’ is too vast and 
exhaustive a category to serve much investigative use as it stands. But as a cornerstone of a 
‘normatively necessary’ civil society, the publicity that these institutions represent is of 
crucial importance. Required are normatively acceptable discourses to provide the publicity to 
found civil society. By 'normatively acceptable' I mean communications in the public domain 
that show a number of characteristics. The two most salient features of these discursive 
! formations are their opposition to the state and their opposition, explicit or otherwise 
(explain), to capitalism. Other, less obvious, features of this tendency of discourse includes its 
! potentially universal inclusiveness of participation and adoption of its cultural forms, its 
iconoclasm, and its democratic innovation.
As a methodological device for identifying these institutions, a conceptual division 
! between culture and communication is unworkable. Institutions of culture (that is culture both 
in the narrow, specific sense where it is “something that pretends to exist for its own sake”.9 
and in the broader meaning of Weberian kultur) and communication are fused. This has 
always been the case. The filtration of ‘something[s] that pretend[ ] to exist for [their] own 
sake’ into the imagery and narratives of broader culture communicate a basic (political)
jLL.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit. p.343
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morality. Thus for any political theory to make serious claims of application it is important to 
clarify what is meant by culture.
Firstly it must be made clear that this term does not refer to a separated aesthetic 
realm of society where ‘art exists for art’s sake’. Such a limited conception is derived from a 
perspective of society formed of independently existing autopoietic systems. Nor must it be, 
on the other hand, interpreted as a metaphysical whole that acts as the ‘motor’ (or perhaps, 
given the strong German idealist influence on this view, Zeitgeist) of society independently of 
any effect of human interaction. A modification of the latter perspective is easier to accept, if 
a broad view of culture includes the complex relations of human volition within the social 
totality it implies. But the perspective of ‘art for art’s sake’ (one of the ‘freest’ of human 
expressions and actions as it may well be) is of limited political function in the development 
of civil society as the dynamic of ‘developmental democracy’. However, the conception of 
culture as a ‘purity of art’ is only ‘apolitical’ in the sense that the ‘legal ideal’ is ‘neutral’, i.e. 
not really. (This is the basic enquiry of Chapter 4). Just as the ‘apolitical’ footings of legality 
provide the structure for morally tendentious and ideologically maintained social relations, 
‘pure (or fine) art’, in the conditions of ‘developed political systems’, fulfils an important 
function of socio-political legitimacy.
An ‘objective reality’ ascribed to (a hegemonic) culture communicates a web of 
‘common sense’, perceived as truth that is then internalised as subjective reality. The ‘givens’ 
of a (hegemonic) culture shape the consciousness of the self as a reflection of more or less 
fixed identity and whose course of development is concordant with this ‘truth’. This is an 
important point of socio-political legitimacy. It is an ineluctable argument to say that in the 
conditions of ‘developed political systems’ the ‘post-modernist cultural logic of capitalism’ 
undermines specific ‘certainties’ of consciousness. But this is only part of the inexorable
J.Habermas The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category o f  Bourgeois Society
processes of establishing another (far more insidious to civil society) ‘certainty’ -  that of 
property being the tangible object of the subjective ideal of freedom. (The correlative, more 
intangible reifying of ‘the private’ -discussed in Chapter 1 as an illusory objective reality -  is 
the cohesion of this legitimacy in ‘developed political systems’).
Culture is the underlying recognition of (as ‘ideologised’ imperatives) boundaries
I
! beyond which an action deviates from accustomed and consensual social and political 
i behaviour. It corresponds to the ‘morality’ that ‘coheres’ a society, or perhaps more 
accurately for purposes of general application, secures a socio-political system. The most
j
basic element of this morality is language. But as the primary institution, language is more 
than a lingua franca of a society, or the common bond of nations, but a communication of 
values that underpin the relations of a society. Even in the societies of so-called ‘developed 
political systems’ (just as was the case in the ‘undeveloped political’ systems of the former 
communist states of eastern Europe), the ‘morality’ remains at the ‘economic-corporate’ level 
of consciousness. (And therefore impedes any further development (politically) beyond the 
i extension of a bureaucratised politics - in other words, an extension of the state). The 
language of ‘developed political systems’ communicates a morality whose vocabulary derives 
I from concepts such as ‘rights’ and ‘contract’. Its political agenda is legitimately structured 
accordingly, and the ‘very conditions of privatism’ then become part of the ‘cultural 
certainties’ that cannot be accommodate the idea of civil society.
The culture of the conjunction of ‘development’ and ‘economic wealth’ has long 
been established as an indistinguishable ‘given’, and the failure of the progression of 
consciousness to the ‘ethico-political’ applies to economic performance at governmental level 
(state) as well as at individual. The seemingly unshakeable union between ‘development’ 
(from such as post-colonial state building to personal) and material accumulation is shored up,
iambridge Polity Press 1995 p.29
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not so much by a proliferation of rights (in their actuality), but by an expansion of rights 
discourse and its contradictory overlap with democratic discourse. This contradiction has been 
all but concealed by the political rhetoric of economic-corporate interests in the public 
domain.
One of the primary institutions of publicity is ‘the family’. Within the reference of 
a private/public divide, the inclusion of the family within publicity might be said to be simply 
wrong, and little represents ‘the private’ better than does ‘the family’. Within the frames of 
reference of this thesis, less explanation is perhaps required regarding ‘the publicity of the 
family’ than its inclusion here rather than in Chapter 3 on Plurality where it is an identified 
‘form of association’. As the emphasis of chapter 3 is on the social relations of civil society as 
‘free association’, ‘the family’, or rather the effect of it on the proposition of a civil society, is 
better understood as a conduit for cultural norms of behaviour rather than an institution of 
‘plurality’ as free (political) association.
However, the intimate sphere is regarded as the most important source of the 
ethical disposition that will secure the social relations of a democratised civil society. 
Following Habermas, for whom “The public’s understanding of the use of reason was guided 
specifically by such experiences as grew out of the audience-oriented subjectivity of the 
conjugal family’s intimate domain”.10 Cohen and Arato place great importance on the family 
(or intimate sphere). Their adoption of discourse-ethics as a legitimating political ethic 
requires that they emphasise the importance of the family (or intimate sphere) as a 
fundamental part of the lifeworld and as such integral to the structure of their civil society. 
The origins of the principle of ethical discourse are to be found in this intimate sphere, the 
ideal of which allows for “interaction free of domination and external social constraint”.11 In 
this, his earlier reflections on the family, Habermas sees within this formation the ideal of
Ibid. p.28
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generating “the development of all capacities that signify cultivated persons as ends in 
themselves”.12 Moreover, this latent ideal, identified as such within the relations of the 
traditional nuclear family, is not merely ideological; Habermas recognises the reality of 
patriarchal domination and economic functions, and concedes that this reality is a threat to the 
potentially real. But it is not an illusory projection. The potential of the relations within the 
intimate sphere is the deference of inter-subjective human experiences in the face of external 
and inhuman forces. Furthermore, these relations are capable of becoming institutionalised as 
forms other than the ‘bourgeois’, or traditional nuclear unit.
However, this intimate sphere is still problematic even if it is formed from a rational 
development of the bourgeois family. Whilst it may be, in an idealised fashion, a sphere of 
relations where domination and hierarchy are surpassed by reciprocity and symmetry, and 
‘givens’ are replaced by inquiry and reasons, it is not in itself, and in its traditional form 
cannot be, the optimal condition for self-development and moral choice that is the ‘domain of 
privacy’. In its traditional form identities are more or less fixed in the consequential roles of 
the dominant discourses germane to this formation. Neither in a reformulated framework, that 
had managed to detach itself from the legacy of tradition and hierarchy left behind by 
patriarchal domination, can this sphere best fashion the domain of privacy in its reconstructed 
sense. This was shown in the last chapter to be a necessarily public process for logical reasons 
of self-development, and for political reasons of an expanded and deepened democracy. The 
political argument challenges the ‘intimate sphere’/(family) as the conceived ethical source 
or as the cultural origin of the public sphere as a mode. It maintains that if the public sphere 
represents a means of critical debate and political involvement then its generation and 
reproduction is to be found elsewhere (in the discursive forms of the public sphere and its 
praxis as social movement). I will propose, in the next chapter, that the critical development
Ibid. p .213
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of consciousness and ethico-political perspective is derived from the public discourses of civil 
society, and the institutionalising processes of social movement as the praxis of those 
discourses.
This intimate sphere is pivotal to Habermas’s account: “The public’s understanding of 
the use of reason was guided specifically by such private experiences as grew out of the 
audience-oriented subjectivity of the conjugal family’s intimate domain”.13 This use of 
reason, the dynamism of Habermas’s critically edged public sphere is impelled from the 
intimate sphere, for which we can read ‘the family’, to the ‘literary sphere’ to the ‘political 
public sphere’ where it is consolidated. Even if these categories could hold up to this 
differentiation, the line of projection is wrong. It may have provided the explanation for the 
failure of the ideal of ‘the public sphere’ to realise itself in what was a specific, historical 
constellation of the development of a ‘bourgeois’ public space or means of discursive political 
activity, as a development of ‘early’ capitalism. But far from being the necessary outcome of 
such a progression, a critical-rational consciousness (without which the ‘public sphere’ loses 
all its evaluative underpinnings) becomes limited by the fusion of these categories that are 
characteristic of ‘later’ capitalism. Moreover, rational criticism, one of the defining features of
; the public sphere, is given easier rein when its object is viewed furthest from the intimate 
sphere. To take perhaps an obvious example like patriarchy, as an abstracted concept it is 
more easily criticised for its mode of domination than are immediate members of the intimate 
sphere who sustain it. Even if indeed there is first of all the recognition that a mode of
! domination is at work in such relations.
t
The obvious criticism to make of the family as an integral, and so ethical, part of 
civil society is that it is not usually chosen or voluntarily entered into (this point will be 
returned to in ch.3 on Plurality). But even this compulsion is not the main impediment to the
Ibid. pp.53-5
88
critical role of a ‘politically aware’ self. It may be that, in rare instances, the intimate sphere 
has become independent of economic necessity and material reproduction, but even here 
critical or rational appraisal is either distorted or subdued altogether by ‘affective 
considerations’ and constraint. Intellectual and moral reform requires compatibility between 
the affective and the cognitive. Because of strong ties based on the former, the intimate 
j sphere/family is not readily amenable to this reform, and cannot therefore provide the initial 
| impetus for a critical dimension to (an ‘ethico-political’ level of) consciousness in its wider 
vision.
The ‘givens’ of consciousness, transmitted by publicity, are historical 
contingencies. An economic-corporate consciousness is an historical contingency; its cultural 
forms assuming widely varying discourses on traditional institutions like the contradictory 
relations between the liberal ideal of freedom of the individual and ‘family values’, and 
between the former and national identity. But this apparent variety masks the economic- 
corporate category of these cultural forms, from the ‘ethno-centric’ politics of ‘undeveloped 
systems’ to the ‘consumer-centric’ politics of developed systems. Just as they can promote 
and support a vibrant democracy, in the manner that a ‘post-traditional civil society’ suggests, 
the institutions of publicity can also ossify into oppressive tradition.
Publicity used as freely as it is by civil society theory as a normative concept of 
institutions overlooks the negative aspects that comprise some of its ‘core values’. 
Consequently the dominant core institutions of publicity itself, such as property, legality, 
tradition, the discursive forms on freedom and rights that project the free market as the sphere 
of exercise of that freedom are overlooked. Publicity, in other words is, in the generalised 
| condition of ‘developed political systems’, a threat to the development of civil society. 
Publicity then is far from the guarantor of a transparent politics; it is the generator of
Ibid. p.28
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contradictory discourses, yet manages to contrive a certainty to these institutions despite these 
contradictions. It is in this sense that institutions of culture and communication, 
predominantly, are the promulgators of a ‘false’ consciousness that asserts permanency and 
inevitability rather than contingency and possibility. It is an irony that the logical conclusion 
i of the bewildering array and amalgam of discourses, that publicity represents, leads to as 
| privatised an existence as is possible through the accumulation of property/wealth; (private 
! education, health insurance, and for some of those whose ‘self-development’ has proceeded 
accordingly, private ‘gated communities'. The social and political effects of this cultural 
i condition on democracy is to reduce it to a realist and attenuated model of a rubber stamp 
legitimating process in ‘developed political systems’, and to confuse it with the freedom of 
market principles in ‘undeveloped political systems’, 
j In light of these analyses, far from being the mutually reinforcing principles that
Cohen and Arato claim of their synthesis, the expansion of rights discourses is in truth 
extremely problematic for the democratisation of civil society. If ‘discourse’ is to be 
understood in the Foucauldian sense of “curious entities which one believes one can recognise 
at first glance, but whose limits one would have some difficulty in defining”,14 then it is 
possible to conceive of the language of rights as reinforcing the particularism of a privatised 
society. Indeed, the continued ascendance of rights as inviolable and private in their relation 
to the individual, and interpretation as the core values of ‘democracy’ adds a legal dimension 
j  to morality. (This question of legality as moral resource is taken up at length in Chapter 4).
No action, if it contravenes the contextual rationale of this particular discourse, can 
be deemed ‘a development’ if it is in any way economically self-abrogating. This applies to 
states as well as the individuals who are subject to them. By using Schopflin’s division as a 
conceptual tool of convenience here (however generalised and problematic the geographical
application may be) a political system acquires its prefix of ‘developed’ if it has prioritised its 
agenda to matters of private economic concern. The modem constitutional governments of 
‘capitalist democracies’ that are Schopflin’s idea of ‘developed’ political systems operate at 
the level of ‘economic-corporate’ concerns, which reflect the levels of concern that preoccupy 
I those who are subject to them. The ‘economic-corporate’ level of morality, in ‘developed 
; political systems’ can be identified by, among other things, the judgement of a government on 
i perceived economic performance rather than, say, the conduct of its foreign policy, 
i  Arguments to the contrary that may use the ‘Falklands Factor', as an example of how a 
politically cynical war returned a victory for a government whose appalling economic record 
ought to have kept them far from power is evidence that foreign policy, for instance, 
overriding domestic economic policies equates to the economic-corporate becoming 
subordinate would be wrong. The economic-corporate entity in this case was ‘national- 
identity’ (a ‘given’ which served a particularist cause), a boundary beyond which the socio­
political system as a whole could not step (however ‘developed’ it may have been according 
to Schopflin’s criteria). It is the institutions of culture and communication (publicity) that 
maintain a traditionalist aspect to consciousness that has consistently failed the development 
of an (ethico-) political consciousness that is the ‘idea’ of civil society.
To make it possible to define the democratic potential that civil society theorists 
and liberals alike assume from publicity (synonymous with a transparent and democratic 
polity) it is necessary to conceptually reduce the term to apply to the ‘public domain’. It is in 
the rapid structural and technological developments of communication and information that 
can be found striking ambiguities regarding this potential. The task of theorising the public 
j  domain, crucial to a radical theory of democracy is made conceptually the more problematic 
by the overlap with terms usually employed within an understanding of the (Habermasian)
M.Foucault ‘Politics and the study o f discourse’ in The Foucault Effect (eds) G.Burchell, C.Gordon, and P.Miller.
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‘public sphere’. Conceptual clarification requires the abstraction of a defined aspect of 
publicity whose institutions of culture and communication reflect a disposal of economic- 
corporate interest and a development of ethico-political discourse.
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas explains what the public sphere is not: an 
institution (“and certainly not [ ] an organisation”15) neither a framework of norms consisting of 
roles and membership regulations nor a system. Rather it is better, described as a communicative 
process that ‘filters and synthesises’ public opinions; understood as a peripherally derived 
sluicing mechanism of the ‘core area’ of institutional complexes of administration and judicial 
system, and characterised by “permeable and shifting horizons”.16 It is communicatively 
structured not just in relation to the mode (i.e. the function and content of everyday 
communication) but also socio-graphically, forming a relatively tangible social space.17 An 
important point is that the extension of the sphere is coterminous with its abstraction; that is, 
from the identifiably ‘local’ and ‘physical’ to the broader and a ‘virtual’ comprised of “scattered
1Rreaders, listeners, or viewers linked by the public media ...”. The implications are numerous 
and will be examined below, but it is important to point out the salient feature that the ‘links’ of 
this broader sphere are all consumers of information, the ‘common strands of identity’19 in 
otherwise societies that are culturally specific.
Objections to Habermas’s theory of the public sphere are numerous. I will refer here 
to Nancy Fraser’s criticisms of Habermas’s ‘public sphere’, for two principal reasons. The first is 
that the four assumptions that she claims have to be made in Habermas’s theory refer to the most 
salient points of its criticism. And secondly that this criticism itself is constructed from 
economic-corporate reference points, confusing the public sphere with the economic-corporate
University o f Chicago Press. 1991 p.54
15 J.Habeimas Between Facts and Norms; Contributions to a D iscourse Theory o f  Law and Dem ocracy  Cambridge. 
Polity Press. 1997 p.360
16 Ibid. p J 5 6
17 Ibid. p .160
18 Ibid. p .161
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discourses of the public domain. The normative emphasis that is required of a theory of the 
public sphere is consequently minimised.
The first of the four assumptions that are inherent and problematic, according to Fraser, 
in Habermas’s theory is that there is the tacit liberal acceptance that ‘social’ equality is not a 
necessary condition for political democracy. As a corollary, her criticism is that ‘discursive 
malpractice’ within the bourgeois public sphere itself is overlooked in the emphasis on formal 
inclusion, and that participatory politics cannot be achieved in an overarching public (which 
‘denies’ what she (Fraser) describes as ‘subaltern publics’ which then, consequently, denies 
‘open access’) where there must theoretically be a “zero degree of culture”.20 The question of 
social equality is addressed below , but if its vagueness can be accepted here for brevity’s sake 
then we cannot but accept that this must be the structural condition for genuine democracy, but 
equally it would be absurd to suggest that it is sufficient.
The problem of focusing on ‘access’ (which again is elaborated on below by way of a 
critical assessment of prognostic views on democracy vis-a-vis developments in information and 
communication technology) is that it reduces the problem of ‘participatory democracy’ to the 
material access to hardware and the ‘cultural products’ of the public domain. But the public 
sphere, it cannot be emphasised enough, is not a domain of discourses that can by virtue of its 
own publicity secure the democratic base to a civil society even if ‘universal access’ to these 
| products is achieved. To varying degrees access to a public forum already exists in some 
\ political systems, but it is significant that the greater the expansion of this domain and access to
j
1 it, which is one of the hallmarks of a ‘developed political system’, the less critical becomes its
i
content. This is the logical progression of cultural development under capitalist expansion; the 
maintenance of economic-corporate categories and identities then precludes, or at least impedes, 
the development of a ‘public sphere’. The quest for universal, or equally distributed, access to
19 N.Fraser Unruly Practices Cambridge. Polity Press 1990 p. 120
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the public domain translates democracy into the expansion of consumption of ‘cultural products’ 
The public sphere, on the other hand, articulates the discourses of civil society, and represents 
the praxis of social movement. It is not an ‘original position’; it is democratically sourced 
creativity that is a living cultural hybrid with sociological roots, not a sphere of ‘zero degree of 
culture’.
Fraser is right to raise the question of access and social inequality as preconditions for a 
participatory democracy. It is a valid criticism from the point of view of the redistribution of 
wealth. But she is conceptually wrong in her criticism of the public sphere for this assumption of 
a “zero degree of culture”.21 To conceive of the ‘public sphere’ as a rational debate shrouded in 
some ‘veil of ignorance’ would be a gross misinterpretation and would deny any effective 
political application. Rather than an assumption of a zero degree of culture, there must be a 
presumption of a certain kind o f culture; the necessary political culture for a ‘public sphere’ 
worthy of the name. An important facet then of the ‘public sphere’, is as a mode of discourse 
which can invigorate the privatised self into becoming ‘politically aware’; that is, aware of the 
‘public self’ and its conditions of development.
Fraser’s attack on the desirability of a ‘singular public sphere’ is another instance of the 
thrust of attack on Habermas’s public sphere coming from a conceptual framework that can only 
deny theoretical development. Her argument that the idea of a ‘political nation’ identifying itself
| and concerning itself with set agendas within sovereign borders is vulnerable on two counts. 
Firstly, she underestimates the still powerful ideological forces behind the continued
l rt
predominance of ‘political nation’ as one of numerous economic-corporate identities. Having
i<
said this, the cultural globalisation processes support her argument insofar as it is pointing in the 
right direction. Secondly, and more importantly, her argument can only conceive of ‘the public 
sphere’ as being the domain of political resolution to conflicting economic-corporate demands,
20 ibid.
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and the subsequent dilution and compromise of these demands as ‘common’ interest of 
economic-corporate entities like ‘political nation’.
Certain developing institutions of publicity may not necessarily derive from reflexive and 
post-traditional discursive overlap, and so may be devoid of any ethico-political convergence. 
However, it is also true to say (as Fraser does) that if a specific sphere of social relations become 
a public cultural entity then it is by definition opening itself to the probability of rational scrutiny 
from other public discourses. These relations are more likely then to become, for instance,
! egalitarian and inclusive (if these characteristics of public sphere discourses were not found to be 
intrinsic to a particular ‘public’). But within this argument of discursive contest and exposure 
between publics is an assumption of a trans-cultural communication which, according to Fraser’s 
language, “requires multicultural literacy [that] can be acquired through practice”.22 So if it is 
accepted that “communication across cultural lines is not in principle impossible” then it must 
also be recognised that the public sphere (whose normative realisation is as a mode rather than 
site) represents a singularity of aim. If these cultural lines are to be crossed it represents the 
‘normatively necessary’ deconstruction and reconstruction of specifically oriented cultures that 
| form the basis of ‘applied1 civil society.
The third point of criticism made of Habermas by Fraser concerns the boundaries of what 
is deemed of ‘public concern’. Discourse should be restricted to a ‘common good’, and the 
public sphere can be no place for particularist interest. But if the public sphere is to include 
particularist interest then there would be no point in trying to theorise it as an ethically specific 
aspect of communication in civil society.
A sharp division between state and civil society is untenable. It is an unrealistic separation 
in an analysis of civil society as a category of political sociology devoid of any ethical ideal.i
i Fraser is therefore right to criticise this when a tangible realm outside the state’s intrusion in
21 ibid. p. 121
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some form and to some degree, whether this intrusion be legal or communicative, doesn’t exist 
in ‘developed political systems’. But civil society is well defined as a sphere conceptually 
differentiated from the state at a normative level, and as ‘actually’ separated in practical social 
movement insofar as it is ‘detached’ from ‘the state’).
The problems that inhere in Habermas’s public sphere model can only be fully 
grasped when the distinction between the communicative logics of the lifeworld and ‘systems’ is 
established. But in circular fashion, for the public sphere to retain its potential of political 
influence, certain conditions must be in place prior to the communicative process that is its 
distinction. There must be a priori agreements and recognition of ‘validity norms’ for discourse- 
ethics to proceed. There must be, first of all, an initial acceptance that one’s own argument may 
be flawed, an acceptance that is a condition of its validity claim. There must already exist a 
communicative rationality prior to the actual public space and which is independent of the 
instrumental rationality of ‘systems’.
But the reality is that those ‘in’, or seeking, political power do not act on such 
| premises. This is an important point. Civil society theory insists that its agents and their 
objectives, democratisation included, must be ‘self-limiting’. Without this principle, civil society 
would lose its defining strategy, but its retention has the equally undesirable effect of sacrificing 
the acheivability of its normative objectives. It also has the peculiarly undemocratic effect of 
setting boundaries on the agency of civil society by subordinating it to the demands of systems 
efficiency.24
The importance of Habermas here is despite the coupling of the ideal to the historicism of 
its near development; “[his] linking of his study of the development of the liberal-bourgeois 
public sphere to a specific historical pattern of development should not lead us to neglect his
' 22 N.Fraser ibid. p. 127
23 Ibid.
24 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit. p.328
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theoretical model of this sphere, however ideal-typical or even composite it may appear".25 I 
agree with them. However, there adaptation of the public sphere does not resolve analytical 
problems (it remains the public domain), and consequently lacks the ethical composition that a 
democracy conceived in the idea of civil society requires.
There are two key areas of concern. The first is the origin or source of a critical dimension 
to public debate or, put another way, ‘ethico-political’ involvement; and the second is the 
problem of ‘crises o f conscience at the periphery’ facing the core-periphery model of democracy 
that Habermas adopts. Any model of democracy that attempts to retain its normative elements by 
relying on a participatory notion of the public sphere cannot avoid these two questions.
Important in the understanding of ‘the public sphere’ is its conception as a ‘norm’ or 
ideal rather than a fact of contemporary societies. In other words, it must be identified not as a 
‘site’ (or sites) or, exclusively as a mode (as in the practice of discourse-ethics) but by the 
discursive content or tendency that distinguishes this sphere from the public domain described 
above. The credibility of the ‘public sphere’ as a viable means of democratic politics has never 
been assured, and its use in any political theory invokes cynicism from the realist school of 
democracy and the political left who still view it in terms of Habermas’s flawed construction. 
Aside from the flaw that Habermas himself identifies in his earlier conception of the public 
sphere, there is also the problem which assumes the ‘authentic ontology’ of individuals to be 
fundamentally private. But the conception of ‘private’ so understood, its questionable continued 
legitimacy notwithstanding, carries with it a corresponding striving for ontological security.
Defences of the public sphere as being of contemporary relevance and socio-political 
potential include revisions of Habermas’s conception. The public sphere, however much it needs 
to be revised and adapted under perpetually changing conditions, of necessity, invokes the 
[normative values of rational-critical debate, which was the historical legacy bestowed upon
25 Ibid. p .219
97
9 f isubsequent generations by the original bourgeois version with all its well-documented faults. 
What may be missed in the necessary adaptations pointed to by McGuigan here is the required 
extent and depth of this revision. Hill and Montag take a bit further, saying that: “It is necessary 
to go further to ask what is the function of the concept of the concept of the public sphere today 
politically, as well as in historical analysis and philosophical reflection”.27 Its function may fulfil 
the normative levels of rational-critical debate and discursive formations whose tendencies point 
toward an ethico-political consciousness, or, on the other hand, the ‘political function’ of what 
Hill and Montag are describing (which is essentially the wider public domain) serves the 
interests of state and capital at a ‘commonsensical’ level. Warner’s contribution to the theory of 
the ‘the public sphere’ is that it is this sphere that incorporates the public aspect of 
consciousness, or ‘public subjectivity’. The relation between the ‘public self’ and ‘the self’ must 
be one of unity; as a participatory democracy demands (and as privacy in its reconstructed sense 
depends upon). If a discourse can develop in any given public space, then its capacity of rising 
above the economic-corporate levels of publicity to a level of ethico-political apprehension, or 
consciousness can reflect the normative domain of the public sphere.
The (virtual) disappearance of the public sphere into the commercialised public domain 
has dire implications for both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of communicative or 
deliberative democracy. ‘Crises of conscience’ (at the periphery); political apathy; alienation; 
marginalisation; individualism: are all causal factors in what can amount to a dangerous 
democratic deficit.
The defining boundary of ‘the public sphere’ requires re-drawing, and clarification must 
be made concerning the differentiation between ‘public sphere’ and publicity; the two concepts 
are neither identical nor coterminous. The latter, it might be reminded, alludes to institutions of
; 26 J.M.McGuigan. Culture and the Public Sphere. London. Routledge. 1996. p. 176 Habermas did not mean that the 
public sphere was intrinsically bourgeois. Rather it was society that was bourgeois that produced a bourgeois public 
sphere.
27 M.Hill & W.Montag (eds.) M asses, Classes and the Public Sphere Verso 2000 p.6
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culture and communication in a broader sense than the narrower notion of ‘political publicness\  
But importantly it represents something more abstract (and complex). It incorporates the public 
aspect of consciousness, or ‘public subjectivity’. The relation between the ‘public self’ and ‘the 
self’ must be one of unity; as a participatory democracy demands (and as privacy in its 
reconstructed sense depends upon). If a discourse can develop in any given public space, then its 
capacity for inspiring a reflexive introspection (in other words the ‘public self’ apprehending the 
‘private self’ and being held to rational account by it) is a measure of its capability of rising 
above the economic-corporate levels of publicity, that dominate Western societies and political 
systems, to a level of ‘ethico-political’ apprehension, or consciousness. We may consider how 
the economic-corporate levels of publicity affect our self-identity; as ‘nationals’ for instance, and 
the corresponding status ascribed us depending on our subsequent (nominal) roles in inter­
national relations. An awareness of our own contingency may be raised, that is to say, a 
realisation of the illusory necessity and inevitability of who we are and in what kind of society. 
Discourse that has ethico-political communicative potential as part of ‘the public sphere’ may 
highlight some of the despotic effects of publicity itself. Thus Publicity does not represent the 
antithesis of privacy, but includes institutions and relations which could not be incorporated into 
a sphere declared ‘public’ simply because of their mode; that is, they neither facilitate nor 
revolve around a communicative rationality, or put another way perhaps, cannot attain an ethico- 
political status. For the normative purposes of civil society, the public sphere as a mode must be 
emphasised more than the problematic distinction of it as a site. So for clarity of abstraction, ‘the 
public sphere’ is situated in ‘publicity’, but the former distinguishes itself through its capacity to 
maintain an ‘ethico-political’ level of discourse. The ethico-political tendencies of discourses 
in the public domain, the framework of a reconsidered version of the public sphere, erode social
28 J.Habermas Between Facts and Norms op.cit p.361
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context insofar as they transcend culturally specific ‘traditional’ structures of power and 
i  authority.
The deliberative form of democracy that Habermas counsels requires a structural model 
around which it can establish its politics of influence. It requires a model that can retain the core 
normative elements of democracy, too many of which have been lost in models like ‘systems- 
theory’ and the ‘economic theory of democracy’ according to Habermas. Resolving the defects 
of these models is the effect of the more normatively favourable model of ‘core-periphery’ 
which he proposes. Of the two defective models, the former “cuts the last remaining ties with 
normative models, essentially limits itself to the self-referential problems of an autopoietic 
political system. ... the latter, in a contrasting but equally defective presupposition of a 
methodological individualism focuses on legitimation”.29 The deliberative form of democracy 
that Habermas counsels requires a structural model around which it can establish its politics of 
influence. Given that systems logic has become an ‘irreversible fact’ (a ‘given’) of modem life 
according to Habermas, he turns to a model of ‘radical democracy’ as a means to ameliorate the 
effects of the market and of state intrusion. The question that he then addresses is “whether and 
how a constitutionally regulated circulation of power might be established”.30 He offers a 
deliberative model of democracy to try and accommodate this procedural sovereignty 
(sovereignty inheres in the procedure, rather than in the people themselves). It is in: “those 
subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of the discursive opinion and will- 
formation in such a way that their fallible outcomes have the presumption of practical reason on 
their side”. His claim is that it can retain the core normative elements of democracy, too many of 
which have been lost in models like ‘systems-theory’ and the ‘economic theory of democracy’. 
The former of these two defective models “cuts the last remaining ties with normative models, 
essentially limits itself to the self-referential problems of an autopoietic political system ... The
29 Ibid. p.333
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(latter, in a contrasting but equally defective presupposition of a methodological individualism 
focuses on legitimation”.31
The application of the theory of the public sphere to politics requires at least these 
two things: a certain degree of quality to the ‘debate’; and a significant and socially broad-based 
input. The first condition was, problematically, undermined by the actual and historical 
development of, what (theoretically) should have been the supportive, structures of the second 
condition. In Structural Transformation, Habermas charts the degeneration of the public sphere 
as causally directed by the development of mass media and of corporatism. Private organisations 
accrued political power while the private realm was penetrated by the state. The public and 
private realms blurred, consequentially breaking down the intimate sphere and ultimately 
substituting rational-critical debate with the consumption of culture. (If the content and 
presentation of newspapers, for example, in consumer-capitalist society can be used as fairly 
reliable yardsticks to ‘measure the quality of the debate’ then there are implications for the 
analysis of ‘privatism’. (It would have to be considered as a ‘loss of publicity’ to private 
concerns and consequently the deformation of privacy as an objective reaction to the loss). The 
second condition is neither without difficulty. Technological developments in communication 
would, logically one would think, point to greater participation. This may ultimately prove to be 
the case in an as yet inconceivable way. However the more sceptical view, which is well 
grounded in a number of disciplinary fields, tells us to be more cautious of the possibilities of 
some advanced form of ‘cyber-democracy’.32
The question of whether greater participation in a polity will follow technological 
developments in communications is neither necessarily correlative nor new. In the first instance,
30 Ibid  p.354
31 Ibid. p.333 Habermas has lowered the expectations he has o f democracy by reconfiguring it within the capitalist 
| system rather than as a more radical self-governance. See J.Habermas. ‘Conversations about Questions o f Political 
I Theory’ in his 'A Berlin Republic: Writings on Germany'. Trans. Steven Randall. Lincoln University o f Nebraska
Press. 1997
32 M.Poster The Second Media Age  Cambridge Polity Press 1995
if anything the correlation appears to be negative. In a relatively short historical period rapid 
developments in technology, and particularly information technology, have mirrored a decline in 
the same period in the faith (and subsequently participation) in politics. However much voting is 
now considered ineffective and more a stamp of legitimation than a democratic exercise, its 
value, given weight by past democratic struggles for basic political freedoms, still makes its 
levels a reliable indicator of the depth of political disillusionment in ‘developed political 
systems’. The second instance echoes past arguments concerning the relation between 
technological development and the prospects for democracy. The subject of the subsequent 
cultural impact on politics is nothing new. Arguments stretch back to Adorno, Horkeimer, 
Williams, Brecht, and Benjamin. Contemporary arguments parallel those that dominated critical 
theory for much of the 20th century. In much the same way as the ‘cruder’ media of cinema and 
television before it, the technological advances in the field of information and communication in 
| the contemporary public domain suggests optimism, pessimism, and, more reasonable in 
theoretical terms, ambivalence.33 The potential of this form of communication is examined by 
Rheingold in his assessment of a revitalisation of ‘citizen-based democracy’. He theorises 
‘virtual communities’ that develop in cyberspace: “virtual communities” are social aggregations 
that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on public discussions long enough, with 
sufficient human feeling, to turn webs of personal relationships in cyberspace”.34 But 
problematically he tries to apply the terms and conditions of Habermas’s theory of the public 
sphere to these ‘virtual communities’. There are three identifiable and fundamental problems, all 
of which can be sourced at the structure of cultural production, access, commodification, and 
homogenisation. Rheingold’s ‘updating’ may have some kernel of the ideal of Habermas’s 
public sphere in certain discourses that are symmetrical, reciprocal, and reflexive,35 but the
33 M.Poster op.cit.;Rheingold op.cit.
34 H.Rheingold.op.cit p.5
35 These terms refer to the conditions o f discourse -  ethics in Habermas’s communicative theory.
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‘autonomy’ that is ascribed to the ‘cyberdemocrat’ is problematic for reasons already established 
in Chapter 1.
What challenges the notion of autonomy here is, despite the claim that the spheres of 
exchange are relatively free of external power and authority (although this should not be taken 
without a considerable measure of circumspection), they are subject to ideological factors of 
consciousness. The absence of extraneous power and authority does not maintain, by virtue of its 
absence, the normative dimension of the ‘public sphere’. For this, the contents and ‘tendencies’ 
of discourses must ethically qualify as a component of a public (sphere) dialogue of creative 
exchange undistorted by the instrumental rationality (and its complementary economic-corporate 
consciousness) that steers the media of the ‘systems’ that steer society.
The phrase ‘the political application of the public sphere’, it could be said, is something 
of a misnomer that misemploys the term ’public sphere’. The public sphere is already political 
by definition according to the terms of reference in this thesis. What is required of the public 
sphere for a democratised civil society is that it becomes the dominant, or rather hegemonic, 
‘political sphere’. Its application to the political sphere makes apparent the inherent reformism of 
civil society theories that require only that the public sphere mediates between society and the 
state. The principle of ‘self-limitation’ that is central to theories of civil society limits their own 
radicalism and they become trapped in an economic-corporate framework. (This restraint mirrors 
the points raised earlier concerning the differences between ecologism and environmentalism). 
The managerial approach of the latter is no more than ‘mediation’ between society and the state, 
amounting to tinkering and ineffective reforms when at its most optimal application.
However, the focus here on Habermas’s adoption of the ‘core-periphery’ model does 
two things that are pertinent and contributory to this thesis. Firstly there is the question of 
I democracy itself, and the imperative of retaining its core normative values to underpin civil 
society, bringing into political relief the problem of privatism. Secondly, and perhaps more
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fundamentally defective, is the lack of reconsideration of the public sphere. The question that 
must be asked is what political role this ‘sphere’ of discourse that transcends the ‘commonsense’ 
of ‘tradition’ etc has in the development of civil society as the (hegemonic) political sphere and 
as opposed to a sphere of critical political ‘influence9.
Habermas is fairly explicit about the limitations of democracy in ‘complex societies’, and so, 
implicitly about the prospects for retaining its core values.
We have to let go of interpretations that have become dear to us, including the 
idea that radical democracy is a form of self-administering socialism. Only a 
democracy that is understood in terms of communication theory is feasible 
communication in a civil society, which grows out of an intact private sphere, 
along with the communicative stream of a vital public sphere embedded in a 
under the conditions of complex societies. In this instance, the relationship 
of centre and periphery must be reversed: in my model the forms of 
liberal political culture, are what chiefly bear the burden of normative 
expectations.36
The model relies on a ‘conscience at the periphery’. The concept of ‘conscience’, as 
individually motivated/sourced ‘good will’ loosely based on the bourgeois idea of charity or 
some liberal moral principle to be applied when individual rational agency permits, was shown, 
in Chapter 1, to be unfounded. Certainly as a legitimating political ethic it is hopelessly 
inadequate, as Vaclav Havel’s political sojourn has shown. Without this ‘ethic’ at the 
‘periphery’, in other words at the democratic base (and what should therefore be situated at the 
centre of any model of democracy that attempts to retain its normative values) the 
‘communicative stream’ of democracy will remain just that. The ‘periphery’ then becomes an apt 
description of the democratic base in its marginalisation and alienation, and of the attenuation of 
democracy in the mere legitimation of the system that this base subsequently becomes. (The 
mechanical ritual of voting in developed political systems etc).
36 J.Habermas: ‘The New Obscurity. The Crisis o f the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies’ in The 
New Conservatism'.Cultural Criticism and the H istorians’ D ebate  (ed. and trans. by Shierry Weber Nichelsen. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989. p.68>
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For a model of democracy that relies on a ‘communicative stream’ of influence there 
must be the two elements in place universal, or at least an extensive quantity of participation in, 
and a critical quality to the debate. The second condition was, problematically, undermined by 
the actual and historical development of, what (theoretically) should have been the supportive 
structures of the first. In Structural Transformation, Habermas charts the degeneration of the 
public sphere as causally directed by the development of mass media and the encroachment of 
the state into what he (later) calls ‘the lifeworld’: “In reality ... the occupation of the political 
public sphere by the unprotected masses led to an interlocking of state and society which 
removed from the public sphere its former basis without supplying a new one. The integration of
j  the public and private realms entailed a corresponding disorganisation of the public sphere that 
once was the go-between linking the state and society”.37 Private organisations accrued political 
power while the ‘private realm’ was penetrated by the state. The public and private realms 
blurred, consequentially breaking down the intimate sphere and ultimately substituting critical 
debate with the consumption of culture.
Although these impediments to democracy are well documented and broadly accepted 
with fatalistic resignation to the limits of its understanding, becoming less a concept of self- 
governance and more a stamp of legitimation, little attention is given to the cultural processes 
that deny political development. The manifold processes of privatism are the sociological effects 
of the practical implementation of the philosophy of the individual. The structural loss of public 
spaces/institutions/movements of critical disposition and discourse (in part) accounts for 
privatism. As a complement to the ‘ideological perspective’ of this problem offered in Chapterl, 
privatism can be seen as an objective reaction to this loss. Arguments among those on the left
I
j about whether ‘privatism’ is this or that detract from the immediate threat to democracy, and
I1'
miss the symbiosis of the two apparently different perspectives. Nothing less than a reversal of
37 J.Habermas Structural Transformation, op.cit p. 177
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these trends is pre-requisite for a democracy with any retention of normative values like self- 
governance. For publicity to serve as an ethical pillar of a democratic civil society, its institutions 
have to be measured in terms of their contribution (or otherwise) to the furtherance of that 
; democracy and its commitment to an egalitarian society based on self-development and moral 
I choice', rather than the consumption which is passive and complicit but is increasingly, and 
misguidedly, seen to command political leverage.
Distinguished from the normative category of the ‘public sphere’, whose reformulated 
conception demands stringent criteria that the public domain does not (but not to say it 
theoretically could not) meet, the public domain is one of discursive contestation (not conducted 
I on the symmetrical, reciprocal, or reflexive terms that are required for ethical-discourse). The 
dominant culture of the developed political systems supports a public domain that disseminates 
the folkloric philosophy of ‘the private’ in commonsensical terms. Little development in terms of 
consciousness, or ‘perspectival view’, can be expected from this dominance. The perception of 
the world that is presented by this ‘postmodernist cultural logic of capitalism’, is one of 
‘disconnection’ and fragmentation.
The cultural forms and norms created in these ‘developed’ public domains are generally 
aesthetically and intellectually accessible, demanding little reflection. The participatory elements 
of this domain, access allowing, are predominantly (and paradoxically) processes that nurture the 
conception of privacy as privatism. The political consequences for civil society then are far- 
reaching. The cultural flow of economic power as a means of securing ‘freedom’ through the 
privatisation of material needs, aspiration, and ultimately life itself (in all its facets) is the
I dominant current, and flows contra to the kind of ‘cultural hegemony’ required for the socio-
!
?
political base of civil society. Any theory of democracy that constructs itself around the idea of 
the public domain as a mechanism of the furtherance of democracy as a ‘mediator’ between 
society and state is flawed by the traditional assumptions of: a (at least relatively) neutral state,
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and (a relatively) uncritical acceptance of parliamentary political representation as the boundary 
of democracy. A conception of the public domain as the ‘public sphere’, in other words a 
conception of ‘free association’ that does not meet the criteria for any effective dialogue or 
| discourse of ethico-political tendency, cannot uphold a normatively emphasised democracy. 
Such a reduction requires an analysis of discourses that can ‘cross-fertilise’ into ethico-political 
formations/tendencies, and a look at the structural/institutional possibilities of the development 
of this process.
Toward a theoretical analysis of ‘the public domain’ in ‘developed political systems’, 
perspectives in media studies provide two important and relevant points of criticism. The first 
of these concerns the set of assumptions that found the analyses of media in ‘democratic’ 
systems: freedom of press, speech, assembly etc. In other words, it is the assumption that 
freedom from political intervention is sufficient condition for freedom of expression. The second 
concerns the generalised media systems of ‘developed political systems’ (i.e. the division 
between the ‘commercial’ model and the ‘public service’ model) and with specific regard to the 
ascendance of the former over the latter in all ‘developed political systems’.
There are two characteristics generally ascribed to models of ‘democratic’ systems 
that are of specific interest here. The first is that the media provides constitutional guarantees (or 
at least institutionalised norms and conventions of legality) of public access to political 
information, which then fabricates a transparency to democracy. The second is that this access 
provides the basis of a well-informed public to furnish its democracy with some semblance of 
meaning beyond choosing whom to vote for. Where ‘media pluralism’, that is privately owned 
production of ‘objective news’ and ‘cultural production’, is established, it is assumed that
38 In the post- war years, reflecting the black and white divisions perceived through Cold War rhetoric, macro-level 
studies o f the media centred around the distinction between ‘democratic’ (i.e. American and Western European) and 
, ‘non-democratic’ regimes (predominantly the ‘totalitarian’ systems o f the former Soviet bloc, but also the 
authoritarian regimes o f right wing dictatorships). The division is, as is invariably the case in social theory, too 
clear-cut. Some of the characteristics o f the ‘non-democratic’ media systems could, without too much difficulty, 
apply to the ‘public service’ models o f some ‘democratic’ regimes.
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cultural pluralism, and the reproduction of democracy, is maintained. However, as will be 
discussed below, the ‘media pluralism’, which translates as the ‘commercial’ model of 
‘developed political systems’, has not (and cannot) reproduce a sufficiently politicised society to 
act as a democratic check. Where ‘the media’ that is correspondent with ‘democracies’, and 
particularly those whose it is commercially based, is considered from such premises, its 
theorising can only contribute to a limited conception of democracy. Even in the conditions of a 
‘pluralism’ that actually politically informed its audiences, the conception of democracy implied 
only allows for a representative system that falls far short of democracy as the institutionalising 
of the idea of civil society. Problematically these normative bases for a system of media, 
detached from government control, are assumed to be defendable by politically and legally 
enshrined means. That this is emphatically not the case is supported by the second point of 
concern; the conceptual generalisations made of comparative studies of ‘the media’ and politics 
in ‘democratic’ systems: the ‘public service’ model and the ‘commercial’ model.
Developments (technical, political, social, economic) in the last two decades or so 
reveals that the demise of the former has been as steady as the expansion of the latter has been 
rapid. Philosophically, the two different models are grounded as the problematic question of the 
role of the state in the media, and historically on American and European systems. From the 
perspective of civil society, as a means of a ‘developmental democracy’ that is characteristically 
‘ethico-political, the ‘public service’ model has an inherent weakness. The problem is that its 
public is ‘captured’ in that it relays a culture and communication that reinforces categories of 
exclusion -  the nation-state. It unavoidably presents a world-view that is a limitation of the 
(national) identity it subliminally as well as explicitly communicates. This exclusionary feature
\
| of the ‘public service’ model is a basic paralogism of the claims of its proponents (at least 
aspirational) impartiality. A system of communication and information deeply embedded in the 
publicity of a nation-state can only present ‘facts’ within the context of its own interpretation.
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Any political neutrality and objectivity of communicating information can only be substantiated 
once the political agenda and institutionalised norms have been set.
Media manipulated ‘depoliticisation’ is an essential process for the reproduction of 
I the commercial system. Public service systems, on the other hand, in its communication of the 
j  political order emphasised more substantive political concerns rather than the personalisation of 
politics. But although ‘depoliticisation’ may not have been so apparent, in communicating a 
sense of ‘political identity’ from the party system it effectively ‘depoliticised’ its public by 
restricting its perspective on what constitutes ‘political’.
A transparency to the politics of its state may (theoretically) be maintained by a 
‘public service’ model. But this still holds when the political agenda is written around the self- 
interest of the economic-corporate categories: of ‘nation’ down to the lawful, and rightful, 
accumulation of property and wealth by the ‘private individual’. The public service model may 
serve as the means by which governments are held to account, but it cannot, without 
undermining its own raison d'etre, convey the same protest against the undemocratic nature of 
its political system and the exclusivity of it that it represents. In other words, the legitimacy of 
the nation-state and all the undemocratic institutions it must necessarily entail.
The ‘public service’ model, if not altogether defunct, is moribund. Its commercial 
variation has, by means of globalisation processes, become the dominant mode of 
communication. Propelled by technical advancement, the sharply defined boundaries of polity 
that are necessary to maintain a ‘public service’ model of communication have been eroded. 
Cultural consumption has become evermore trans-national and the public service model, as a 
j system of ‘national communication’, cannot maintain itself as the dominant producer for this 
consumption. The dominance of nation-bonding exercises in the media, through the consumption 
of sporting events and cultural institutions, has long been overtaken by commercial forms of 
communication that are supposedly without any ideology or ‘substantive’ interest. The public
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service model has, moreover, taken on certain characteristics of commercial models. Common 
presentation of political news from the B.B.C. is a technique of reporting that mirrors the ‘the 
Game’, analysed as part of the American system, where, for instance, for every one minute an
, American presidential candidate speaks on television, a reporter/commentator will speak for
S • 39
S IX .
The ascendance of the commercial model in global terms has colonised ‘culture’ as 
private interest. In contrast to state controlled media, including the ‘detached’ public service 
models of ‘democracies’, it has no obvious political message or notion of a common or public 
good. It is nevertheless, the historical outcome of a political philosophy it serves to reproduce, 
the philosophy of the individual. It may fit the description of a model of ‘the media’ that is one 
that is free from government control. But this does not mean that it is free from political control. 
The assumption is that the threat to freedom is directed exclusively by the state. For any 
theoretical advance to democracy, and certainly for any practical assumption of it, freedom of 
(public) expression must be recognised as being stifled primarily by the private interests of the 
public domain.
The negation of this freedom in a ‘free-flow of communication’ is far more insidious 
in commercial models of media than those otherwise described. It is an exaggeration to suggest 
that government control over the media was as decisive as the generalisations of ‘non- 
democratic’ systems suggest, the censorship of state diktat, according to comparative studies of 
the media in different political systems, had varying impact but showed an historical 
independence of thought that belied the ‘totality’ of these regime’s control. Indeed ‘fear’ was and 
is the key to this domination. Whereas the ‘commercial’ model, as in so many other facets of
|
communicating information, is far more effective in establishing its basic principles as ‘common 
sense’.
39 T.E.Patterson 'The United States: News in a Free-Market Society' in R. Gunther and A. Mughan (eds) Dem ocracy
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A discussion of the ‘commercial’ model must refer to the media in the U.S. The 
immediate relevance to civil society is that a study of the ‘commercial’ model is really only an 
abstracted discussion of the American system regardless of which ‘developed (or ‘undeveloped’) 
political system’ there may be a specific focus. The reality is: “ ... roughly 1,600 daily 
. newspapers, 7,500 weeklies, 11,000 radio stations, 4 national television broadcast networks, 20- 
odd national radio networks, 1,000 local television stations, and 6,000 cable television systems. 
The vast majority of these organisations are privately owned. The business of news gathering 
and dissemination is almost entirely controlled by profit-seeking entities”.40 Such statistics, ever 
unreliable, point towards a thriving plurality of public spheres reflecting a public-oriented 
expression in a free-flow of communication. But when the news (as the base of democratic 
accountability, content of these ‘spheres of expression’ is examined, it reflects more a multiple 
choice of political consumption. Left as a matter of choice, the public domain of this model 
could not support the political culture of a well-informed demos. Patterson describes this 
inadequacy as a reflection of ‘media logic’ rather than political values.41 He pinpoints 
‘interpretative reporting’ as the cause of the media’s inability to ‘present itself as a suitable basis 
for political choice’.42 Although 'the media', as with all other forms production, develops its own 
modus operandi, but an analytical division 'media logic' and 'political values' is an error. This 
media logic, as cultural production cannot help reflect and promote the broad political values of 
the system of which it is an integral part.
The history of the American press as a whole shows that as far back as the 1880s it 
was “a shrieking, gaudy, sensation-loving, devil-may-care kind of journalism which lured the 
reader by any means possible”.43 Where this ‘tabloidization’ of the news may be seen to be a 
! relatively recent development of media presentation in ‘developed political systems’ with public
"i
and the M edia. A Com parative Perspective  Cambridge University Press 2000 p246
40 Ibid  p.244
41 Ibid  p .264
42 Ibid
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service models, more than a long established feature of the American system of communicating 
information, this ‘depoliticising’ of politics is intrinsic to the commercial model. In terms of 
political coverage, “the significance of issues and events is defined less by their importance to 
society than their recency”.44 There must also be added to this the factor of proximity - or direct 
implication - in the importance of news communication. The 'proximity' (not just in geographical 
t terms) of the event to the nation-state determines its level of importance and degree of 
'newsworthiness'.
The orientation towards consumption, rather than the presentation of ‘facts’ for 
further reflection, is evident in the remarks of the president of N.B.C. News that: “Every news 
story should, without any sacrifice of probity or responsibility display the attributes of fiction, of 
drama. It should have structure and conflict, a problem and denouement, rising action and falling 
action, a beginning, a middle and an end”.45 The indistinction between information and 
entertainment reflects the prioritising of greater audience numbers and advertising revenue, and a 
decreasingly important ‘objective presentation of facts’. The presentation of politics in the 
commercial model cultivates a political culture of drama rather than one of critical and reflective 
debate. The protagonists of the formal political sphere become the substance of politics, in 
contemporary adaptations of a Machiavellian narrative. Murray Edelman identifies a “ ... 
tendency in news coverage for dramatic incidents involving prominent individuals to displace
>> 46issues .
| In the first chapter, the argument was put forward that the culture of privatism is the
j
j more or less logical consequence of certain ideological ‘givens’ and ‘common sense’. It was
j
: concluded that for ‘privacy’ to mean anything, and certainly as a normative concept, then pre­
requisite is a public domain of critical reflection. However, privacy in developed political
43 E.Emery The Press and Am erica: An Interpretive history o f  the M ass M edia  Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall 1977
44 M.Edelman Constructing the P olitical Spectacle  University o f Chicago Press 1988 p.255
45 Robinson and Sheehan cited in Patterson op.cit p.520
46 Edelman op.cit p.225
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systems can be seen to have deformed into privatism from structural factors. These can be 
identified by examining the sources of privatism in ‘cultural production’ and the effect this has 
of denuding the public domain of the institutional development of (public) spheres of critical 
discourse. The need to extricate the public sphere, if it is to retain any theoretical worth, is 
underlined by the condition of a public domain dominated by institutions of 
! economic/commercial interest.
The processes by which the institutions of publicity as the public domain have developed 
over the last two decades or so have not produced a ‘levelling out’ of accessibility to a wider 
market.47 The democratic reach of the ‘sovereignty of the consumer’48 is curtailed by the speed 
at which these developments have taken, and are taking, place. For those (like Rheingold) who 
forecast a more technologically expanded democracy, the current social reality does not justify 
much their optimism.
Golding and Murdock in their ‘critical political economy of cultural production’ identify 
two factors (material and cultural) to consider concerning the contraction of ‘access’ rather than 
its expansion: monetary barriers and social location.49 The first of these is perhaps so obvious 
that its reference seems otiose. However, this barrier is often overlooked by those who herald the 
technological strides in communications as also the steps toward some ‘cyber-democratic’ 
future. Perhaps the most important contribution of Golding and Murdock’s essay is that it acts as 
a reminder of the wider context of a society beset with inequalities that dampen the optimism 
fired by the technical possibilities of furthering democracy.
This form of ‘cyber-democratic’ discourse conducted within the frames of reference 
concerning the media itself is at best premature, and at worst as deceptive as the discourse of 
political equality as a fact of ‘developed political systems’. I will go on to consider whether
ifI--------------------------------------
' 47 Here the focus is specifically on the technological developments in communication and technology and the 
developments in political econom y o f cultural production 
, 48 P.Golding and G.Murdock op.cit p.85 
49 ibid.
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leaving it at this point of access is a radical enough perspective for theorising the radical 
democracy that civil society promises. Without further analysis the whole question of access is 
left to the material or physical access to the public domain. That is, access to ‘cultural 
production’. A reasonably equal distribution of ‘access’ would then become conducive to the 
democracy of Habermas’s ‘liberal political culture’, or to Cohen and Arato’s ‘rights bearing civil 
society’. But not necessarily to, nor indeed likely to be to, a society that assumes democracy as 
political power through the development of its own institutions. Or one that only aspires to a 
limited ‘influence’ over the state and capital.
Consumer sovereignty is in any total sense clearly impossible, as Golding and Murdock 
correctly point out.50 The task of political economy as they see it then is to examine the barriers 
that limit such freedom (i.e. based on unlimited access to a ‘complete range of cultural goods’).51 
I would not argue with the egalitarian objectives of this. The fundamental task of political 
economy is to examine the broader systemic disparities of socio-economic status, as well as 
focusing on this specific access. Where this perspective, important though it is, is limited, is that 
it becomes concerned with matters of distributive justice and the focus on democracy is 
minimised. More damagingly, it equates an expansion of access with the expansion of 
‘democratic freedoms’. The whole problem is looked at from the implicit premise that access to 
‘cultural goods’, and its expansion, is likewise to freedom (thus ‘democracy’) itself. An 
important point to consider here is whether ‘civil society’ can afford to restrict its conception of 
democracy to the material accumulation that has become an ‘additional’ core value or 
(‘politically developed’) contemporary interpretation, or to digital referenda whose agendas are 
(already set. The answer is obviously not. A primary element of the ‘idea’ of civil society 
; democracy is the (political) power to set its own agenda, its needs, priorities, behavioural norms 
etc., neither is the material means that this access implies the logical direction of an assumption
50 ibid. p .86
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o f democracy. The problems for the radical democratisation of society that aspires to its own 
‘normative necessity’ would be seen to continue in the same vein once the necessary material 
access had been ‘levelled’. But even if civil society had the latitude to accommodate a more 
realist oriented conception of democracy such as a ‘cyber-democracy’ then the democracy that 
reflected the access to participation would show a contraction rather than an expansion.
Questions that concern themselves with material access to cultural goods can effect a 
reduction of the idea of democracy to the sovereignty of the consumer. But even in its own terms 
this sovereignty is highly unevenly distributed. According to Golding and Murdock: “The 
disposable spending required for communication and information goods and services is tilted 
radically and increasingly towards more affluent groups”.52This will always be the case whilst 
they remain market commodities and not, what would effectively be the institutions of civil 
society as, ‘services of the public sphere’.53
Compounding the problem within the wider context of social and economic inequalities 
is the nature of the development itself. The speed at which the technology of communications 
and information is developing requires near constant updating of software and periodical 
replacement of the hardware. This updating and upgrading puts it beyond the means of the 
majority of subjects within 'developed political systems' (outside these systems the question is 
perhaps the least pressing) and prevents a similar ‘levelling out’ process that followed ‘other’ 
consumer goods (to a degree that it would have to be described as an expansion rather than a 
contraction). The uneven distribution of ‘cultural consumption’, far from showing signs of 
levelling out (or ‘becoming democratic’), is growing.
If we are to contemplate a society that is radically democratised, and thus radically 
different to a bourgeois society based on the philosophy of the individual, then questions that go 
J beyond egalitarianism regarding ‘access’ and how this relates to democracy must be addressed.
51 ibid.
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Firstly, it needs to be asked: access to what? Or, put another way, (to assess the nature of this 
access) how is it deployed? Is it necessarily a politically participatory access (as it would have to 
be even for the ‘self-limitation’ of the proposed politics of influence through mediation between 
state and society)? Or is any ‘participation’ motivated by, and confined to, privatistic and 
accumulative frames of reference? A public domain dominated by commercially driven 
‘participation’ makes the contemplation of democracy, as anything beyond its bourgeois 
’ confusion with ‘rights’ and consumption, futile.
It is critical for any theory of radically democratised civil society to grasp the ‘content’ of 
this access to the public domain as the cultural lifeblood of its political reproduction. Required 
i are analyses of discursive forms that predominate, and an assessment of their contribution to the 
expansion (or contraction) of democracy. This anticipates the discussion below on the more 
contributory elements. I will identify these elements as the discursive practice of social 
movement in Chapter 3. That is, elements within the public domain which distinguish 
themselves from the hegemonic economic-corporate discourses of wealth accumulation and self­
development etc., what they have as a common link, and the potential for their development. For 
the remainder of this chapter, however, I will concentrate more on the ‘downside’ of this domain 
regarding any development or expansion of democracy.
The threat to privacy and democracy is perhaps most effectively outlined, ironically and 
at the same time appropriately, against the paradoxical backdrop of the undermining of a right by
| its exercise. Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the public
fj
j sphere of its unimpeded exercise which it presupposes, states that: 'Everyone has the r ig h t... to
I
\
; hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
; the media regardless of frontiers'. However, the last two decades have been witness to an 
unprecedented development that has serious implications for the freedom of communication and
52 ib id
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expression codified in Article 19 and, consequently, for a communicatively grounded 
democratised civil society; the emergence of the global communications cartel. Communication 
has become the narrowing concern of a small number of economic-corporate bodies involved in 
the production of culture. The question that seems most pertinent to ask is how a civil society 
whose associational principle is cohered by critical reflection is to develop the kind of 
j ‘normative democracy’ that can survive amid such a commercial milieu.
If Article 19 represents in shorthand the basic precondition and freedom of expression for 
democratised civil society, then its institution requires a protection from the corporate threat that 
is not adequately dealt with in civil society theories. (Legality, as will be shown in Chapter 4, is 
not merely an insufficient defence but is ‘philosophically’ and fundamentally at odds with the 
discourses of civil society that reflect the idea as an assumption of democracy). Herbert Schiller 
makes the point that the threat to individual expression is conceived of as coming exclusively 
from the state. In the American case, to which he refers, this myopic view is reflected in law: 
stemming from a century old Supreme Court ruling, of ‘extravagant interpretation’, of the 
corporation as an individual.54 Given such a (legal) equation, and more importantly a ‘cultural 
identification’, the corporate threat to self-expression is overlooked. Certainly the relation 
between corporations and law is an unbalanced one, they can use the law as would an individual 
(call on police protection of property; sue for libel; take out legal injunctions -  against their own 
; employees or other antagonists) but in many respects, unlike an individual, they are not subject
i
i
! to it. Neither are they subject, unlike states, to international human rights law. Indeed, since the
ij
precedent was set at The Hague, individuals are now accountable for any violation of this law,
j
but companies still are not.
‘The Corporation’ has developed in law an almost impenetrable screen, a discipline 
known (or more generally unknown) as ‘corporate law’, behind which it can hide from what is
53 ib id
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minimal scrutiny from legal and public inquiry. Deregulation has allowed for corporate 
expansion and avoidance of this scrutiny, whilst cultural (ethico-political) opposition, such as 
environmental or ‘moral’, is subdued by privatism and kept to a relatively small amorphous 
mass. Optimal conditions, for the effective exercise of such a right as laid down in the U.N. 
charter, are sketched in Habermas’s ideal of what the public sphere should look something like: 
“The mass media must be kept free from the pressure of the political and other functional elites;
: they must be capable of raising and maintaining the discursive level of public opinion-formation 
without constraining the communicative freedom of critical audiences”.55 But what sociological
| or political justification can be made in modem conditions for the defence of such a free 
communicative possibility?
I Developments over the last two decades in ‘the media’ are characterised not only by the
fast developing technology but also the ‘structural convergence’ of corporate ownership and 
‘cultural production’. Both have serious implications for this freedom of communication and for 
democracy. The ambivalence that a debate on the rapidity of the technological developments 
inevitably raises underlines this as the more difficult of the two developments to assess in cost- 
benefit terms for democracy. The emergence of the global communications cartel, on the other 
hand, poses a threat far easier to recognise. I will draw attention to these two converging 
processes by charting the developments in the ownership of production followed by a critical 
discussion of the ‘vertical integration’ of ‘cultural production’. I will then go on to consider the
! effects of these two parallel developments on the public domain, on the conception and exercise
!;
I of democracy, and (ultimately) on the problems for civil society.
j
I______________________________________________________________________________________________
; 54 H.Schiller Invisible Crises: What Conglomerate Control o f  M edia Means fo r  America and the W orld  W estview  
Press. Boulder. Colerado 1996
55 J.Habermas Between Facts and Norm s op.cit pp442-6
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The flow of information, and cultural production, is controlled by an ever-shrinking 
number of transnational media corporations, led by seven major players.56 The effect is a 
convergence of cultural production, that is the control of the production, and 'vertical 
integration', the marketing of the same cultural product in different form. The cultural product of 
a film, for instance, can be and is marketed as its promotional form in various guises, even food.
To understand these processes that characterise a culture of privatism, it is necessary to 
extend the parameters of civil society theory to include, as a main point of its discussion, the 
reception of ‘cultural products’. This takes democratic theory beyond the point of access; within 
which, the tendency is to identify its distribution with democracy and lay sovereignty at the 
consumer’s spending power. Concepts of democracy that remain within these parameters cannot 
sustain a society that is committed to its own democratisation.
One theoretical position to this question is that ‘reception’ (of culture and 
communication) must be seen as an activity, and, moreover, a situated activity.57 The individual 
subject can recreate these cultural products into forms that are ‘alien’ to the intentions of the 
producers. It also suggests an implicit autonomy, or independence from the ‘logic’ of the 
producers, but does not identify its source (other than to emphasise a specific culture as the 
‘language’ of this re-creation). I will draw together what are the directly relevant implications for 
the idea of democracy (as outlined in this thesis so far) as an interrogative conclusion to the 
perspective on reception that dismisses passive consumption as a ‘myth’.581 will look at the two 
j basic points of ‘reception’, activity and situated activity that underpin the position outlined 
j immediately above.
|_____________________________
56 These are Disney; Time-Wamer; Bertelsmann; Viacom; Tele-Communications Inc.; General Electric; and 
Murdoch. Time-Wamer 1989 merger with Time (magazine publisher) and Warner film studios. Bertelsmann 
merged with News International. Murdoch . . .  Grown from Australian and British press holdings to . . .  20th Century 
Fox; Fox T.V. Network (U.S.); Latin Sky Broadcasting (joint venture with AT&T); and two major broadcasting 
conglomerates in M exico and Brazil. Viacom ...controls 13 US t.v. stations. Owns Paramount Studios, see : 
Anthony Smith, The Age o f  Behemoths: The Globalisation o f  M ass M edia Films. N ew York: Priority Press 1991}
57 J.B.Thompson & D.Held (eds.) Haberm as: Critical D ebates  London. Macmillan. 1982 p.39
58 Ibid  p.38
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When ‘reception’ is given such autonomy, the possibility of ‘activity’ as a form of 
‘passivity’ is overlooked. Perhaps the most obvious critical point to make first concerns 
‘reception’ and its supposed (culturally specific) active re-creation of cultural products. It is a 
misleading account if this analysis is translated into political sociology. It suggests an 
exaggerated cultural resistance to the homogenisation of (specific) culture through consumption. 
The second point is the assumption that this resistance, or recreation, is not passive because it is 
an activity. But where activity may be ‘passive’, recreation, or resistance may not be. The term 
( ‘passive resistance’ is an oxymoron.
For any reformulation, or re-creation, of cultural product that is ‘alien to the aims and 
| intentions its producer’, it has to become something that does not follow the logical development 
j  of economic-corporate interests. In other words, this resistance (recreation) must a fundamental 
objection to, rather than mere adaptation of the product. The argument of recreating cultural 
products through situated activity is a distorting mirror image of the reality of resistance 
becoming a cultural product through most pointedly the commercialisation of protest; rather than 
a ‘democratic reinterpretation’ of the basic ‘commonsense’ of the philosophy of the 
individual/economic-corporate entity.
One of the primary means by which the homogenisation and commercialisation of culture
I as a product is effected is the process of ‘vertical integration’. One of the cultural effects of the
{i
j structural convergence and concentration of power in communications industries is this
j
\ commercial process of ‘vertical integration’. The cultural ‘mainstream’ is fed by corporations in 
\ a system of production that commodifies an idea at any given point in the consumer market.
; Thus a book or a film, for instance, can become a soundtrack, ‘fast food’, or any other product 
retailed by its subsidiaries.
The importance of social context, and the implicit normative-democratic inference is 
undermined by the commercial processes that effect both ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’
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political systems. The political consequence of this process is the ‘clogging up’ of any potential 
spheres of publicity that might run democratically counter to the actual course of its institutional 
development, as set by communications cartels and states. As the ‘social imagination’ of 
‘developed’ political systems becomes limited in its de-politicised privatisation, it becomes 
| clearer why the idea of ‘activity’ and ‘passivity’ as opposed must be rejected. The intrusion of 
the state on the ‘social imagination’ sharpens the critical nature of ‘literary public spheres’ and 
amplifies its expression. This may be due to the absence of a (Habermasian) ‘public sphere 
wedged against the state’, and may go some way in explaining the dissidence of the former 
Soviet bloc and elsewhere. Where the intrusion is by capitalist ‘cultural production’, the opposite 
is the case; the critical edge is blunted. The conjunction of ‘activity’ and ‘passivity’ can be 
identified by looking at the nature of this activity in the public domain. It is here that the 
passivity, that has been declared ‘mythical’59 expresses itself through participation in the wider 
public domain and consumption of its cultural products. ‘Passive activity’ derives from the 
powerful cultural norms of the philosophy of the individual/corporate entity, and therefore very 
much in accordance with the aims and intentions of ‘the producers’, or perhaps more accurately 
with the aims of cultural production.
The system of (cultural) production that imposes a commercial integration and 
homogenisation run counter to the factor of situated activity. The social context, whilst crucial to 
consciousness in terms of culturally specific variations on what constitutes ‘commonsense’, is 
| being eroded by a convergence of a culture of material gain. In other words, the dominant 
J ‘privatised’ cultures of ‘developed political systems’ have been and are being globally imposed
j on political systems as yet ‘undeveloped’. In the guise of ‘democratic freedom’ access to cultural
|
production will inevitably undermine the importance of the social context; an effect not in itself 
undesirable. Indeed the destabilising of culturally specific ‘norms’ is to be welcomed by
59 Ib id
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proponents of ‘radical democracy’. Whether these norms be the ‘givens’ of the philosophy of the 
individual as translated into the commonsense of developed political systems, or the ‘bloody 
certainties’ associated with political systems as yet undeveloped in its adoption of the liberal 
‘common sense’, their ‘demise’ is a condition of the idea of civil society.
For publicity to serve as an ethical pillar of a democratic civil society, its 
institutions have to be measured in terms of their contribution (or otherwise) to the furtherance of
S that democracy. It must also lend itself to an egalitarian society based on self-development and
I moral choice; rather than the consumption which is passive and complicit that it promotes, but is 
increasingly, and misguidedly, seen to command political leverage. The notion of publicity 
defined as a generic category of institutions, and then left at this definition without any reduction 
or evaluation, can only refer to unambiguous and politically desirable conditions for democracy. 
But as this chapter has shown, such conditions are not a logical corollary or conceptually 
indivisible from even the most realist conception of democracy. Publicity is a neutral concept, 
and must not be approached from the implicit premises of it being inherently contributory toward 
the development of democracy. What has been established in this chapter is that civil society 
requires this contribution from its 'institutions of culture and communication'.
The public sphere as a network or web of ethico-political discourse is also the co­
ordination of its practice. The freedom of expression that is bound up with the normative 
concerns of publicity, is not identical with access to a public domain dominated by commercial
\ interest and discourses of accumulation of 'the private'. This freedom is a democratic expression
j
1 in its origin that recreates its own language, values, institutions etc. It cannot therefore be
\ properly considered without its practical aspect being similarly identified through an analysis of
{
' 'freedom of association'. It is this question that is taken up in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Plurality
\
! (families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy
allows for a variety of forms of life)
This chapter investigates the feasibility of the idea of civil society by looking for its 
sociological root and the possibility of maintaining social relations that reflect the ethically 
disposed discourses of the public sphere (as defined in chapter 2). Where the last chapter’s 
chief concern was with freedom of expression, this one is about the closely related freedom of 
association. This association, reflecting the ethico-political expression of the public sphere, 
would necessarily entail a form of social relations that constructs a form of democracy that 
becomes ‘free association’, pace the severely attenuated liberal democracy that merely permits 
a ‘free association’ among the categories of plurality. In the context of the democratic demands 
of civil society in the death throes of the communist states in eastern Europe, these categories 
of ‘informal groups’ and ‘voluntary associations’ allowing for a ‘variety of forms of life’ made 
political sense. The demands were directly and explicitly political in their antipathy toward the 
explicit social engineering of the soviet experiment. However, as these categories are more or 
less in place in ‘developed political systems’, adaptation of the civil society idea through the|
\ institutions of plurality raises two important and problematic points. Firstly, these demandsfII
I pose little or no threat to the established political order. Indeed they are an important point of
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legitimacy of the political system as a whole and perceived as the apolitical fruit of ‘private 
morality’. The ‘free association’ that develops does not support the furtherance of democracy 
as an ‘ethico-political assumption’. Free association must be considered as political if 
: democracy is to be assumed by society. ‘Free association’ must act as the dynamo of the 
political order, and not ‘outside it’. The second point then is how we define this ‘freedom of 
association’; it is the association (or social relation) itself that must be considered as the 
indicator of ‘freedom’, and not just the ‘freedom to associate’ exercised by individual choice.
Following a critical analysis of the categories of plurality, I will consider the 'freedom' 
ascribed to them. A discussion of autonomy is in some respects a recap of the discussions of 
‘the self/subject’ in chapter 1, and the economic-corporate culture of the public domain in 
chapter 2. The autonomous and varied forms o f life are, implicitly assumed to be, wholly 
facilitated by the ‘withdrawal’ of the state. It is overlooked that the institutions of publicity 
pose as great a, if not greater, threat to this plurality than does the encroachment of state diktat. 
I will look at the nature of these groups and try to establish a differentiation between ‘political 
autonomy’ (i.e. democratic) and an autonomy of private moral judgment.
Having established this form of ‘free association’ as the necessary basis of social 
relations for a normatively inspired form of democracy constructed from ‘civil society’, I will 
focus on ‘social movement’ (and its contemporary formations) as a possible paradigm for this 
free association and regeneration of democracy within society. The reference to social 
movement in the singular is deliberate. A substantial part of the chapter will be devoted to 
abstracting from the linkages of social movements, and here they will be discussed in terms
jj
J critical of Cohen and Arato’s paradigm of the new social movement (N.S.M.), a common 
potential of (ethico-political) democratic struggle.
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The description of ‘new’ is something of a misemployment. It is useful in the 
comparisons made with ‘old’ movements to highlight similarities as well as differences, but the 
term refers to the now dated characteristics of some of the movements spawned in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Social movement today cannot fit so easily into categories of ‘feminist’ or ‘green’,
| or indeed 'labour1. The movement that does occur, and which occasionally becomes the subject
|
j of distorted media coverage in the public domain, is far more fluid in its object of protest and is 
j characterized as much by its lack of identity as were the ‘New social Movements’ were by 
their strong (economic-corporate) identity.1
I will criticise the conceptual separation of ‘new’ from social movement in terms of a 
qualitative separation from ‘old’ movements, and in terms of Cohen and Arato’s theoretical 
framework of the ‘thematisation’ of this ‘newness’. In the first case, following Craig Calhoun , 
I will try to establish that there is an essential continuity to social movement that is ultimately 
reduced to a collective disillusionment. (In other words democratic and progressive). But this 
continuity is dismissed by theorists of the N.S.M. paradigm3 and the important point that social 
movement becomes consolidated into social movements before the point when they face the 
‘Michelsian dilemma’ of hierarchy in the political realm is then overlooked.4 The second case 
refers to the model of stage theory that Cohen and Arato critique and try to develop away from 
i  with a dualistic analysis of strategy. This theory focuses on the metamorphosis of ‘movement 
j into party’ at this formal point of representation. The problem with this is that any progression 
of freedom of association that might be made by social movement is stymied by the
1 This fluidity is characterised by the I.S.M., active in movements against capitalist corporations and active on 
| the West Bank, www.intemationalsoolidaritymovement.org
’ 2 C.Calhoun '"New Social Movements" o f the Early Nineteenth Century' in K.Nash (ed) Contemporary
Readings in Political Sociology Oxford Blackwell 2000
3 A.Tourraine The Voice and the Eye Cambridge University Press 1981
4 R.Michels Political Parties; A Sociological Study o f  the Oligarchical Tendencies o f  Modern Democracy 
New Jersey Transaction Publishers 1999
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consolidation of its economic-corporate phase of development; frozen by its respective 
recognition and inclusion. The fundamental characteristics of N.S.M., according to Cohen and 
Arato's analysis, is their 'conscious refusal' to accept the formal politicisation of a movement 
that is rooted in civil society and cannot cross the boundaries of the lifeworld. This is more 
than a strategy for them, it is a (political) philosophy. Their dualistic social theory prevents 
them from coming to any other conclusion on the agencies of civil society. Moreover, their 
application of ‘mediation’, to overcome the dilemma that stage theory resigns itself to as 
irresolvable, also misses the important point of inquiry, and in any case offers little by way of 
institutional or political innovation even within its own analytical framework.
But an important development occurs in social movement before political 
representation is achieved. ‘Recognition’ is in itself a consolidation of movement into an 
economic-corporate entity that renders invisible the links they have with other movements 
defined by the continuity of democratic struggle. What begins as collective disillusionment and 
struggle against a system of inter-connected forms of domination becomes fragmented into 
corporate entities whose interests are now consolidated within this framework and furthered by 
‘goal-oriented reasoning’. If civil society theory is to find the necessary rootedness in the real 
whilst retaining its normative underpinnings and aspiration then social movement has to be 
theorized in ethico-political terms and universal/fluid tendencies and discourses must be 
identified.
The paradigm of new social movements, as considered by Cohen and Arato, is flawed 
on two counts. The retention of strong corporate identity (not seen in itself as a problem for the 
development of democracy) such as that which they attach to new social movements, inhibits 
their developmental potential. This potential is set in terms of the progression of political
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consciousness that rises above the 'identity' of the movement. It is also defective in its analysis 
of the degeneration of social movement arising from its 'formalisation' and official inclusion. 
But the consolidation of movement identity is the initial moment of its decline. I will begin by 
looking at the defined categories that are the identified supports for the freedom of association 
(in a 'post-traditional civil society).
At first reading it may seem that this category requires a good deal more unpicking than 
? those of privacy and publicity. A simplified reduction of it however, is the form of social 
\ relations that maintain and reproduce the institutions of society (whether it be bourgeois, 
\ traditional, post-traditional, or whatever). But, like the categories of privacy and publicity, a 
j significant degree of conceptual adjustment is required to satisfy, on the one hand, the 
| normative principles of civil society theory and to provide, on the other, an accommodating 
framework for theorising elements of contemporary social movement. I will first assess these 
forms of social relations in terms of their place in and reproduction of civil society.
The first of these categories - the family - has occupied a central and vexed role in 
political and social theory. Its critique comprises a vast canon: undermining the family unit as 
an ethical social formation of modernity; as a product of ideological and historical 
I construction; as a shielded sphere of power relations; and as a source of ethical dispensation.51
| have little to add to this other than a focus on Cohen and Arato's ambivalent but ultimately
\\; optimistic analysis of this sphere of relations. For them, the family provides an ethical root 
1 whose optimal route is into the social relations of the paradigm of N.S.M.s and their political 
£ objectives.
The complexity of 'the family' in the context of democratic expansion of civil society is 
reflected by the ambiguity that Cohen and Arato reveal in their own assessments. They stress
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the differentiation that they claim feminist writers (Nancy Fraser) overlook. That is, b e t w e e n i s  
the organised relations of the sub-systems steered by power and money which neutralise any 
normative validity claims to action, and those relations which arise from a modernised 
lifeworld and the rationally steered to a more communicatively grounded egalitarianism. But 
they also recognise that families can be functionalised by the imperatives of the sub-systems; 
"strategic actions within them [...] exchanges of services of labour and money or support"6 are 
intrinsic to any economic system, yet "families are n o t ... economic sub-systems".7
There is certainly a resonance to the term 'the family1 that goes beyond a definitional 
term of social formation. From the perspective of theorising the normative project of civil 
society, the problems facing it are writ large as 'the family'. The view of it that unfolds here is 
that the family is a social (i.e. public) institution, despite all its ideologically constructed 
characteristics and appearances of being 'private'. This illusion of 'the private' as a conjunction 
of 'the family' is maintained through the (largely commercial) processes of privatism. I will 
keep the discussion focused on the normative implications of this; specifically the social 
relations it institutionalises and the aspirations and values that are engendered in the 
subject/self.
As proponents of discourse-ethics, Cohen and Arato follow Habermas in identifying the 
source of communicative action as the family, firmly situated in the lifeworld, and ascribe it 
the potential for establishing egalitarian principles. But it reads, in their thesis, as a qualified
IJ  and restrained potential. They measure it against the potential of the economic and state sub-
I
| systems for establishing these principles, where they have little or no expectation of democratic
.(
extension apart from mediated influence. In their view, "it is precisely because the family is a
5 Hegel; Marxist; feminist; Habermas, Cohen and Arato.
6 J.L.Cohen and A.Arato op.cit p.536
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core institution in and of civil society (and neither a natural presupposition of civil society nor 
just one more component of an economic subsystem) that egalitarian principles can be applied 
to it to a far greater extent than to a firm or a bureaucracy".8 However, this identification is 
problematic. Given this link, the social relations of the intimate sphere -or the family, widening 
into the kind of relations that define the informal groups and voluntary associations, is of 
critical importance to civil society. I will try to establish that this 'intimate sphere1, which itself 
escapes critical enough attention in civil society theory, is not just an unreliable ethical source 
for a post-traditional society but an impossible one. Even if we could attach some 
independence to this sphere of relations from the rest of society, the morality that is 
engendered within a unit such as the family - or any other form of intimate relations -is an 
essentially self-regarding one. This self-regard may not be established so conclusively within 
the relations themselves (although Nietzsche and the feminists have a good go as I shall come 
to shortly) but is an essential facet of membership vis-a-vis other spheres of relations, or other 
corporate units of the same sphere. This self-regard is then expanded to wider social relations 
of identity (and membership).
Any potential that the family (or whatever formation of intimate relations) may have in
instilling a disposition toward 'ethical life' becomes lost in its self-identification as 'private'.
The folkloric dictum 'charity begins at home' is extended to other corporate entities and
identities - nation, race, sex, and class. The detriment is not just to the development of 'the self,
in the form of social alienation effected by personalising the human condition, but also to the
establishment of a 'post-traditional' society that leaves no tradition untouched by critical social 
.{ scrutiny.
{
! 7 Ibid
8 J.L.Cohen and A.Arato op.cit p.724 n.81
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Although the terms 'family' and 'intimate sphere' are largely interchangeable in the 
context of civil society, it is the family as the recognisable bourgeois unit that comes under 
critical attack from Cohen and Arato. But little regard is paid to the actual relations of this 
| sphere. There is a tendency to valorize it, but in a 'post-traditional society' nothing can be seen 
as unalterable as conceptual practice. Along with security (of various kinds), perhaps the most 
fundamental bond of the intimate sphere is love (although given some of the arguments on this 
matter, perhaps it would be inaccurate to so easily differentiate the two). However, among the 
questions raised about love (biological device; voluntary or involuntary?) the most pertinent 
surrounds the question of whether it reflects a desire for power or for self-sacrifice and whether 
it is motivated by a need to share or to possess.
The best articulated cynical account of 'love' comes from the feminist critique. It is 
attacked as a mechanism for presenting putative benefits for women under male domination. 
When this illusion is stripped away, the reality bears little resemblance to what we would want 
to understand love to be. Indeed, "love, perhaps even more than childbearing, is the pivot of 
women's oppression today".9 The oppressive mechanism of love, according to this view, 
functions as the substitution of violence and coercion in a power relation that claims to meet 
the needs, or at least the desires, of the subordinate party. The ideological illusion is summed 
up by Simone de Beauvoir: "[the woman] ... chooses to desire her enslavement so ardently that 
it will seem to her the expression of her liberty".10 Once the illusion becomes transparent, the 
sense of self-worth derived from being attractive to just one other can be seen to be a gross 
| over-evaluation; the submission of one's will for 'security' is a form of paralysis of this will.
| ____________________________
I 9 J.Mitchell Women's Estate Harmondsworth Middx Penguin 1971 p.103 
10 S. de Beauvoir The Second Sex Harmondsworth Middx 1972 p .l 16
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It would be an error of over-generalisation to apply these, or any other accounts, 
universally to every sphere of intimate relations, but we can make reasonable speculations 
about the basic commonsense engendered and absorbed at this point of social integration. In 
other words, we can ask whether it fosters an 'other-regarding' ethic of sharing or a self- 
\ regarding preparation of possession for life in society as a whole. A corollary to this question 
concerns those aspects of society that are the greatest informants of this socialisation. In 
chapter 1 it was shown to be the cultural practices of the philosophy of the individual, and in 
chapter 2 the convergence of cultural production and communication flow were looked at as 
the economic and cultural consolidation of these practices. Despite the improbable ethical 
trajectory of the intimate sphere of relations, 'the family' is considered (by Cohen and Arato) to 
be the primary source of ethical disposition that will secure the required social relations of a 
radically democratised society. Following Habermas, for whom "the public's understanding of 
the use of reason was guided specifically by such experiences as grew out of the audience- 
oriented subjectivity of the conjugal family's intimate domain".11 Their adoption of discourse- 
ethics as a legitimating political ethic, requires that they identify a sphere of relations that 
allow for what Habermas describes as "interaction free of domination and external 
constraint".12 In his earlier reflections on the family, Habermas sees within this formation the 
ideal of generating "the development of all capacities that signify cultivated persons as ends in 
themselves".13 This latent ideal, identified within the relations of the traditional nuclear family, 
is not merely ieological; Habermas recognises the reality of patriarchal domination and 
economic functions, and concedes that this reality is a threat to the potentially real. But it is not 
i an illusory projection. The potential of the relations within this sphere is the deference of inter-
11 J.Habermas The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere op.cit p.28
12 Ibid  p.213
subjective human experiences in the face of external and inhuman forces. They are capable of 
becoming institutionalised as forms other than the 'bourgeois' or traditional nuclear unit. But it 
is still problematic even if it is formed from a critical development of the bourgeois family. 
Whilst it may be, in an idealised fashion, a sphere of relations where domination and hierarchy 
are surpassed by reciprocity and symmetry, and 'givens' are replaced by inquiry and critique, it 
I is not in itself, and in its traditional form cannot be, the optimal condition for self-development 
j and moral choice; much less as a sphere that can provide an ethic of legitimacy for a 'post- 
1 traditional' democracy. In its traditional form, identities are more or less fixed in the 
consequential roles of the dominant discourses germane to this formation. Neither in a 
reformulated framework, that had managed to detach itself from the legacy of tradition and 
hierarchy left behind by patriarchal domination, can this sphere best fashion the domain of 
privacy in its reconstructed sense. This was shown in the first chapter to be a necessarily public 
("audience-oriented") process for reasons of self-development, and for political purposes 
toward an expanded and deepened democracy.
The importance of the family to Cohen and Arato's model is underlined further in their 
criticism of Hegel on this matter. As we have seen, they have no problem with it being the 
'primary ethical root' of an ethically disposed society (for Hegel, embodied in the state), but 
disagree with him on two counts. The first is a straightforward criticism of what they term an 
ideological assumption; that the bourgeois formation has a 'naturalness' about it.14 But Cohen 
and Arato do not wish to dismiss the family as an ethical source of social interaction, just point
I out that the bourgeois formation is a historical construct that obstructs the egalitarian principles
|
j that are realizable in this sphere under different forms of intimate relations. The second point
: 13 Ibid  pp55-5
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they raise with Hegel concerns the continuity between the family and corporation or, in their 
system, social movements. (It is this that is of particular interest here) Cohen and Arato argue 
that Hegel's identification of the corporations as the point of social integration is as a result of 
his, in their view, incorrect analysis of the negation of the family's ethical role by civil society 
j ('the system of needs').15 They deny that there is a rupture in this continuity of 'solidarity'
| between the family and their agents of 'ethico-political' persuasion and tendency: social
j movements. In their schema this ethical strand of solidarity is maintained. But Hegel is talking
| of an ethic based upon a specific formation that will produce a specific morality (a patriarchal
I morality): "Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which
demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy, and certain forms 
of artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste, and elegance, but they cannot 
attain the ideal".16
Leaving aside the most obvious criticism to make of Hegel on this matter (which by 
itself takes away the foundation of his concept of 'ethical life'), the point I wish to consider for 
purposes of examining Cohen and Arato is the specificity of the basic moral education received 
in the family - or the intimate sphere. Hegel is implicitly prescribing this morality by explicitly 
: prescribing the social formation - the patriarchal family. The problem for Cohen and Arato is
that they require (implicitly) the same kind of 'moral specification'. But this cannot be met; a 
I sphere of social relations, however intimate, cannot be severed from the institutions of
publicity sufficiently to warrant an attachment of some dubious (moral) autonomy. As the
14 This is linked with Hegel's doctrine o f property (discussed in ch .l). The relation between the family and 
property is inextricable in Hegel's system.
5 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p. 106
16 G.W.F.Hegel Philosophy o f  Right op.cit.p. 166
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family is a transmitter and not a ’producer' of morality, the specificity that they dismiss as 
ideological in Hegel is in fact a glaring omission from their own work.
What Cohen and Arato's theory does not tackle is the attachment of 'private' to these 
more or less 'closed' social relations. Although firmly entrenched in reality, and which informs 
(or even inspires as its antithesis) almost every conceivable 'social relation', patriarchy is not a 
problem of theory for Cohen and Arato's realizable ideal of a more egalitarian space. It is not 
the false consciousness of patriarchy that blocks the normative claims of Cohen and Arato's 
proposed democratisation, rather it is the consciousness of the economic-corporate - whose 
social formation with historically the most resonant moral claims is 'the family'.
Cohen and Arato are of course right to criticise Hegel for the 'naturalness' he ascribes 
to the patriarchal/bourgeois unit, but their analysis of the family also commands a 'naturalness' 
to it insofar as they attribute to it a significant and qualitative (communicative) difference to 
wider social relations. But there is no ethical imperative inherent in intimate relations. The 
family, rather than a well-spring of the desired ethic, is a conduit for the dominant discourses 
of the public domain. It can only reflect these discourses (not alter them) and represents the 
unholy union between the philosophy of the individual and a fetishised conception of 'private' 
as its most functional(ist) form. The moral standing of the family is dependent on preserving 
the illusion of 'the private', and the 'private' is essential to the philosophy of the individual. For 
the family to function in the ethically disposed manner that Cohen and Arato require for the 
normative foundation of their political legitimacy, and for it to establish egalitarian principles 
bidden within', there must be a reflection of ethico-political discourses that characterise the
I
s normatively designated domain of the public sphere. It can only reproduce the society that
134
informs it; much less, as a fragmented and privatised corporate formation, can it change it in 
any way.
The idea of ‘free association’ is critically important; and for civil society it must 
\ connote more than a capacity for freedom to choose one association over another. ‘Free 
association’ must indicate the capacity for social movement (or democratic struggle) to morph 
itself into (democratic) struggles that may be apparently, against disconnected authority and 
systems domination. ‘Free Association’ must, logically and for reasons of the democratization 
of civil society, escape the bounds of economic-corporate constraint. For a better 
understanding of ‘free association’, I will take it as literally as possible to criticize the stated 
categories of plurality and to reinforce the argument that the freedom of association required to 
support a civil society can only be found in the radicalized understanding of social movement.
An apolitical plurality that produces a 'variety of forms of life', as within developed 
political systems, does not produce the association (necessary for civil society) that develop 
into critical forms; that is, forms of relations/association that are of greater freedom. Strictly 
speaking there can be no absolute freedom of association; if there is no constraint, however 
coded or minimal, there can be no association. However, it is perfectly legitimate to talk in 
terms of degrees of freedom of social relations. This may seem obvious, but its application to 
social movement(s) can illustrate the conceptual division required between a 'freedom to 
associate' and 'freedom o f association'.
The importance of this difference can be illustrated when applied to the American 
feminist movement, as Cohen and Arato’s model of a new social movement, and the labour
;
| movement, the general referent for analyses of ‘old’ social movements. The feminist
I movement provides a good example of the progression of this freedom of association; a
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progression crucial to a normative conception of democracy. Presumably the association (the 
social relations) of the women in the van of the feminist movement at Seneca Falls was of 
greater freedom than that which prevailed back in the trailer. But it would be wrong to presume 
j that this association of common identity was the 'ethical terminus1 of association; that social 
movement in this form was the limit to the development of movement and (ethico-) political 
application. The nomination of the 'New' Social Movement as the paradigm of association that 
wields limited mediated political influence leaves any development inconceivable. Certainly 
under the constitution of the United States the women were exercising their right of freedom to 
associate. But the association itself can develop an 'identity fixation' when any political 
progression is halted by the pre-occupation with (economic-)corporate interests. This analysis 
can also be applied uncomplicatedly to the labour movement. With regard to the right to 
freedom to associate, not all labour movements had (or have) it; that is a right to associate (or 
develop social relations) at a level of identity and organisation that threatened politically. 
When the social movement is a fight for this right, (to politically associate in the first place) 
then it is a political struggle. This was so in the case of the Polish movement Solidarity. But 
when this right is achieved, with some exceptions, the struggles have been, historically, 
economic. Any trade union activity concerned with its own interests (pay, conditions) can only 
be discussed in economic-corporate terms. It only becomes (ethico-)political when interests are 
expanded in the breaking down of identity (and, therefore, exclusion) and discursive interaction 
with other forms of social imovement. When any part of the labour movement becomes 
trapped in its own identity, 'fixed' as a labour movement, its (ethico-) political development 
stalls. By 'political development', I don't mean an increased representation and influence in the 
| formal political sphere; this may be the measure of development for a 'developed political
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system', but the idea of civil society could not be actualised in such economic-corporate 
structures.
Freedom of association must be read in terms of the association as subject, and not 
object. The association itself must be free, not only from state interference but the cultural 
baggage of the philosophy of the individual from which the concept of freedom of association 
stems. But the privatised culture of this philosophy de-politicises society as a whole and 
impedes the (ethico-)politicisation of social movement. Freedom of association must mean the 
freedom from the rationality of strategic and material gain. In other words, association must be 
detached from a culture of economic-corporate identity and social exclusion, and must be 
unencumbered by misconceived notions about being 'private'. Clubs and associations of an 
'apolitical' nature are of little or no use to an expanded democratic civil society - indeed, they 
can serve as the institutions of 'passive activity' that represent the consent of society to its form 
of governance.
It is evident that a reconsideration of the term 'freedom of association is required. It 
must be clearly distinguished from the liberal conception of 'freedom to associate'; instead it 
must be understood in 'ethico-political' terms. Without any (ethico-) political development, 
'freedom of association' merely characterises a society of competing power blocks that does not 
provide us with an image any different to the 'actually existing democracies' of 'developed 
political systems'. The essential ingredient of solidarity dissolves when the continuities and 
linkages of social movement itself become fragmented into categorised groupings of political 
protest.
Social movement is the agency of civil society, and I give qualified support to Cohen 
and Arato's thesis "... that social movements constitute the dynamic element in processes that
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might realise the positive potentials of modem civil societies".17 Qualification comes with two 
points with which I would take issue. The first concerns the reconsidered understanding of civil 
society as first and last a public phenomenon antithetical to aspects of 'the private', and 
certainly with little connection to the intimate sphere as a source of its values. The second 
point concerns directly the nature of 'social movement', which will be addressed in the rest of 
this chapter. It is difficult to envisage this realisation, within their terms, as anything more than 
a liberal democracy that accommodates the 'soulless reformism' that they have hopes of 
developing beyond with this 'politics of influence'. However, the realisation of a radical 
1 democracy constructed from civil society stands or falls on the question of 'social movement'.
I Before elaborating the necessarily wider conception, I will first critically examine the position 
| that Cohen and Arato take on social movements, with specific attention paid to their 
identification of a 'thematisation of newness' as the outstanding characteristic of new Social 
i Movements.
The analysis of social movement as the agency of a radical conception of democracy is 
flawed. It assumes that the paradigm of the N.S.M. overcomes the fatalism of stage theory by 
adopting a 'dual-strategy'. But this misses the problems of consolidation by identity in social
i| movement before formal inclusion takes place. The problem appears to be wholly with the 
i 'Michelsian dilemma'. Cohen and Arato’s claim is that the inevitable bureaucratisation and 
i hierarchical transformation of social movement (when included formally into political society) 
can be avoided if the model and historical course of the new social movement is followed. 
However, apart from merely reconceptualising the problem in the theoretical complexities of 
mediation and representation, their model of agency (specifically the American feminist 
movement) restricts the "developmental possibilities of collective actors", and the 'societal
17 J.L.Cohen an Arato op.cit p.49
types in which these movements occur' (to specifically the American 'developed political 
system'); two questions that Cohen and Arato raise themselves.18 The developmental 
possibilities available to collective actors are held back by the constraints of a corporate 
movement and its implicit objectives of particularist political and economic gain. This 
precludes the forms of association that might underpin the normative emphasis they think they 
‘ place on their conception of democracy. But even if this course is accepted as 'normatively 
sufficient', their propositions around 'mediation' are obscured by their emphatic stipulation that 
f 'movements cannot survive the crossover from 'lifeworld' to 'systems'. The initial stage of 
1 social movement development, according to stage theory involves the formation of loosely 
j  articulated demands made by loosely connected groups and associations before congealing into 
bureaucracy and hierarchy.
I It is the second stage of development that is problematic. Here stage theory offers little
by way of developmental possibilities available to collective actors. Indeed it provides an 
impasse for any democratic development; movements inevitably succumbing to 'the iron law of 
oligarchy'. But it is one Cohen and Arato's thesis fails to redress clearly in their proposals of 
i 'mediation'. More importantly its point of address, like that of stage theory, misses the problem
[ of identity and consolidation and the implications of limiting democracy. Where stage theory is
|
i inadequate, according to Cohen and Arato, is in its inability "to account for the new social 
j movements that [they] find most interesting".19 Their work attempts to rectify this oversight. 
The linear development of stage theory i.e. the bureaucratised and ultimately undemocratic end 
of democratic movement does not accommodate or reflect the development of Cohen and 
Arato's case in point, the American feminist movement. Here, this linear development was
18 ibid. p.494
19 ibid. p.557
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avoided. The politics of influence that they see as being established by the 'dual-strategy' of 
this movement does not conclude with self-bureaucratisation: "These movements are aimed at 
the intermediate structures of political society ... ." 20 Whilst Cohen and Arato criticise stage 
theory for not being able to accommodate the potential democratic developments of this 'new'
I strategy of social movement, they acknowledge its identification of civil society being the 
target for critical social movement. But the trajectory taken by the Americam feminist 
movement belies the stark alternatives of stage theory that fix it to linear progression towards 
its own bureaucratisation. Cohen and Arato stress that the two faces of the movement have not 
merged: "The division of labour between the two segments of the movement shifts over 
time".21 They continue their criticism of stage theory in its overly simple conception o f 
learning; a fundamental error in its assumption that 'cultural politics' cannot achieve 
strategic/political goals. In this incorrect or inadequate analysis, the inevitable course is one 
toward the hierarchical organisation of formal political society. For Cohen and Arato, this is a 
myopic view that implies a lack of reflection on the "rootedness of actors of political society in 
civil society".22 It is only possible to conceive of strategic and political goals being achieved by 
'actors of political society' as agencies of civil society in two ways. The first can be dismissed 
as an inadequate theory of civil society itself. It is inadequate to the demands of its own 
'normative necessity' insofar as it remains within the theoretical framework of private power 
and interest factions in society little different to the 'actually existing democracies' of 
'developed political systems’. The other way, which accommodates the theoretical conditions 
of these demands, is by conceiving political society as inextricable from civil society, and that
|
’ 20 ibid.
21 ibid. p.558
22 ibid.
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the latter, by the processes involved in the democratic development of social movement, - 
becomes the former.
However, history does at least prima facie seem to support stage theory's thesis of 
linear development, and Cohen and Arato's argument, drawing on the experiences of the 
American feminist movement, that the normative core of democracy can be retained by 
'representation by mediation' looks indeed flimsy. But, they argue, the empirical evidence for 
the failures of social movements to retain their identity as 'ambiguous', and that the "criterion 
of success needs to be redefined".23 If this is meant to say that a continuity among social 
movements has been maintained despite the estrangement of its political representation, then 
Cohen and Arato are right to criticise stage theory in this fashion. But if it means (as it does) 
that, based on some equally ambiguous empirical evidence drawn from the 'American feminist 
experience' and its political development, that 'movement identity' can effect the normative 
elements of democracy on its system of representation then it must be rejected. A system of 
representative democracy necessarily extracts these elements and replaces them as points of 
validation with the procedure itself. Cohen and Arato have not distanced themselves from the 
'realist' school of democratic theory as much as they thought.24
The second major flaw in stage theory identified by Cohen and Arato is the 'poverty of
9 C
the model's political conception'. In other words it denies the action of civil society on 
political society, recognising only that civil society acts upon itself. For purposes of 
clarification here on what is an over simplification of an already deceptively simple point, it is 
necessary to establish at least two things. What the extent of this action is, and, for purposes of
23 ibid. p559  Retention o f identity here means 'social movement identity' as opposed to its loss to formal 
institutionalising, and not 'identity' as criticised in this thesis as an obstacle to the democratic development of 
social movement itself.
24 Ibid
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a strict understanding of civil society, what the nature of the action is. But in Cohen and 
Arato's schema of a 'politics of influence', this action is limited not only in the dilution of aims 
and objectives of specific movements, but more importantly limited to these objectives once 
identity building is more complete and consolidated. This 'politics of influence' is only a form 
of representation of civil society actors (apparently shifting back and forth between civil and 
; political societies) now mired in the economic-corporate category of an 'identity'; by the 
' processes of (identity) consolidation, recognition, inclusion, and bureaucratisation 
I (categorisation).
Where stage theory is limited is in its theoretical vision insofar as it does not allow for 
any normative-democratic progression; only the completion of the second stage, when full 
institutionalisation and representation is established. The outcome of this at best is an 
attenuated 'realist' conception of democracy already established in 'developed political 
systems'. But there is little Cohen and Arato's thesis to suggest that this will in any way be 
enhanced or deepened by their reliance on what they conceive of as the mediating structures of 
the public sphere. Their example of the American feminist movement 'shifting back and forth 
in a fluid division of labour' in a strategy of dual-logic is first of all a questionable sociological 
foundation upon which to frame a theoretical (ethical) expansion for, presumably, the societies 
of 'developed political systems' as a whole. But more fundamentally, it shares with stage theory 
a limited theoretical vision. The problem that Cohen and Arato have with stage theory is that it
f
j
does not allow for the actors of of civil society, engaged in the 'politics of identity', to act upon
I
[• those of political society and ultimately the state. This is a contentious enough point within
I
their own set conceptual limitations. But the crucial point overlooked here is the problem of the 
identity becoming fixed and bureaucratised in a way that denies the fluidity that is lifeblood to
25 Ib id  p.560
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a radical conception of democracy based on the idea of civil society. Although identity 
formation is vitally important in the initial stages of collective agency, 'identity politics' can 
chrystalise into more or less fixed lines of demarcation among the competing economic- 
corporate interests of society. The political effect, if there is no development beyond this 
identity, is disproportionate representation in political society of various (economic-corporate) 
power blocks in (civil) society. Whether the channels of mediation are developed to the 
democratic point of Cohen and Arato's optimism, or non-existent in the movement 
fundamentalist's analysis of social movement, or collective action, the movement itself remains 
trapped within an economic-corporate perspective whose concern is furthered by goal-oriented 
logic and political bargaining. Neither theory (that of Cohen and Arato or stage theory) 
considers the potential development of social movement beyond these boundaries of identity. 
Within such limited frameworks, social movement as the foundation of a radical democracy 
cannot be theorised in ethico-political terms. This limitation is much less excusable in Cohen 
and Arato’s thesis than it is in stage theories given the normative project of a democratised 
civil society.
For a society founded on the principle of 'solidarity', the question of its realisation 
should not be framed so that the problem is reduced to one of representational competition of 
interest in political society but, rather, with how the democratic potential of social movement 
can develop beyond the particularism to which it invariably succumbs. Any ethico-political 
tendencies of social movement in its initial formation are undermined by the retention of the 
strong emphasis on identity, and are ultimately lost when this 'politics of identity' becomes 
institutionalised as a 'politics of influence'.
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The politicising effect of social movement/collective action must, if it is to retain its 
promise as (ethico-political) agency in society, instill a 'democratic inclusivity' in the collective 
consciousness of society before any formal representation in political society emasculates it. If 
this is not achieved through the cultural politics of civil society first then the politics of 
influence that Cohen and Arato advocate is not under threat (it would be if this movement were 
to continue its democratic development). Nor even is the 'identity' of the movement in society, 
but the radical (and "normatively necessary and empirically possible") conception of 
democracy based on civil society is.
Following the rise of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s in developed political 
systems - notably France and the U.S. - a number of theorists identified distinct and 'new' 
features to social movement(s). The tendency toward the classification of strategic factors as 
grounds for claiming a 'newness' to social movement follows, by theoretical corollary, an 
almost unanimous insistence on theoretical/conceptual split with 'old' social movement. One 
1 writer whose study of social movement goes against this current is Craig Calhoun.26 He claims 
that a conceptual division derived from historical application of 'old' and 'new' is "specious"
I and that "[abandoning the false historical claim enables us to understand better the whole 
? modem history of social movements".27 The important point, and it is the basis of his 
argument, is that all movements begin with attributes that are considered peculiar to social 
movements of the 1960s onward.
The comparisons made between 'old' and 'new' include the limited but non-negotiable 
demands, allegedly peculiar to the new movements, rather than the objective of the 'total' 
revolution, peculiar to 'old' movements. Calhoun questions the assumption of the 'new
26 C.Calhoun op.cit
21 Ibid  p. 130
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concerns of identity, autonomy, and self-realisation. His historical analysis effectively opposes 
this assumption, but because its aim is to debunk the division, and although it alludes to 
movement development, it does not extend to an analysis of social movement as having 
developed beyond an economic-corporate identity. He does however say that any analysis of 
social movement will be more productive, or more usefully contributory to a wider debate, if it 
focuses on the inherent plurality of forms, contents and social bases rather than "in terms of a 
single model defined by labour or revolutionary movements, or a single set of instrumental 
questions about mobilisation".28
As his first and main example, Calhoun takes the social movement that Cohen and 
Arato consider to be the New Social Movement par excellence: the American feminist 
movement, and the broader women's movement. He traces the roots back to the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries. Feminist discourse has its genealogical roots in Mary Wollstonecraft 
; (although it can be traced much further than this (to Sappho), and the broader women's 
[ movement has its practical roots in Owenite socialism (although again this can be traced back 
[ further). But Calhoun's historical argument focuses on the "rapid increase in public life of the 
American citizenry"29 in the period between 1830 and 1860. He recognises that this public life 
was male-dominated, but also notes that "gender relations were directly a focus of concern".30 
This undermines any claim to originality to N.S.M.s based on 'identity concerns' arising out of 
the politically charged/primed conditions of the 1960s. 'Identity', in its political context, is not a 
new phenomenon; it is an integral part of the development of any notion of democracy, but it 
also negates this development to an ethico-political level. This negation is readily identifiable 
in the form of nationalism. Its development has a violent history and its basis of
28 Ibid
19 Ibid p. 134
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exclusion/inclusion is now exhausted (with some exceptions, most saliently the stateless^-twin' 
Palestinians and the Kurds) as the momentum for social movement, and furthering the cause of 
democracy. But there is no reason to exclude 'nationality' from the N.S.M. on the basis of 
'identity'. As Calhoun asks: "What was the focus of early nineteenth century nationalism if not 
identity?"31
Given the imperative of civil society theories of dissociating themselves from 
socialism, Calhoun's argument for inclusion of the labour movement in the same paradigm may 
seem even more contentious than that other old ideology (based on identity) of nationalism.
Given some thought, however, the claims of 'identity' as the central feature of 'labour' is little 
different at an abstracted level to those of nationalism. What is overlooked again though is that 
the very question of 'identity' has an ambiguous relationship to democracy. Its detriment 
toward democracy is its crystallisation. The democratic opportunity of the Russian Revolution, 
for instance, became the political mutation of 'identity fetishism'. The disastrous soviet 
(democratic) experiment never got beyond this fixation of 'identity'. Although no social 
movements other than the labour movement in its Marxist form has laid claim to exclusive 
(political) agency as the appointee of history, a strong sense of its own identity mitigates 
against the 'cross-fertilisation' (Chantal Mouffe32) necessary for any progression to an ethico- 
political stage.
The politicisation of society as a whole is a second shared characteristic of 'old' and
!
j  'new'. But the danger of collapsing the concept into an implausible degree of voluntarism must 
I be borne in mind. It is as accurate to say that social movements are produced by politicisation.
'I
(I will come to the historical conditions' further on this chapter). But leaving aside objective
30 Ibid
31
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factors, social movement politicises society in two important and related ways. The first is as 
the articulation of disillusionment into movement, to attack (formal) political society 
democratically by 'extra-parliamentary' means' etc).
The second way that social movement politicises society is by way of attack on society 
itself. It refers to consciousness and the social imaginary. 'Politicisation' here means reflection 
upon or engagement with the 'wider concerns' of existence. Where the defining characteristic 
of a 'developed political system', in Schopflin's definition, is the narrow concern of aspects of 
'the private' (authorising a political agenda of private material gain), politicisation includes 
priorities and values not determined by exclusive categories whose priority must be its own 
interest.
Whichever way politicisation is looked at, it cannot be sustained as dividing factor 
between 'old' and 'new', in Calhoun's words: "... the modem era is shaped by a certain 
oscillation between politicisation and depoliticisation of everyday life. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, as well as in the early ninetennth century, social movements 
brought a range of new phenomena into the public (if not always the political) realm. Indeed, 
the early labour movements themselves aimed crucially to politicise aspects of everyday life
' I ' l
formerly (and by their opponents) not considered properly political".
The question of 'identity' points to a fundamental change in its origins when Calhoun 
states that "political economic identities have lost their salience [and have been] replaced by 
ascriptive identities".34 He points out that before the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 'class' 
seldom self-applied or was basis of workers' mobilisation, and asks whether Chartism was 
strictly a class movement. Its demands included issues with appeal to those excluded from
32 C.Mouffe op.cit p.389
33 C.Calhoun op.cit p. 137
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suffrage and effective citizenship rights in early 19th century Britain. Other historical examples 
of social movement he applies this question to includes the attack of barricades in Paris in 
1848. A class-based analysis of this fails to account for it. He recalls the 'republicanism central 
; to the political and economic struggle of the Cincinnati Workers - only to give way to an 
alternative, more class-based form of struggles in the 1840s'. What can be seen most obviously 
from these three examples of social movement in different instances is that the ethico-political 
elements that accommodate democratic development are not something that can be theorised 
properly by dividing 'old' from 'new'. This division overlooks the developmental point that 
should be of interest to democratic theory, and then goes on to theorise 'new social movements' 
in an unavoidably restrictive framework.
‘Class’ in Marxian terms is a strategy. As class was intended to abolish itself (and with 
it the forms of domination in society reduced to their class base) the labour movement can 
claim a universalist dimension as the ultimate objective went beyond its own economic- 
corporate interest. But the assimilation of the movement into institutionalized politics rendered 
this dimension obsolete, and the movement became trapped in its econ-corporate level of 
development by its own representation in the political system (a system which could not 
accommodate the ‘perspectival radicalism’ so therefore subsumed it). Moreover, many social 
movements of the 1960s were recognised and motivated by the problem of ‘class’.
The adoption of a principle of self-exemplification is one area where Calhoun concedes 
some ground to the N.S.M. paradigm. He makes the point that historically socialist and 
especially communist parties built internal structures that were at odds with the axiom that 
'movements are ends in themselves'. Such structures ran counter to the non-hierarchical
s
5 objective of the movement itself. This may have been the direction taken by the labour
34 Ib id  p. 138
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movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, but its course was not inevitable. Calhoun's criticism 
is aimed at a different, and in the overall context of the comparison between 'old' and 'new1, 
incorrect target. He does not mention syndicalist movements to which the principle of self­
exemplification would apply, but more than this it is really a criticism of the formal inclusion 
of the movement rather than of the movement itself. The instrumental lines taken by political 
parties, now estranged from their origins of social movement, ruptured the possibility of any 
significant self-exemplification of the labour movement historically. There is nothing inherent 
to N.S.M.s, that was absent in 'old' movements, that can prevent the social movement's 
democratic degeneration in this manner. The German Green movement is a more contemporary 
example of the abandonment of the principle of self-exemplification. Calhoun's criticism is 
therefore not one that can be made of the social movement of labour itself, which is really the 
case in point, but is better targeted at representative democracy. N.S.M.s have been given 
exception on account of a non-hierarchical organization that is intended to prefigure the desired 
social conditions. (On the basis of this criterion alone, the organization of the International 
Brigades in the Spanish Civil War could make its way into the category {new) social 
movement).
The question of self-exemplification however must be looked at from a different but 
equally as important a perspective as a comparison between old/new. For a society based on 
the projection of values as exemplified by organisational forms and styles of movement must 
itself be considered contingent and developmental. This point is still problematic for a non- 
hierarchical understanding of social movements. Although the organisational forms and 
relations within the practices of a social movement may be a democratic development, the 
retention of 'identity' upon which these forms are constructed impedes a (radical) development
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of democracy that can extend its normative basis. A strong retention of 'identity' is an actual 
problem for any democratic project inspired by the 'idea' of civil society; the importance of the 
comparison between old and new is bringing into relief the 'identity trap' that stalls, or prevents 
altogether, self-exemplification by its own representation and submission to the politics of the
j economic-corporate.
j A further, and for purposes here final, characteristic of N.S.M.s is the adoption of non-
conventional methods. This distinction is perhaps the most difficult to maintain. It is (logically)
| impossible for any social movement to disengage from these methods because of its exclusion 
from formal politics (at the very least in the initial stages of its development). 'Non- 
conventional political method', with certain qualification, could be an acceptable translation of 
'social movement'.
Where the forms of domination, that are the object of social movement attack, may be 
determined by historical context, and so too therefore the characteristics of the movement, the 
movement itself, the democratic struggle, may not. The peculiarities of the new social 
movement paradigm, are really historically determining factors of strategy and obscure the 
essential similarities with 'old' movements.
Opposed to this view however, new social movement is conceived of by Cohen and 
Arato as substantially and significantly different from movements past. This difference is 
located in the 'thematisation' of the 'newness' as point of principle, rather than as more
I
I superficial characteristics of organisation, tactic, and strategy. They point out that the
!i
I achievements and continuities of labour movements have been due (in part) to their capacity to
?!
! 'combine course', that is, a straddling of both civil and political spheres. The 'newness' of social 
movements then "lies not so much in their dualism as in their more emphatic thematisation of
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this dualism".35 What this means is a conscious "refusal to instrumentalise cultural politics and 
identity building for the sake of narrowly conceived political success".36 They fail to see that 
narrowly conceived political success can only be the outcome of (econ-)corporate social 
movement.
It is the 'politics of influence', the key element as Cohen and Arato see it, that is missing 
from social movement theories. For an adequate theory, social movement analysis must 
consider whether it can satisfy four fundamental inquiries. It is necessary to understand the 
processes of identity formations and the extent of the solidarity they defend. The relations 
between social adversaries and the stakes of these conflicts must be assessed. It is also 
necessary to analyse 'the politics of influence' exercised by actors in civil society on those in 
political society. Finally, there must be an analysis of the structural and cultural developments 
that contribute to the heightened self-reflection of actors.37 It is the view of Cohen and Arato 
that, with certain amendments, the 'new social movement paradigm' can accommodate all these 
questions. Before considering them under the conceptual terms I have employed thus far, I
would add another question: Can the N.S.M. paradigm, however amended and modified from a
'formal-political' perspective, accurately reflect and accommodate contemporary social 
movement. The increasingly 'global nature' of movement is the perhaps most obvious feature 
of contemporary civil society agency that cannot be accommodated by this paradigm. Its 
political attachment to the 'democratic institutions' of 'developed political systems' looks to be 
increasingly conservative in its political vision and possibly redundant as a useful concept. 
With this point in mind, I will pre-empt the conclusions of the discussions that follow and
I claim here that the answer to the fifth question is that it cannot.
j  35 J.L.Cohen and A.Arato op.cit p.559
36 ibid
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The first inquiry is of crucial importance. It includes processes of identity formation 
and the subsequent problem of solidarity extension that are ignored by the N.S.M. model. The 
paradigm of the social relations generated by a 'new' social movement could not achieve the 
necessary extension of solidarity in part because of the formal inclusion of this identity. The 
extension of solidarity means more than expanding spheres of responsibilities diminishing in 
importance the further away from the intimate sphere they are located (which in the privatised 
cultures of 'developed political systems' is generally somewhere over the horizon). Solidarity 
must refer to the linkage of social movement that crosses the boundaries of economic-corporate 
divisions. Without an understanding of solidarity deeper than that which coheres 'corporate' 
social movement, we cannot conceive of its extension as a political progression of 
consciousness to its 'ethico-political' stage. A consideration of the conflictual nature of the 
relations of these movements is primarily one of the relations between these movements, rather 
than o f them.
If social movements are not driven by the logic of profit (or power) then the conflict 
between 'identifiable movements' must originate in the degeneration of the conception of 
democracy into economic-corporate procedure. It occurs in the obvious clash, and seemingly 
irreconcilable interests between, for instance, a labour movement and the environmental 
movement. It may be the case that the former aims to keep open a shit-producing factory for 
obvious reasons of employment, but the latter for different but equally obvious reasons want it
I
| _
I closed down; a conflict between 'labourism' and 'environmentalism'. The clash of interests is
I\
j; brought into relief in the processes of mediation with and inclusion within the very systems of
j !
logic that are antithetical to the democratic development of social movement. This 
development involves the recognition and articulation of linkage with other social movement,
37 ib id  p.509
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between movement and movement, and not between movement and its political representation 
as the N.S.M. model presents it. The N.S.M. model may support a 'politics of influence', but it 
is democracy in limited form only. The influence exercised by actors in civil society (as 
normatively redefined) on those in 'political society' (corresponding to developed political 
systems) is negligible.
To exert any influence in the formal political sphere social movement must be in a 
condition strong enough to threaten something - aspects of state, corporations/global 
capitalism, tradition. However, when this threat becomes muted by mediation, it is difficult to 
determine what is left of the normative elements of democracy in the political outcome of 
'influence' in this sense. The paradigm of the N.S.M. cannot 'contain' the necessary theoretical 
and actual democratic development of social movement as an ethico-political agency.
No social movement as an economic-corporate entity can expand democracy, beyond 
perhaps furthering its own interests through political bargaining and compromise. This 
includes the labour movement. The model of the October Revolution (that is a revolution 
conducted in the name of a movement whose ultimate objective is the eradication of its own 
identity) has long been obsolete. Part of the embrace of the prefix 'new' comes from the 
abandonment of 'revolutionary rhetoric' by social movements (since the 1960s and 1970s). It 
persuades Cohen and Arato to abandon class.3* Not only is it rejected, rightly, as the 'sole' or 
even 'privileged' agency of 'social movement' but is also, wrongly, rejected as a vital source of 
disillusionment that generates into social movement. It is worth pausing briefly on the question 
of revolution; the 'war of movement’ may no longer be a feasible course but revolution (of the
38 J.L.Cohen Class and Civil Society Cambridge. Mass. The MIT Press 1983; J.Keane Democracy and Civil 
Society London. Verso. 1981
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Copemican variety) is still a vital process of democratic development, and therefore to civil 
society.
I The fourth point to be considered by the N.S.M. paradigm is the: 'structural and cultural
developments that contribute to the heightened self-reflection of others'.39 In other words, it 
must be sensitive to all social movement whose self-reflection progresses beyond the limits of 
'identity' and corporate boundaries. But it is obvious without further investigation that the 
N.S.M. model cannot account for this; the whole conception of it is based on 'identity'. The 
politics that Cohen and Arato conceive as arising out of the agency of the new social 
movements is dependant upon a certain 'fixed' relation with itself and subsequently limitation; 
there is logically a degree of exclusion, however fluid they perceive themselves to be. If it is 
not an exclusion of individuals then it is an exclusion of a wider, more democratic political 
agenda.
The essential feature of new social movements, according to Cohen and Arato, is the 
thematisation of their own 'newness'. Put into effect this 'thematisation' is the practice of the 
principle o f self-limitation', a 'restraint' that has been a defining feature of civil society action, 
and a tenet of its theory since Michnik's elaboration of 'new evolutionism'.40 But this 
elaboration misses the unlimited horizons of democratic development through the institutions 
of civil society. The state (and economy) become the horizons when the notion of self- 
limitation is taken as a principle to be applied to the limits of democracy. A modified
j Gramscian interpretation of the relation between 'new evolutionism' and self-limitation is
|f provided by Pelzcynski in his interpretation of events in Poland in the decades before the end
I
' 39 J.L.Cohen and A.Arato op.cit p.509
40 A.Michnik op.cit
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of the Polish communist state.41 The understanding of self-limitation that lends itself to this 
analysis of Solidarity is that its application was strategic and not principled. The gradual 
grounding of cultural conditions (for the 'actuality of the idea') was a 'war of position'.
! As a principle, 'self-limitation' is extremely problematic. As an axiom of privacy, it
makes little sense to hold the development of the self and moral 'choice' to it. As a guiding 
boundary line, between what is permissible political activity and what is not, it is vague, but 
more problematically it stems the (revolutionary) energy of social movement. If it is 
understood then as a guiding principle then it is formed from a narrow conception of revolution 
(one still based on the 'war of manoeuvre'). Self-limitation cannot be understood merely as an 
antonym of revolution. To live by a principle of self-limitation (in any facet of life) is 
inevitably going to put a break on the development of democracy as something to be assumed. 
Far from being mutually supporting principles, 'self-limitation' and 'post-traditional relations to 
tradition' veer towards contradiction.
How the relation between 'self-limitation' and 'revolution' is understood is crucial to 
understanding the nature of civil society and the social movement that struggles to establish its 
ethical foundations. As a general peculation on various models of civil society, the more 
instant, and principled, the dismissal of revolution its vocabulary, the less is its democratic
j potential. Self-limitation as strategy can accommodate 'revolutionary' change. However, as a
principle (of self-impediment) that 'respects the integrity of the political and economic
j systems'42 (i.e liberal representative democracy and capitalism as here we are talking about
\i
|| 'developed political systems') it cannot. The obvious democratic restrictions to an application
i
of a principle based upon a demarcation line between state and civil society (or state, economy
41 Z.A.Pelzcynski op.cit
42 Cohen and Arato op.cit
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and civil society), obscure the more fundamental problem of an institutionalised cultural ethic 
of 'self-limitation' developed from discursive practice. The (formal) political effects of an 
| adherence to a principle of self-limitation, as defined fairly explicitly with regard to its relation 
to the 'sub-systems' by Cohen and Arato, are a self-evident limit to the expansion of 
democracy. The danger of the application of 'self-limitation' as a normatively self-validating 
ethic for the politics of social movement is its development into a broader discourse of self- 
restraint. There are important and obvious implications for the proposed fluidity, or 
'modularity' as Gellner describes it43, of the subject of civil society and the processes of 
j  intellectual and moral reform referred to in Chapter 1.
A principle of self-limitation becomes, in political terms, a strategy of reform. The 
theoretical parameters imposed by a rigid reading of self-limitation as a 'core' principle, 
perhaps beyond 'post-traditional scrutiny', rather than effecting 'the idea' of civil society 
actually inhibits it. The democratic movements of civil society in communist east-central 
Europe had, rather than dispensed with the idea of revolution, dispensed with the idea of 
reform; the system was 'unreformable'. Self-limitation was an externally imposed necessity, 
and for Solidarity in Poland most notably, not a self-imposed principle of restraint.
The 'thematisation' of 'newness' that is Cohen and Arato's modified contribution to 
social movement theory implies a greater freewill to social movement than is the case in 
reality. 'Dual-logic' is not derived from expansion and empowering of social movement itself, 
but from response to historical context. In the same manner as was determined the strategy of 
the European Democratic Opposition (i.e. externally imposed by systems amenable to 
democracy in name and presentation only), 'new' social movements of the West were similarly 
determined by the prevailing political conditions. The political directions that the American
43 E.Gellner in J.A.Hall op.cit
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feminist movement, or any other movement for that matter, took were for reasons determined 
by the antithesis provided by the values of patriarchy, racism, and class - factors not logically 
intrinsic or exclusive to the idea of the state. Such values emanate from society itself even if 
they are conventionally and institutionally entrenched by the state. It was not the idea of 
political power as such that was anathema to social movement (such as the American feminist 
movement) that emphasised the 'extra-parliamentary' aspect of its 'dual-strategy', more that it 
was just unattainable in the 'developed political system' that provided its initial disillusionment 
and collective will.
The communist system could not facilitate a graduation toward a democratic society 
whose solidarity could reproduce the necessary normative political ethic for the realisation of 
'the idea' of civil society, and it seems neither can the 'actually existing democracies of the 
'West'. It is important to bear in mind that the inability of the communist system to reform itself 
was considered in this discursive vein by civil society movements, and emphatically not as an 
inability to accommodate capitalism.44 And neither can 'actually existing politically developed' 
systems.45 However unrealisable to the thinker whose political-conceptual universe extends as 
far as realpolitik the (at least gradual) application of 'the idea' of civil society might be, the 
democratic opposition in the former communist states represented a certain descent from (the 
socio-political implausibility of) idealism to a theoretical possibility. Whilst Solidarity 
maintained the application of self-limitation as a strategy (not as 'principle') the cultural, and 
therefore gradual, transformations necessary were maintained as the grounding conditions for
44 V.Havel; A.Michnik; G.Konrad; G.M.Tamas. None o f these authors o f civil society were sympathetic to
capitalism.
45 The claim of 'development' here could be forcefully argued to be legitimate, as Havel did in different terms. It 
refers to the less obviously brutal threats to democracy and social movement that 'developed political systems' 
pose through more sophisticated and insidious techniques and mechanisms of control. See Summer Meditations 
op.cit
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the (gradual) 'actuality of the idea'. The subsequent collapse, or rather 'dispersal', of the 
democratic opposition after the collapse of the communist system was partly as a result of the 
change in its application of self-limitation; it became effectively a 'principle'. In political terms 
democracy, as conceived in civil society theory and discourse, was by-passed; it then became 
something closer to the 'actually existing democracy' of 'developed political systems'. Political 
'self-limitation' became institutionalised in the consciousness/social imaginary as a democracy 
conceived as 'rights', and no more was 'freedom to be found through solidarity' but in the 
market.46
The discussion of social movement has thus far focused on the economic-corporate 
limits of democracy, and specifically obstacles like 'identity' that traps social movement 
democracy conception of the within a politics of the economic-corporate. The remainder of the 
chapter will offer an outline of the 'ethico-political'. There are three related areas to which the 
notion of the ethico-political should be applied. The first to be considered is social movement, 
and its characteristics of a lack of exclusive identity, and the subsequent development of its 
consciousness through its own receptivity to the possibility of contingency. The second area of 
relevance concerns the structural conditions of this movement. The third important relation is 
that with the 'state'. The first echoes the arguments in Chapterl concerning the development of 
consciousness; the structural conditions have been discussed in terms of the public sphere, in 
Chapter2, as the discursive forms of the ethico-political; and the third raises the questions that 
are discussed in the next Chapter on Legality. I will therefore leave the question of the state 
vis-a-vis the 'ethico-political' until then.
Where the concept of the economic -corporate might be applied to any collective 
organisation or private concern whose objective is it its own recognised (self) interest, the term
46 Lech Walesa cited in Introductory Chapter of this thesis.
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'ethico-political' is more elusive. However, it does encapsulate 'the idea' of civil society, as an 
elevated democratic plane. One obvious way of giving it some definition is to declare that all 
that cannot be classified as 'economic-corporate' must then be 'ethico-political'. But this would 
be inaccurate. The economic-corporate social categories correspond to a well-defined set of 
interests based on 'identity'. However, not all such categories so defined can be understood as 
'economic-corporate' in the sense of furthering the interests of that category. The most obvious 
example of this is historical slave revolts. It would be absurd to classify the slaves as a trapped 
economic-corporate entity. The objective of the slaves was to free themselves from being 
slaves and not furthering their interests as slaves. We might add that the servitude of the slave 
is a caricatured projection of the systems of domination that bear upon the subjects of 
‘developed political systems’. In the same manner that the rejection of the identity of ‘slave’ 
and its total abolition is the total rejection of that form of domination, the forms of domination 
that cohere developed political systems must be rejected totally if a radically democratised civil 
society is to develop.
The argument put forward so far in this chapter is that where the concept of 'social 
movement' is deployed as a more or less singular movement opposed to specific forms of 
domination, civil society theory generally traps democracy as an economic-corporate 
procedure. There is no room for any conceptual development of democracy beyond perhaps 
increased representation whose practice, or procedure, would become a "soulless" reformism. 
It is a perspective of political entrapment that is "unable to transcend the limitations of 
'problem solving theory'47 Habermas is partly right about the particularism of social 
movements, but rather than becoming so they remain so. The strong self-identity of social 
movements works against a developmental conception of democracy through the agencies of
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civil society. Any agency of radical democracy is lost or at least extensively moderated when 
the energy of collective disillusionment is transformed into a specifically (self-)defined, 
(formally) recognised movement, and 'identity', but not necessarily formal political inclusion is 
established.
Ethico-political movement is thwarted by a collective action deriving its identity (and 
raison d'etre) from its specific object of attack and institutions of domination. Here it might 
help to recap on a couple of points already made. In chapter2 an analogy was made between 
ecologism and environmentalism. It is possible to identify fundamentally philosophical 
differences between them that correspond to the categories of 'ethico-political' and 'economic- 
corporate'. The former is the perspective of the ecologist who sees the object of attack as part 
of a systemic problem and which cannot be isolated from the whole and then reformed. The 
latter, the environmentalist would be content with piece-meal, and ultimately ineffective, 
reforms. To remain in the economic-corporate perspective, as here the environmentalist, is to 
miss the linkages of the objects of protest, and importantly, misses the links between the 
agencies of protest - social movement.
This brings us to the second point of recap. The opposition between labourism and 
environmentalism still applies when the points of attack are seen as separable. The ecologist is 
aware of such linkage as deregulation allowing companies both to pollute and destroy the 
environment and to dismiss workers without consultation. The antagonism between 
environmentalism and labourism is inapplicable if the perspective is wider, and objects of 
protest formerly 'singular' (or isolatable) are recognised to be converging interests of the same 
agencies and processes of exploitation and domination. An ethico-political consciousness 
allows for the radical agency of social movement to develop a democratic oppositional unity
47 R.W.Cox and T.J.Sinclair Approaches to World Order Cambridge University Press 1996 p.89
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(in the example above, against the destructive effects of the logic of capitalism - human and r - . 
environmental).
Ethico-political social movement involves a periscopic perspective that overlooks the 
sphere of diminishing identity, inclusion, and importance, and focuses a wider angle that 
identifies with common democratic struggles against common forms of domination. It is the 
collective recognition of the contingency of identity. To reproduce the radically democratised 
society envisioned by Cohen and Arato, social movement must constitute a democratic struggle 
that can morph itself into an opposition against different forms of domination. These forms are 
basically the regimenting bureaucracy and coercion of the state, and the depoliticising effects 
of privatism on society. Social movement actively opposes the state violence on the West Bank 
whilst simultaneously engaging in protests against the W.T.O.48 It pits itself against the most 
implacable of cultural mores and traditions, 'realism' etc within society itself, as well as its 
more overt anti-democratic elements like fascism in all its (economic-corporate) guises. The 
movement's self-exemplification is vitally important to the fluidity required of the civil society 
it aspires to cultivate. The problem of 'self-limitation' again surfaces. It has already been noted 
how this understood as a strategy allows for a (theoretically limitless) developmental 
conception of democracy but as a principle it precludes it. As a strategy it allows for social 
movement to exemplify a more radical democracy, whose forms of association reflect a 
gradual process of the outward expansion of human being through the discourses of the public 
sphere and ethical movement, rather than the static spheres of diminishing responsibility. This 
culturally imposed hierarchical formation of economic-corporate entities - family, nationality, 
gender, in whichever sequence of priority - retains aspects of false consciousness (as defined in
48 The International Solidarity Movement exemplifies this fluidity and 'lack of identity'.
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Chapter2) that cannot assume democracy in that they deny the conditions for living the life 
espoused by humanist philosophy; the actuality of the idea.
For the theoretical possibility of an ethical trajectory to social movement to become 
actual, however insignificant and remote it may seem, there must be in place (or in the process 
of development) certain historical and structural conditions. The processes of globalisation are 
of course complex and not unanimously definitive in their conception, as the disparate views of 
its extent and substance show. But no political or social theory can afford to by-pass the 
problematic points globalisation raises. There are no processes of globalisation irrelevant to a 
theory of civil society, but what is of particular interest here is the claim that "from the 
'globalisation of economies, universalisation of cultures, and the proliferation of institutions' 
there are emerging 'principled ideas' adopted as international norms (and then become 
socialised into domestic understanding)".49 That there is a proliferation of transnational 
movement forming should not be in dispute. What is more difficult but necessary to identify, 
however, is the 'ethico-political' nature (the 'principled ideas') of the politics and institutions 
that emerge from these formations. But it is an important point of identification because it is on 
these formations that a radical (developmental) conception of democracy must be constructed.
In view of some of the processes of globalisation discussed in chapter 2 - specifically 
the corporatisation of communications and information, and cultural production - the actuality 
of the idea through the formation of ethic-political social movement does indeed appear to be 
far removed from its political potential to be an impossible prospect. But the more optimistic 
flip-side to the dominance of neo-liberalism and its culture of privatisation is the use to which 
these developments have been (and are being) put by a web of democratic/social movement 
and activism which show ethico-political tendencies in their linkages with other movement and
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activism, and which carry no ideological baggage of 'identity' to impede it. These structural 
developments in global communications that are almost instantaneous have provided certain of 
| the conditions for social movement to articulate/mobilise itself both politically and
| theoretically. It is important to make clear, at this point, the difference between this 'democratic
assumption' and the idea of 'cyber-democracy' referred to in chapter2. Common problems of 
access to the hardware aside, the former represents the practice of democracy, whereas the 
implications of the latter is that it becomes a mere extension of representative democracy 
taking on illusory dimensions of 'direct democracy', reducing democracy to a more quantitative 
! involvement by a separated, private individual as the 'unit of democracy', and not as a public 
i action.
| Another of the few positive effects of globalisation that run against the current of its
more dominant and destructive course is the weakening of the nation-state; although still the
major political actor, (arguably albeit in name effectively) its moribund condition is already
underway. This is disputed by some as part of wider disagreement on 'globalisation'. Rather 
than 'globalisation' there is only an 'internationalisation'; that is the economy of a given nation­
state may no longer be under the control of that nation-state, but the (nation-)state itself is more 
resilient to these processes. This is undoubtedly true insofar as the 'nation-state' is as intricately 
woven into the consciousness of its subject as it is dependent upon the objective criteria of 
sovereignty within a territorial boundary. The speed at which the demise of the nation-state 
will occur is easily exaggerated. There is unlikely to be anything like the dramatic domino 
collapse of the communist states in Europe re-enacted at nation-state level. Even as its 
'economic sovereignty' is progressively undermined by 'economic internationalism', the strong 
affiliation of 'identity' remains intact.
49 S.Tarrow 'Transnational Social Movement' in K.Nash op.cit p. 183
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It is important not to confuse the 'nation-state' with 'the state'; this latter more abstracted 
concept does not necessarily follow any decline of the former, its visibility may be less in 
evidence, but its rationalising effect of identity construction through the norm of legality is a 
less obvious state intrusion. This has obvious implications for movement in civil society.
The form of association required of ethico-political social movement, must meet 
certain criteria. It must go beyond the 'apolitical' institutions that are characteristic of 
‘developed political systems’, and beloved of civil society theorists. For reasons of 
reproduction of a post-traditional civil society, this ‘free association’ must constitute a 
democratic struggle that direct itself against the state, the atomizing and alienating processes of 
privatism, inequalities of capitalist economy, and against the reactionary and non-(or anti-) 
democratic movement within society (that denies the contingency of its own identity and 
consciousness which in turn preserves forms of ‘tradition-domination’, conservatism and 
fascism).
The only means by which the possibility of such association can be gauged is the 
phenomenon of social movement; movement that aspires to principles that are beyond the 
particular and corresponds to the discourses of the public sphere. The simultaneous extension 
of the concept, to incorporate a social movement that would not be recognized as a social 
movement, and the narrowing of its focus, to an abstracted point of hermeneutic 
understanding, makes it more usable. Conceiving social movement in this way maintains the 
focus on its ethico-political form and its democratic praxis.
In its origin all social movement must have arisen from exclusion of the political 
apparatus, and lack of representation. A developmental complication for social movement is its 
eventual subordination, and perhaps its extinction, to political mobilization, thus limiting its
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radical objectives, once representation is achieved. But even before this point is arrived at the 
progressive potential is vulnerable to stalling by its own identity consolidation and to the
| limited political demands it makes. The problem for social movement then is not exclusively or 
even primarily the inevitable conclusion that stage theory sets. The movement conception of 
democracy is narrowed by focus on itself and then all but lost to the demands of ‘realism’ and 
the political process. For examples of how the normative core of movement democracy as ‘free 
association’ becomes attenuated to the point of non-existence we need look no further than the 
British labour movement; German Greens; others. The objectives of the movement, for 
purposes of political process, become condensed and subsequently lost in their own 
disfigurement. They can only remain sectional interests whilst conducting their cause within 
the political process; entry into which depends upon identity and an already stylized and 
hierarchical representation of that identity.
Strategy is a contingent instrumental expedient determined in large part by the object of 
its attack (state) in its historical condition. ‘Dual-logic’ cannot therefore be accounted for by an 
inherent logic to a form of social movement that differentiates itself from others. However, 
social movement theory has a tendency toward the classification of characteristics like (self- 
limiting) ‘strategy’ to determine a uniqueness of NSMs and, by theoretical corollary, the 
almost unanimous insistence on the division between them and ‘old’ movements. The 'self- 
limitation' of new social movements, is not an indication of the elevated consciousness of 
movement that is ethico-political. On the contrary, it is the logical strategy of reformism to take
| for an (economic-corporate) movement that 'respects the integrity of the system' to which it is
\
is opposed.
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r! But when the principle of 'self-limitation' is viewed from the more radical position of
social movement, and the forms of domination that are the objects of attack from civil society 
are recognized to be, far from disconnected but, varyingly applied means of authority it 
becomes a principle that is effectively a restraint on democracy. The splintering of social 
movement into social movements restricts the movement to an economic-corporate level; as the 
‘compromise’ may be to the detriment of a ‘different’ social movement. The closing down of 
some shit producing factory may be the goal of the ‘green movement’. The ‘labour movement’ 
may want to keep it open. Both are for obvious reasons of economic-corporate interests. An 
ethico-political status is achieved only when recognition of a convergence, rather than a clash, 
of interests is achieved.
For this there must be the adoption of a more radical ‘multiculturalist perspectival’50 
position which cannot accommodate certain institutions that the adherence to an ultimately 
self-defeating principle of self-limitation would leave untouched. An abandonment of the 
principle could, on the other hand, facilitate democracy as ‘free association’ and an assumption 
of political power (not just the political weapon of cultural power). By imposing a principle of 
restraint, even if it is not ‘ideologically derived’ (in the same manner as environmentalists may 
be accused of this by ecologists, see Chapter 2), the social movement theorist contributes to the 
‘ideological hallmarks’ of labelled and pigeon-holed social movements.
These (self-limiting) demands are only limited by their (right or wrong) recognition of 
an unbeatable opponent. They do not represent a limited vision of social movement. Indeed 
they tell us more about the prevailing forms of domination that historically determine the 
strategy of social movements than they do about the movements themselves. The politicisation 
| of society as a whole is a second shared characteristic between ‘old’ and ‘new’. This could
I
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include a whole manner of evils however, and greater specificity is needed to understand the 
meaning of it in relation to social movement, and as part of the cultural condition of a ‘post- 
* traditional ‘ civil society. Social movement politicizes society in two ways. The first is as 
‘democratic attack’ on society itself. Cohen and Arato claim that identifying ‘society’ as 
opposed to ‘formal political society’ as a potential target itself is characteristic of New Social 
Movements only. But this exclusion of ‘old’ movements, as Calhoun’s arguments show, is 
simply incorrect. What this theoretical division does is provide the support for the principle of 
self-limitation. If the old/new division cannot be sustained then the foundations of the self- 
limiting principle are undermined by a link effected by deeper processes than strategy. The 
second meaning of politicizing society can only refer to consciousness and the social 
imaginary. Politicisation here means reflection upon or engagement with the ‘wider concerns’ 
of existence. It is a politicization that is antithetical to the cultural reification of ‘the private’, 
culturally induced political apathy, and acceptance of a politics of the economic-corporate.
Where the forms of domination, that are the object of social movement attack, may be 
determined by historical context (and so too the characteristics of the movement -  its strategy 
etc) the movement itself may not. To illustrate this we can look at an example of democratic 
struggle or movement, which would be difficult if not impossible to include in the common 
understanding of ‘social movements’. In the war in Spain in 1936, the International Brigades 
fought for principles which managed to transcend the powerful economic-corporate grip of 
‘nation’ on its collective consciousness in their failed attempt to supplant that (nationality) 
system of governance with radical conceptions of self-governance. A similar progression to 
‘internationalism’ is the fundamental characteristic of contemporary social movement. In its 
j  latest concerted effort (2002) toward the destruction of the Palestinian people, the Israeli state
50 B.Parekh op.cit
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is the object of protest for the International Solidarity Movement, elements of which are active 
on the West Bank. The more destructive processes of globalisation identified as the effects of 
capitalist expansion is also the object of attack. The connection between the violence of the 
Israeli state and capitalist interests is recognised. The I.S.M. captures the possibility of fluidity 
in social movement that has historically been stifled by the political representation of its 
economic-corporate interest within institutions of state. The forms of domination that gave rise 
to specific movements (patriarchy/feminist; capital/labour etc) then became the limited object 
of attack; a holistic view of power structures and authority is then missed. This is the effect of 
self-limitation. Where social movement (e.g. I.S.M.) differs from the more or less fixed lines of 
demarcation that have conceptualised social movements is in its ability to evade this ‘single 
domination issue movement’ by changing itself into something apparently very different.
The unimpeded development of civil society based on a developmental view of social 
movement (and a ‘publicly oriented self)  is logically ‘global’ in its progression. A plurality of 
association that is itself without the incumberance of fixed identity differentiates itself from 
association that is legally, traditionally, or commercially derived. The plurality of civil society 
is the subject of freedom inextricably bound to the self {and an awareness of the contingency of 
the self), whereas a conception of plurality based on a freedom to associate shifts the 
problematic of ‘autonomy’ and agency to the individual making a moral choice. Just as 
societies, in the broader sense are not prior to an individual rational agency, ‘associations’ are 
not prior or separated from their ‘associates’ in their constitution.
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Chapter 4
Legality
(Structure of general laws needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and publicity 
from at least the state and, tendentially, the economy.)
Thus far, it has only been possible to sustain the broad normative foundations of 
privacy, publicity, and plurality after some substantial revision and more specific foci. 
As the proposed defence of these bases, legality, I shall argue in this chapter, is no 
less ideologically problematic than the concept of ‘the private’ with which it is 
intimately linked (not least as a source of moral justification for action). Before it can 
be assumed that legality can support and maintain the normative structure of an 
ethico-political society, a radical critique and (possible) revision to which the 
preceding three chapters were subject must be similarly extended. Unlike the other 
three categories, however, the method of immanent critique may prove to be 
unyielding. Whereas normative extraction, that can maintain links with ‘the actual’, 
was possible for privacy, publicity, and plurality, legality shows no obviously 
redemptive facet.
We must move away from the idea, in ‘developed political systems’, that ‘law’ 
is (or can act as) a defence against the expansion of the state into social life, and 
instead focus attention on it as the implementation of the discourses of legality with 
which the state seals its own legitimacy. Indeed it appears to be something of a 
nonsense to suggest that the expansion of something can be prevented by a means 
which is at the same time the exercise of a coercive arm of that expansion and a more
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cerebral source of its legitimacy. It is by means of law, and the legitimating discourses 
of legality, that the rationalisation processes of the state cut their edge.
The method of the chapter will follow the same initial steps as the first three. It 
is concerned with two main lines of enquiry: the 'material' instances of Law; and the 
discursive norms of legality. I will examine the concept of legality from a critical 
perspective with two aims in mind: examining the role that legality plays in 
legitimising the modem (legal) state, and itself as 'Law'; and exploring elements to its 
discourses that lend themselves to civil society as a form of public authority or power. 
But an ethically stringent definition of civil society requires a process not readily 
identified with the economic-corporate framework of law as understood in the 
'developed political systems' of the modem (legal) state.
There is the important matter of how we understand 'law', and how it should, if 
it can, be understood to differentiate itself from rules. The 'law', I shall argue, contains 
no essence to it that can differentiate it from rules, only that 'law' takes precedent over 
rules by virtue of it being applicable to the largest conceivable political entity. The 
rules issued by the state are 'law' because they supersede those of organisations within 
it. In the same progression, state law is can be overruled by international law. In order 
to identify an essence to 'law', one of two limiting perspectives must be taken. Either 
the materialist analysis of a coercive power that is instrumental in the subjection of 
one class over another is accepted, or the view that law is a neutral, and by 
implication objective, self-sustaining order. This formalistic view of law is of less use 
than the crude materialist analysis in setting about an examination of the role of law in 
social relations. Neither broad perspective offers much insight into the effect of 'law' 
as a powerful cultural force on the consciousness of the (human) subject of 'law' in 
'developed political systems'. The parenthesis here is important. The initial concern of
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this chapter will be the 'subject of law'. However, this is considered as a generic legal 
category which includes the human self as a 'legal subject'.
The narrow understanding of 'law' that concerns itself exclusively with the 
police and the judiciary are specialised and compartmentalised disciplines. The 
broader discourses of legality, or 'the law', represents the moral cohesion of all aspects 
of ‘developed political systems’, from politics to (a conditioned) morality. The 'law' 
refers to factors of legitimacy and, within the discourses of legality, a universality that 
is far more conceptually elusive than the easily identifiable institutions of judiciary 
and police.
A basic proposition of this chapter is that far from being the object with which 
morality necessarily comes into conflict,1 law in the modem (legal) state is one of its 
principal authors. The moral question itself has become, in 'developed political 
systems', a matter of legality. This is at its most obvious and explicit when it is asked 
of the deployment of state violence. The ‘court’ of the U.N. is quasi-legal, but it is an 
institution of legality par excellence. Shrouded in the abstract certainties of law, moral 
justification is sought for action through securing the legal resolution of the U.N. by 
such means as bribery, threats, economic sanction and political expediency. Through 
these processes, legally justified actions become morally charged. It is therefore 
necessary to 'receive' the term legality with much circumspection and examine the 
implications for (ethico-) political development.
Law, in the modem (legal) state provides the conditions for the development 
of 'purposive-rational' agency that furthers the culture of privatism as the affliction of 
self, and subsequently, political development in supposedly 'developed' political
1 J.L.Cohen and A.Arato op.cit p.52
2 This kind o f cynical political horse-trading was at its most naked in the U .S .’s attempts to ‘persuade’ 
target nation-states to support, and ultimately morally underwrite, the 2003 war on Iraq. (Economic­
a l
systems. Problematically - for the development of civil society - the framework of the 
institutions of law in the modem (legal) state not only accommodate the development 
of private interests, it is their codification and categorised certainty that impedes the 
political consciousness from developing beyond an economic-corporate imagination.
If law, in the modem (legal) state, is to be understood as something more 
complex than a 'command' theory of law, then the relation between the 'subject of law' 
and 'the law' must be addressed by way of examining the possibility of something 
approaching a legal essence. This could only be, however, a defining characteristic 
that separates it from 'rules'. From this we can then determine the relation between 
this subject and what it recognises to be superordinate to 'rules'. I will first engage in 
an extensive discussion of the principal question of who or what constitutes the 
'subject of law', and the important and unavoidable correlative enquiry of how they 
are 'constructed' (Hirst). I will then compare Hirst's idea of 'public law' (public power) 
as the only feasible identification of what he believes to be a vain search for a legal 
essential? This thesis more or less concurs with this view, but his materialist 
emphasis does not fully support his concept of 'public power'. For this a more 
balanced enquiry is required, which would include the aspect of the 'legal 
consciousness' and the reception of the norms of 'law' that is essential to its own 
legitimacy.
The question of the 'construction' of the 'legal subject' is pivotal. A thorough 
analysis of this will provide some of the answer to the question of whether 'law' in the 
modem (legal) state can provide the structure of an ethico-political (civil) society 
understood to be founded on social relations that defy economic-corporate restraint. 
The agency of civil society, so defined in chapter 3 as ethico-political movement
corporate self-interest overrode any semblance o f ‘moral positioning’; Russia, for instance, demanded 
higher commercial costs to the U.S. for its support (oil deals in post-war Iraq).
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rather than a sphere that incorporates privatised actions, does not readily fit into the 
processes (for this is how it shall be defined in this Chapter) of legality and the 
'rationality' (whose nuances of meaning will be discussed also in this Chapter) of the 
form of law upon which the modem (legal) state is founded.
However, this 'construction' is more complex than the purely legal creation
that the word suggests. It is perhaps more broadly described as the formalisation of 
social formations into an economic-corporate (legal) category. The legal inclusion of 
the institutions of the labour movement, for instance, was not a straightforward 
process of legal construction, but a (legal) recognition and problematically, for 
reasons discussed in Chapter 3, consolidation of subjectivity or identity. 'Legal 
construction' involves a consolidation of a prior social formation (not yet agency) into 
a legal subject. Or as Hirst puts it, 'differentiated agencies of decision', but not a legal 
'creation'.4 Much less is the law in developed political systems the necessary 
regulation of prior social agency. Although there may be prior 'social formations', 
they only become 'agencies' through the processes of categorisation that must precede 
legal endowment. The question that must be kept in mind, as the question that drives 
all these enquiries, remains: can the Law, by way of recognition, categorisation, and 
inclusion ('construction'), contribute to an assumption of democracy that is 
characteristic of an ethico-political (civil) society?
The Chapter will then go on to examine the ideological/discursive norms of 
legality, transmitted through the varying institutions of publicity. I will outline an 
historical development of law and the principal contributors to the discourses of 
legality; from the legitimacy of the modem (legal) state to human rights - to establish 
the broader origins of legality. The understanding of law and its relation to this wider
3 P.Q.Hirst Law Socialism and Dem ocray  London Allen and Unwin 1986
4Ibid  p.24
173
concept established, the discussion will move on to the proposition of ideological 
legality. The foundational norms of legality - justice, rights, neutrality etc - will be 
considered in their different (and contradictory) levels of discourse in the public 
domain, and as conceptually problematic to a politically developed civil society. It is 
they that provide for the foundations of a ‘privatised’ society; shape the nature of 
privacy; determine the condition of the public domain, and inhibit the freedom of 
association that characterises ethico-political social movement within it.
Dominant approaches to a theory of 'law' are inadequate to the task of 
examining law as an historical and cultural force, whose effect is directly on social 
relations in a society and not merely as a 'detached' framework of due processes and 
prohibitions. A formalistic approach to law conceives it as external, independent, and 
neutral it completely misses the importance of 'law' as "a constituent way in which 
social relations are lived and experienced".5 As an approach to 'law', formalism has 
the tendency to limit the reach of its principles, pushing law to the periphery of social 
life. This paradigm proposes a conceptual unity to society derived from a surrendered 
individual autonomy.6 The problematic assumption of the autonomy of the subject 
aside, 'consent' theories tend to analyse the position of subjects in terms of 
equivalency that obscures important asymmetrical power relations among those 
subject to the same law. It also equalises the relation between the governed and the 
governors, consequently minimising the coercive aspect to 'law'. This formalistic 
approach serves to perpetuate the objective, neutral, external illusions about law, and 
cannot be adopted as an analytical and theoretical framework.
5 A.Hunt Explorations in Law and Society. Toward a Constitutive Theory o f  Law  London Routledge 
1993 p. 121
6 L.Green 'Commitment and Community' in J.Raz (ed) Authority Oxford Blackwell 1990; K.Greenwalt 
'Promissory Obligation: The Theme of Social Contract' in J.Raz op.cit; A.Linklater Men and Citizens in 
the Theory o f  International Relations London MacMillan Press 1982
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A materialist aspect must be part of its conception to account for the 
problematic question of 'the subject' and autonomy, and to account for the role of 'law' 
in the consciousness of the societies of 'developed political systems'. In much the 
same manner, instrumentalist theories of law have a tendency to limit its concern to 
an analysis of law in terms of its role in the (predominantly) coercive subjection of 
one class over another, or as an analysis of the apparatus of a power elite. One effect 
of this reductionism, it has been pointed out, reproduces the same public/private 
distinction (as the distinction between politics and economics) that the liberal derived 
formation manages to project in the shape of the private aspect of law referring to the 
individual, property rights and economic exchange, and the 'public' aspect as an 
authority . (An authority embodied by the state and whose compulsion is legitimised 
by legality). Criticism of the (Marxist) instrumentalist approach to law comes from 
Paul Hirst. In On Law and Ideology8, Hirst claims that these theories regard law as 
simply an 'expression' of what is in the condition of capitalism, "rather than an arena 
of struggle, a forum with potential political and economic effects".9 What is required 
of a theory of law is one that situates it in the actuality of social relations, and not as 
an epiphenomenal effect of the relations of production (much less as an abstracted 
realm set apart from actual relations). 'Law' becomes internalised, both as an 
acceptance of a (public) power that transcends rules and as specific legal rules. In his 
emphasis of the consensual aspect of hegemony, Gramsci wrote that legality creates
7 S.Picciotto 'The Theory o f the State, Class Struggle and the Rule o f Law' in B.Fine, R.Kinsey, J.Lea, 
S.Picciotto, and J. Young (eds) Capitalism and the Rule o f  Law. From D eviancy Theory to Marxism  
London Hutchinson 1979
8 P.Q.Hirst On Law and Ideology. London MacMillan Press 1979
9 ib id  p p l37-8 . Further Criticism comes from Andrew Fraser who sees instrumentalist conceptions of 
law as precluding "the possibility o f developing a sensitive awareness o f the legal process as a form of 
creative social praxis in its own right. . . .  Marxist instrumentalism, like bourgeois positivism, conceives 
law as only a formal structure o f rules, categorically distinct from the social context within which that 
set o f rules is placed". A.Fraser 'The Legal Theory W e Need Now', Socialist Review  8 (4-5) pp. 147-87
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"a social conformism that is useful to the ruling group's line of development".10 An 
uncritical assumption that legality represents a mechanism for the furtherance of 
democracy must not be made.
I will define 'Law' as part of the social fabric of developed political systems, 
and propose that the discursive formations of legality are ultimately a detriment to the 
development of civil society. This definition can be identified by a differentiation 
from law that is derived from a source of authority other than the law itself. Thus the 
very idea of law becomes the governing principal of social relations rather than an 
'external oracle' of open 'non-rational' (Weber) sources of authority. The rationality of 
'law' is itself the authority. In ‘less developed’ forms (according to Schopflin's version 
of development), this authority could be nation, race, God, or historical imperative as 
a peculiar diversionary form, or any other ‘oracle’ that can exert (public) power over 
social relations. But this is not to say that the legal authority of ‘developed political 
systems’ is founded upon a morally neutral objectivity. Such a perception of law is 
the effect of the authority of statute and legitimacy of legislature. Karl Renner 
describes:
modem law [as] crystallized in a countless multitude of codes, statutes and 
orders, rulings of authorities and judgements of courts; and of contracts and 
other acts of private individuals. What is to be the law is set forth in writing 
and in print: so that what had a merely subjective, nebulous existence in the 
mind of man is rendered objective. In this way the notions of the individual 
are removed from the control of his fluctuating psychology and are made 
permanent. Thus the law appears to be established, stable and fixed (‘given’); 
it becomes statute”.11 The certainty of law is a reflection of the certainty of 
identity as 'legal subject'. Indeed through its categorisation processes, law 
creates its own surety through the consolidation of identity. The following 
argument is toward establishing legality as the (discursive) aspect to the 'point 
of unity in law' (that differentiates it from rules) and the 'institutions of 
legislature' as its actualisation.
10 A.Gramsci Selections from  Prison Notebooks op.cit p. 195
11 K. Renner The Institutions o f  Private Law and their Social Functions London Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 1949 p. 45
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The formal reasoning of calculable interest shapes the nature of privacy. The 
discourses of legality are grounded in the vocabulary of the individual. However, this 
individual is not confined to reference to a liberal ontology (although the moral 
implications of this ontology are often explicitly to the fore), it is also a ‘legal 
individual’ as a unit o f law in its subjective aspect. It may refer to more than a 
singular subject of law -  to an ethnic group or capitalist corporation. It was seen in 
Chapter 2 how the U.S. Supreme Court recognised such a corporation as an 
individual. Rights apply to such ‘corporate legal individuals’ as well as individuals in 
their common understanding as the human subject. The (logical) processes by which 
the interests of such economic-corporate categories, capitalist corporations (more 
characteristic of ‘developed political systems’) and ethnic groups (more obvious in 
‘undeveloped political systems’) are best furthered are also followed by the self­
recognised private individual. I shall consider 'subjects of law' as restrictive to 
political development - that is, a development very different to the hitherto 
understanding of it provided by Schopflin. Political development as here understood 
would describe the expansion of social movement from its economic-corporate 
bounded processes and a transition to an assumption of democracy in wresting some 
political control back into society. I will consider the questions of this (ethico- 
political) 'agency' and its incompatibility with law, and the relation between civil 
society and the state below. The relation between civil society and the state and that 
between civil society and the 'Law' {legality) are not the same. The 'Law' is not 
identical with the state.
An initial requirement of an analysis of legality is a materialist conception of 
law that embodies rather than neglects or ignores outright its subjective aspect. Much 
of what follows on the 'legal subject' is an extension of the discussions on 'the self in
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Chapter 1. The conclusions reached there prevent any analysis of law whose 
subjective aspect is premised on a prior individual rational agency. I will not, 
therefore, dwell on this fundamental point of distinction; the 'legal subject' understood 
here is a social phenomenon. A couple of points to make, before moving on to the 
social origins and legal 'construction' (of the subject) is how legal theory grounded on 
this subjective rationality is in fundamental error. Certain 'legal subjects' (as bearers of 
subjective right) are legal subjects because of their declared inability to reason. These 
would include the categories such as 'insane' and minors. The existence of the thing in 
question (insane) is dependent on its incapacity to be recognised and reflected by the 
very thing (law) that affirms its existence, by constructing its (non-rational) legal 
identity.
Other legally created subjects that have no origin as social formations or 
relations, as bearers of subjective right, would include capitalist corporations. Paul 
Hirst takes the example of the joint stock company to undermine the thesis of 
'subjective bearer', he also points out the category of 'mother' as a legal unit of 
'primary socialisation function'.12 Individual rational agency in the sense of the 
personality and as differentiated economic-corporate agency is an effect of legal 
decree and construction. It is this transformation of the self that Pashukanis describes 
as the transformation, "from a zoological individual into an abstract, impersonal legal 
subject, into the legal person". 13
I will refer here to the theory of law presented by E.B.Pashukanis,14 for the 
important reason that it facilitates the aspect of 'subjective reception' within a 
materialist conception of law. His use of Marx's theory of fetishism of the commodity
12 P.Q.Hirst On Law and Ideology  op.cit
13 E.B.Pashukanis Law and Marxism: A General Theory B.Einhom (trans), C.Arthur (ed) london Ink 
Links 1978 p. 109
14 op.cit
178
form underlines the material origins of laws (in this case the origin of subjective right 
and the development of the law of value) in a way that helps us understand the norms 
of legality to be institutionally rooted and reproduced. His materialist foundations to a 
theory of law departed from the crude Marxist understanding of it as the coercive 
means of class rule, and led him to the realm of ’private right' and the subjective 
bearer as abstracted legal personality to look for the essence of law.
For Pashukanis, this abstraction involves a complex relation between the 
subject and property; the essential form of law (in capitalist states) is to be found in 
private law. Taking his legal theory directly from Marx's commodity form theory, he 
finds the origin of the 'legal subject' in the social relations of production, where it 
forms one aspect of the alienated self; the relation between the subjective (wills of 
formal equality), and the objective (relations between things). He writes: "Every legal 
relation is a relation between subjects. The subject is the atom of legal theory, its 
simplest, irreducible element. Consequently we begin our analysis with the subject".15
The problem with attempting to locate a legal essence in private law is that the 
legal subject becomes identical with the economic subject; only that one is the formal 
abstraction of the other. He explains: "it is precisely in the act of exchange that man 
puts into practice the formal freedom of self-determination".16 Legal capacities other 
than relations of exchange and transaction are recognised in the commodity form 
theory of law, but "only in commodity production does the abstract legal form see the 
light; in other words, only there does the general capacity to possess a right become 
distinguished from concrete legal claims".17 It is in this that Pashukanis claims the 
possibility of a generic legal category of a fixed bearer of rights. This constant is 
despite the vagaries of relations of exchange, a consequence of which is that the
15 ibid  p. 109
16 ibid  p. 117
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actual situation or concrete condition of the bearer is liable to change. Pashukanis uses 
the situations of the debtor and the creditor as both, in different time and 
circumstance, applicable to the inalienable (and legal) right of the bearer. The aspect 
of the subject that is fixed, however, corresponds to an abstract rational agency.
The abstract legal personality could not therefore have existed before the 
development of commodity and exchange relations. The material conditions for the 
abstract legal subject did not exist before the development of relations of transaction 
and exchange. In the principle of ‘equivalency’, capitalist relations brought about a 
development of law of theoretical universality. Without the concept of formal equality 
attached to its social relations, feudal systems lacked a formal unitary or equal legal 
status. The (abstract) equality of exchange-value relations represents an element to 
law, absent in all other forms, considered peculiar to these social relations. But it is 
not abstraction that is the differentiating factor, rather it is the (conceptual) extent of 
its subject category (universality). It transcends the 'rules' of feudal guilds and estates, 
to whose internal organisation all notions of 'equivalence' were restricted, but is a 
form of law based upon the recognition of public authority just like any other system 
-  the feudal included.
The flaw in Pashukanis's analysis is in its assumption that the absence of 
'unity' is conclusive of a qualitative difference when in reality the difference is better 
understood quantitatively. In other words, that element of 'unity', and with it 'public 
authority', is present in all lawful societies, and the difference with the law in the 
modem (legal) state is simply that it oversees vastly greater numbers of organisations 
and processes. The specific 'public authority' that legitimises 'developed political 
systems' is discursive and procedural legality.
17 ib id  p .l 18
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The social (including legal) origin of the subject of law cannot be fully 
evaluated if law is ultimately reduced to (individuated) subjective rights bearers 
implementing the objective conditions of the law of value. The narrowing of the 
relation between the law and its subject has two immediate limitations. First, it does 
not recognise the category of legal subjects that are not human subjects. The theory of 
the fetishism of commodities accounts for the 'legally constructed' will of the 
individual (human) subject, but does not include those that are corporate bodies - 
economic, ethnic. Second, Pashukanis's economic reductionism does recognise such 
non-economic social relations outside the system of production and exchange, but 
ultimately they are all reducible to it. The search for the elemental component of law 
in private law is misplaced. Indeed, according to Paul Hirst's argument, any search for 
an essence to law is ill-conceived because it diverts attention from the legislative 
processes, the only point of differentiation between 'law' and 'rules' that he concedes. I 
shall engage with this (qualified) dismissal of the essence below, and develop my 
argument around these differentiating processes and their relation to legality as a 
discursive form. An elemental, or substantive difference to law in the modem (legal) 
state can only be claimed by its own (ideological) discursive legality.
The construction of legal identity and category leads to the second of the 
enquiries correlative of the principal question (what is the subject of law?). How are 
these subjects, so constructed, to become agencies of democracy as an assumption. 
The ethico-political conditions of radical democratisation by means of social 
movement in civil society demand that there is no economic-corporate constraint on 
social relations, either legally enjoined or by any other ideological or coercive 
method. The agency of civil society is, by definition here, social movement based on
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social relations where the measurement of freedom is on the association itself 
unencumbered by formalised identity and category of operation.
The constitution of the 'legal subject1 must be considered primarily as the 
effect of the categorisation and identity construction of the bureaucratic and 
rationalising processes of state and economy, and therefore limited in the possibilities 
of political development. The 'legal subject' is therefore the effect of law, rather than a 
prior agency of rationality necessitating law. Conceiving law as the regulative means 
of rational agencies exclusively in the form of the person narrows considerably the 
investigation of 'law'. It misses the points of legitimacy secured by legality that 
present and reproduce the 'law' as something beyond the regulating principles of an 
exclusively market-oriented agency.
Areas of constraint to political development may include economic-corporate 
categories that are not in their actions predominantly (never mind exclusively), to use 
Weberian terms, 'purposive-rational', but as easily and fairly described as 'value- 
rational'. The institutions of the modem (legal) state issue the categories and identities 
that are received as amoral. But such agency formation may be self-recognised by 
principles of 'value-rational' action rather than the utility maximisation of 'purposive- 
action'. In summary the law is more than an instance of regulation, it is, crucially, the 
authority behind the identity it has either explicitly constructed (this might include 
'criminal', 'insane', 'sexual deviant', 'mother', 'single mother', etc, etc) or formalised as 
the legal identity of social formations (trade union, capitalist corporation, ethnic 
minority).
The economic reductionism of Pashukanis's theory of law is fraught with 
conceptual difficulties as well as having impossible political ramifications for civil 
society. Any resolution to the problem of law can only be achieved when the
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differentiated agencies of property acquisition and their regulative necessity are 
removed; the 'withering away of the law' will be followed by the abolition of private 
property. But reducing domination of law to the domination of the commodity form 
necessarily misses the broader rationality to the legal-domination central to societies 
of ‘developed political systems’. This domination encompasses more than commodity 
exchange relations. The rationality of ‘law’ provides the human consciousness with 
well-defined perspectives to its environment; the self perceives its own development 
as proceeding according to these rational identities and actions. The rationality of law 
locks the consciousness into economic-corporate frames of reference. Thus the 
domination of the legal-ideal is not founded on a legal essential, nor can it be located 
in private law. An extraction of the problem of private law as Pashukanis presents it, 
in other words private property, would not be followed of necessity by a ‘withering of 
the law’.
An irreducible legal element is a fiction; enquiries after which divert attention 
away from the complexities of legality in developed political systems. The only 
conceptual parallel that can be made is in an area of 'unity to law' that can only be 
grasped in the idea. This comprises all (often contradictory) discursive formations of 
legality, including the bases of rights, justice, and neutrality etc established in the 
consciousness as a 'legal mentality'.18 This 'unity', however, can only establish itself as 
an over-arching 'public power' through the actual processes of the legal institutions of 
state in their application of these concepts.
Paul Hirst describes the privileging of private law as a "profound error": 
"Pashukanis's search for the 'form' of law, for the definitive feature of its rules that 
provide its raison d'etre, was a chase after a chimera. It is legal institutions that
18 M.Delmas-Marty Towards a Truly Common Law. Europe as a Laboratory fo r  Legal Pluralism  
Cambridge University Press 2002
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differentiate the rules they make as 'laws'.19 His critique of Pashukanis's commodity 
form theory develops the 'legal subject' beyond its restrictive identification with 
'economic subject' by looking to 'public law' for an elemental definition to law that 
sets it apart from mere rules.
Hirst's own theory is a perspective of law that shifts the focus from one on 
private property to one that emphasises its "instance of regulation"20 and its 
organisational complexities. Law, in his analysis, consists of three elements 
('necessary to the instance of regulation'): An apparatus of regulation; rules issued 
from these apparatuses that defines the form o f existence of the subject by determining 
its status in its ascribed legal category; norms o f conduct that stipulate category- 
specific legal requirements; and an apparatus of coercively backed adjudication.21 His 
criticism of Pashukanis's 'legal subject' analysis comes (in part) from his point that the 
exclusivity of the personality of the bearer of subjective right necessarily excludes 
analysis of other subject formations, like the joint stock company, and other legal 
categories such as 'wife'.22 This underlines the need to broaden the subject category to 
include all corporate institutions whose interests are based on principles of wealth 
accumulation, exclusion, tradition, etc.
The idea behind the concept of, what Paul Hirst describes as, 'public power' 
(public law) is crucially important to an immanent critique of legality as discursive 
formations in the public domain. Public law in this conception represents the 
legitimacy behind the powers that 'issue' law, thus elevating it above the category of 
'rule'. Legality, although distorted in its discursive presentation in the public domain, 
represents a convergence of 'law' above the category of (mere) rule to a conception of
19 Hirst Law Socialism and D em ocracy  op.cit p.21
20 ibid  p. 19
21 ibid
22 Hirst On Law and Ideology op.cit p.??
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universality. The purpose of this part of the critique is to establish a conceptual 
parallel between the illusion that Hirst describes this 'public power' as, and legality as 
a source of legitimacy. A fairly detailed look at Hirst's concept of 'public power' is 
therefore required.
Denying any essentialism to it, Hirst defines 'law' as an "institutionally 
specific instance of regulation, which is itself presented in the form of public law".23 
Public law is not a corpus of legislation defined as an opposite to private law. It 
entails, first of all, recognition of a public from which comes an authority that 
supersedes all other laws as rules. Strictly speaking this 'law' is still conceptually no 
different to rules, the difference lies in that they are perceived to be superior - in their 
application to wider organisations. Hirst makes the proposition that “public law 
involves the 'fiction' that the state exists in the form of law and that law is not merely 
one definite sphere of state activity but is definitive of the whole”.24 Thus the 'law' 
and 'the state' are not identical, but 'public law' acts as a form of public power 
(received as embodied in the state). Neither is this something peculiar to modem 
(legal) states; the identification with the state in the public imaginary is present in 
other forms of state. The specificity of the fiction of public law lies in the 
differentiation (and recognition of as the basis of legitimacy) between it and rules; the 
nearest thing to a legal essentialism that can be reasonably and accurately made.
Hirst makes this point in another way, emphasising the institutionalisation of 
law and its multifarious agencies. A necessary condition of public law is the 'fiction' 
of it being 'definitive of the whole'. It requires this because: "(1) Laws and regulatory 
instances are not a homogeneous sphere of legality (law) - there is no 'Law' in general, 
only specific bodies of rules and definite apparatuses regulating spheres of activity ...;
23 Hirst Law Socialism and D em ocracy op.cit p.22
24 ibid  p.24
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(2) because the rules of procedure that legal agencies follow are specific constructions 
of other agencies of decision, legislatures and higher courts".25 In a sense, public law 
amounts to more than the sum of its complex and varied parts. It presents itself as the 
(illusory) unification of this complexity of rules and regulation, and the perception 
that "all laws are equally valid and should be obeyed".26
Public law is presented as composite of sovereignty: "The doctrine of 
sovereignty transcends different forms of state and constitution", it was presented thus 
in feudal systems, and was "retained and reinforced by the doctrines of the liberal era 
.. ,".27 It is sovereignty that resolves the paradox involving the notion of 'law' as being 
"'above' the activities it regulates, and yet subject itself ...".28 Furthermore, "Law and 
public law cannot be separated; this is because what differentiates 'law' from other 
classes of rule are the claims advanced by institutionally specific instances of 
regulation".29 But Hirst's identification of legislation, and its complex material 
processes as the 'point of unity' in public law is only one aspect to it. His argument 
does neglect the consensual aspect of law that must be of primary consideration when 
both a priori rational agency and a 'command' theory of law are rejected as methods 
of explanation.
It is fitting at this point to recap on the position reached on the understanding 
of 'law'; and then examine its relation to the state. With the aid of Hirst's critique of a 
materialist theory of law derived from the commodity form, it has been established 
that there is no legal essence - in the sense of a substantive differentiating factor to 
law in the modem (legal) state. Any converging point of unity to law that may be 
identified cannot be supported with reference to the subject category alone. For
25 ibid  p.25
26 ibid
27 ibid
28 ibid  p.26
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Pashukanis, this involves the individuating effects of commodity relations and the 
transcendence of a (human) rights bearer as the effective establishment of a 
qualitative or essential difference to law in 'developed political systems'. The 
consciousness of 'the subject', as 'legal mentality', is, however, crucially important. It 
is in the discourses of legality in developed political systems that this reception of 
legitimacy to 'law' can be discerned. The 'passive activity', referred to in Chapter 2 as 
a 'consensual' aspect to the public domain and its cultural production, would in this 
instance perceive the formal reasoning of law and its injunctions as 'common-sense'. 
The point of unity to law in the modem (legal) state is a convergence of the norms of 
legality, that provide the consent to law, and the legal institutions of state that issue 
and enforce them.
The 'law' as the public power that commands the recognition of its subjects 
that it is law, is the source of legitimacy for the modem (legal) state of developed 
political systems, much less is democracy. A good example of the misapplication of 
the term 'representative democracy' comes from the most developed political system 
of them all, where its president was 'nominated' ('elected' would be even more of a 
misemployment) through processes of legality and not the 'channels and procedures 
of democracy. But this has never compromised the legitimacy of the administration.
The pre-fix 'legal' to the state in developed political systems refers to its 
legitimacy, rather than a reference to the 'nature' of the state itself. There are elements 
to the state that need have nothing to do with the norms of legality. The 'legal-state' 
refers to a form of legitimacy, not a form of state. The legal-state remains legitimate 
so long as it acts within the 'law' or within the terms of legality (or at least is 
perceived to do so). It is a paradox that the source of its own legitimacy is 'within'
29 ib id  p.27
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itself but apart from it. The state has to stand over the 'law' as the mechanism of 
regulation, but also has to be subordinate to it.
As a necessary component to 'law' (as differentiated from 'rules' that are not 
themselves subject to a point of unity), the state has a complex relation to it. It must 
be emphasised that they are not identical. The only feasible division that can be 
applied to the law and the state is a methodological one. Legal institutions and 
processes are not coincidental with the state institutions of judiciary/police; agencies 
of wealth distribution; and parliament. But since some of these institutions are basic to 
the composition of any modem state, the difficulty in separating the processes of 
legality from all (including arbitrary) actions of the state is analytically impossible, 
just as it is to separate state and society conclusively. More important, in political 
terms, is the difficulty of this separation occurring in the consciousness of those 
subject to 'law' in developed political systems. The point of 'unity to law', or processes 
of legality as 'public' and superior to mere rules, is perceived to be embodied by the 
state; not in any way distinct from it.
The institutions of state (judiciary/police; social security agencies; parliament) 
are received as the actualisation of the norms of 'neutrality', 'justice', and 'rights', the 
material embodiment of these discourses. The 'law' (legality) is an adoption of 
procedure by the state, whose 'public power' is dependent on its adherence to the 
concepts that are authorised in the public domain. The 'law', on the basis that legality 
represents (the consensual aspect of) public power, is 'outside' (or 'above' -as its 
source of legitimacy) the state. But it is 'within' the state as the application of the basic 
principle of a 'unity to law' that claims any reality only in the human consciousness. 
The political ramifications of this are that: whilst legality, as an instance of 
recognition of public power and the retention of some of its precepts, may not be an
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impediment to the development of democracy through social movement in civil 
society, its identification with the state signals its terminal decline.
It is impossible to talk about law without acknowledgement of its coercive 
form. But these two aspects are not clearly separated; coercion and consent blur into 
each other. Coercion is sanctioned by virtue that it is legal. The use of state violence 
proves with depressing regularity to be beyond democratic accountability when its 
justification is made in the legitimising language of legality. The 'fairness' represented 
in the evenly balanced scales on the universal symbol of 'justice' ratifies the use of the 
sword not just as a symbol of 'fair trial' in the narrow area of criminal law. However, a 
coercive aspect to 'public power' is not a logically necessary condition of its 
existence. As it has been historically presented as the sovereignty of the state, this 
'power' has always entailed police institutions. All states are police states, anything 
else would not be a state. The extent of the 'power' that legality holds (as a public 
power) in the imaginary of those subject to it in 'developed political systems' can be 
seen by the effectiveness of its own discourses to present the modem (legal) state as 
something else.
To establish the 'public power' of legality in ‘developed political systems’, it 
must be examined from at least five different viewpoints: 1) it must be recognised as 
the basis of moral decision in 'developed political systems'; 2) it incorporates the idea 
of 'neutrality', from which is then extracted a certainty to our understanding in those 
societies; 3) it presents the exercise of right as the realisation of the subjective 
freedom of its bearer; 4) it is representative of justice - in all its areas - criminal, 
social; 5) it rationalises social relations. This is not an ordering of importance. Indeed, 
ordering might not be an entirely appropriate way of approaching these aspects; the 
'public power' that inheres in legality is perhaps better identified from the discursive
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fusion and contradiction that forms its ability to be, as Hirst put it, 'definitive of the 
whole'.30 The 'Law' is more than a legal discourse restricted to the necessary 
functioning of an economic system based on equivalency in the law of contract and its 
peculiar manifestation under capitalism. It is also crucially important to the 
functioning of the system as a whole, including social relations that may have no 
direct economic bearing or effect; in other words its ideological function.
The development of 'law' into the form received as sovereign in 'developed 
political systems' can be chronicled from a number of different foundational points: 
Roman Law; Greek rationalism; natural law; Judaeo-Christianity; the post- 
Aristotelian philosophies of the early Enlightenment and the subsequent development 
of liberalism. It is in the discourses of this latter philosophy that the contemporary 
relation to property can be found at its most inextricable in the triplicity of common- 
sense that is law-property-morality, and most influential in the questions relating to 
'neutrality' and 'right'.
From Roman Law came the distinction between public and private law, that 
was to become the legal distinction between state and civil society in the political 
developments of capitalism. The character of 'public law' became distinct from the 
reference to property that characterised private law. It was the Roman Law doctrine of 
legibus solutas (whatever pleases the prince has the force of law, or in modem terms, 
sovereignty legitimised by legality) that provided the concept of impersonal authority, 
the key element to the legitimacy of the modem (legal) state. Without formal 
reasoning inherited from Roman Law and Greek rationalism, it is impossible to 
conceive of the ‘legal ideal’.
30 Hirst Law Socialism and Dem ocracy  p.24
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Judaeo-Christianity played a precursor role in the formation of 'individual
agency' whose rationality is basic to contemporary legality. Through its concept of
'culpable personality', as logically necessary to redemptive faith and divine
retribution, the discourses of Judaeo-Christianity established the grounding to an
individuated subject of 'Law'. This is explicitly posed in the book of Exodus where the
1 1
simple quid pro quo principle of retributive justice is written as ‘an eye for an eye’. 
Although the conditions of modernity that fractured feudal social relations, into the 
atomism of civil society (Marx) or system of needs (Hegel), and the emphasis on this 
universality shifted to one of 'a right to' rather than 'a duty to' were some way off in 
historical terms, the identification of a free-willed and responsible individual had 
already been made by the discourses of Judaeo-Christianity.
There are also conceptual origins to contemporary human rights discourse in 
the Old Testament. Its basic terms are in Leviticus as: ‘... if a stranger sojourn with 
thee in your land, you shall not wrong him. But the stranger that dwells with you shall 
be to you as one bom among you, . . . \ 32 The same universality is the foundation of 
the New Testament: ‘For God has no favourites: those who have sinned outside the 
pale of the law of Moses will perish outside its pale, and all who have sinned under 
that law will be judged by the law’.33
The universality of subjective right as the foundation of the modem (state) 
legal state can be seen to have derived from two broad, and theoretically speaking, 
incompatible perspectives of natural law. The first is the tradition which views law as 
the confirmation of the universal physical laws of nature. According to this view, a 
law that is not just cannot be a law; as opposed to the second tradition and contributor,
31 Exodus 22:26
32 Leviticus 19:16
33 Romans 18:4
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positivist law which disregarded the content so that a law remains so whether it is 
‘just’ or not. The doctrines of natural law secularised divine authority.
The early Enlightenment discourses on the individual were conducted in 
rationalist language in its widest sense.34 The break with the Aristotelian tradition and 
the advent of the doctrine of the social contract changed the perception of society to 
one comprised not of natural social structure and hierarchy (although equally 
answerable to the same 'public power' - God) but one composed of individuals. In this 
event law became a management of conflict, not of 'prior differentiated agency', but of 
legally constructed agency.
The loose association that connected these legally constructed individuals 
required a system of law that was, in appearance at least, impartial and indifferent to 
any specific morality or creed. It could then lay claim to objectivity in its standing 
outside and above society -  its characteristic of ‘finality’; the rational oracle of 
(public) authority that secures the modem (legal) state. The material developments of 
legality came with the advent of the modem (legal) state and the development of 
capitalism. The state required an abstract vocabulary of legitimacy, and capitalism a 
regulation of contract, and both the construction of the 'subject'.
From these historical referents come the contemporary discourses of legality. 
Some of these concepts, inherited from the liberal tradition, are central to the 
contemporary canon of civil society and have had ‘negative’ consequences for the 
development of its academic discourse. These conceptual bases of the modem norm 
of legality -  justice, rights, and impartiality (as moral neutrality as well as formal 
equality) -  arose from a development of intense conflict between self-interested
34 Rationalism here does oppose empiricism as a ‘ narrow’ differentiation. (Locke, Hume, Berkeley, et 
al) empiricist in sense o f rejecting the possibility o f obtaining knowledge o f what exists by reason 
alone (Descartes. Leibniz, Spinoza et al) and that it is characteristically deductive. The rationalism here 
refers to a commitment to reason as opposed to non-rational sources o f authority.
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individuals (i.e. individuals in law, whether they be human subjects or capitalist 
corporations). Just as important as not identifying the term legality with all systems of 
law is not conjoining it with the form of law that it implies. Legality refers to a system 
that orders society through broad discursive measures whose focus is wider than the 
practice and institutions of the state legal order, and which maintains the legitimacy of 
the ‘legal ideal’, and ultimately ‘rationality’ itself as the pre-eminent value.
The term ‘rationality’ must be considered not as objectively situated logical 
flagpoles, but as the steering value of the legal ideal itself. Its interpretation as 
‘common-sense’ deflects from its antipathy toward an ethico-political (civil) society’. 
The discourses of legality mystify the relation between rationality and objectivity, and 
the rational course of action is received as the objectively true course. To put it 
another way, no self-abrogating rationale can be applied to legal analysis. We have, 
therefore, as the starting point of ‘objectivity’ an assumption of ‘given’ categories of 
economic-corporate interest. David Hume was among the first to question the limits 
of reason in practical affairs.35 He observed that our faculty of reasoning can operate 
only upon given premises. It is only after certain premises are assumed can 
conclusions be reached by reason. The point of Hume's argument is that: it is rational 
to do certain things - so we ought to do certain things. But the rationality implied in 
the 'ought' is in doubt; what ought to be done is done as much out of convenience as 
anything else. So we may then question whether it is rational doing whatever it is that 
is convenient. The problem of rationality, that is for Weber 'the problem of 
modernity', is dependent on a process of generalisation and systematisation. This 
involves the extraction of ‘legal relevancies’ (from social relations) to determine the 
manner in which these logical aspects are concordant with the formal reasoning of
35 D.Hume op.cit
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legal analysis.36 According to Foucault, what we have to do is analyse "specific 
rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalisation”.37 
Rationalisation, as the discipline of law, is an important part of the individuating 
processes of the state. It applies itself to “ ... everyday life which categorises the 
individual, marks him by his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he 
must recognise in him”.38 There is a soundness to the ‘certainty’ and ‘rationality’ that 
law represents and by logical corollary the ‘right’ thing to be done is the ‘rational’ 
thing that can be done.
The Law is the maintenance of a conflict that it itself creates through its own 
construction of the 'legal subject' and its well-defined interests in designated areas of 
action and right. The coercive necessity of the state, however, requires legitimacy for 
the system of domination that it preserves. The contradiction comes from the 
regulation of conflicting legal subjects whose status was constructed by the Law. The 
philosophical paralogism for all these justificatory ‘norms’ is an assumption of 
individual rational agency that only makes sense in terms of a (constructed) 'legal 
subject'. Moreover, not only is this agency received as ‘autonomous’ in its protection 
from external impediment of action (both, paradoxically, provided by the state) but 
also in its action as chosen independently of value-laden and rhetorical discourses of 
rationality and choice themselves. The rationality of legality provides the ground for 
the development and consolidation of instrumental social relations.
Most synonymous, as an element or base, with law is the idea of justice. This 
is more commonly as retributive means, but the political question of social justice is 
discussed at academic levels in terms of the degree to which the liberty of the 
individual is impeded by ‘socially necessary’ considerations of distributive justice.
36 M. Weber Economy and Society University o f California Press. 1978 p.62
37 M.Foucault 'The Subject and Power ' in K.Nash op.cit p.l 7
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The term itself means, at this theoretically precise level of presentation, egalitarian 
and democratic notions and practices that are themselves an affront to freedom. Some 
(‘social’-) liberal thinkers have tried to close a gap that for the main current of this 
tradition is one of incompatibility.39 But where the level of discourse presents the 
relation between liberty and equality as opposed rather than coincidental, the 
discourses of legality in the public domain conflate the two. This fusion is not as an 
analytically tight resolution to the problem of conceptual incompatibility, but as hazy 
inclusions in the political (and general) vocabulary of 'developed political systems' 
that serves to conceal rather than ameliorate ‘injustices’ and inequalities.
But despite its presentation through the discourses of legality as a kind of 
secularised Christian philanthropy, the answer to the question ‘what is just?’ is hardly 
settled. Indeed there are significant differences in interpretation of this slippery 
concept from even among those who shit from the same horse so to speak. I shall 
consider some of these variations below. But it must be made clear that the division 
itself is in a way misleading. It suggests that the orthodox liberal emphasis on (and 
priority of) the individual has been diminished, or subordinated in the cause of 'social 
justice', in ‘social liberal’ theories. But this is not the case. Stemming from different 
perspectives on the relation between 'liberty' and 'equality', the differences in these 
currents belie their similarities. Both (broad) viewpoints prioritise liberty (and the 
individual) over equality (and society). The emphasis is merely more explicit in the 
condemnation of social justice in the discourses of neo-conservatism, and the New 
Right and its apostles, than those of 'social liberalism'. Even in the latter it is still 
barely concealed in the super-ordination of the principle of liberty over that of 
equality.
38 ibid.
39 The most prominent o f these being T.H.Green, R.Tawney and H.Laski.
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One of the most influential prophets of these contemporary discourses is 
Hayek. In his work, the concept of justice loses its meaning entirely if it is to involve 
a regularity and coercion that is logically antithetical to an abstracted and negative 
understanding of liberty. In this context, the term 'justice' is misemployed. The term 
'social justice' is ultimately contradictory, and, for Hayek, the 'road to serfdom' begins 
with interventionism by redistribution.40 The most referred to contemporary 
comparison of theoretical priority is that between John Rawls and Robert Nozick.41 
Rawls's theory of justice is alive to the problem of social inequalities and is meant to 
offer ameliorative proposals through the application of a principle of justice. Any 
such principle according to Nozick would be 'unjust' because liberty had been 
infringed upon. Even for Rawls, equality amounts to equal basic liberties; following 
his lexical ordering of the principles of his theory of justice. A basic criticism to make 
of Rawls is that he fails to take account of 'the worth of liberty'; as Henry Shue writes: 
"To ascribe priority to equal basic liberties when some citizens are too poor to be able 
to enjoy their liberties is a cruel charade".42 Although the distributive principle of 
Rawls's theory is in place to secure the conditions in which 'justice' can be properly 
carried out. The priority is with liberty as the basic component of 'freedom'.
The point to underline is that the notion of justice is presented as a 
philanthropic welfarism (questions of security and other matters of realpolitik 
notwithstanding) even though the priority of the needs of the individual is 
conceptually 'given', and effectively translated into the demands of the 'legal 
individual'. Despite this, the received common-sense understanding of 'justice' is as 
something inherently desirable, fusing contradictory aspects of Christian philanthropy
40 F.Hayek The Road to Serfdom  London. Routledge. 2001
41 R.Nozick Anarchy State and Utopia.Oxiord. Blackwell. 1978; J.Rawls A Theory o f  Justice Oxford 
University Press 1999
42 H.Shue 'Liberty and Self-Respect' in Ethics 85 1974. P.201
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and Judaeo retributive justice into the 'collective consciousness of society'. In similar 
vein to Hayek, Nozick's understanding of freedom cannot accommodate any form of 
social justice. A fundamental part of the criteria of freedom is that an action is 
unimpeded by other actions that have no rightful basis. A policy of egalitarian re­
distribution comes into this category and would therefore be, in Nozickian terms of 
reference, unjust.
The concepts of 'equality' and 'liberty', as part of the discourses of legality in 
'developed political systems', need to be redefined or at least re-examined. Steven 
Lukes sees their presentation as an irreconcilable opposition of 'equality versus 
liberty'.43 However, the presentation to which Lukes refers is of an academic level of 
debate. At another level, as the 'wider' discourses of legality in the public domain, 
these norms of 'developed political systems' are not incompatible. Contrary to the 
analysis of either one or the other, but not both as offered by some of the theories 
summarised above, these discourses conflate the two. Certainly the separation of the 
two to which Lukes refers is evident enough, and he is right to argue that it would 
make ideological sense to maintain it. But the language of legality is composed of far 
more complex formations and channels of publicity than the more precise and 
considered levels of debate and communication referred to in Lukes's argument. The 
rhetorical standard of 'liberty' of those in charge of the 'free world' is in no way 
compromised, in its reception in the public domain, by its synonymous use with the 
other norms of equality and justice. Legality reproduces its own moral legitimacy in 
this way by including as central to its discourses the notion of 'justice' (and 'equality' 
however vaguely defined). However, the embrace of ‘the private’, that is the culture 
of privatism in ‘developed political systems’, is the practical application of the
43 S.Lukes ‘Liberty and Equality’ in D.Held Political Theory Today Cambridge. Polity Press 1983 p.51
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priority of liberty over justice, and denies the necessary conditions for the ethico- 
political development of social movement. Such movement would be disassociated 
from liberal democratic conceptions of the effective implementation of rights by its, 
necessary, recognition of equality in far more substantial terms than the formalistic 
legality of ‘developed political systems’.
Where the vague notions of 'liberty' and 'justice' fuse into a discourse of 
legality that appeals to its own, necessarily present, universality is in human rights 
discourse. Just as all bases of legality, the more difficult norm of 'individual liberty 
excluded, have their origins in either religious humanism of Greek rationalism, or 
both. Contemporary discourses on human rights owe the development of two distinct 
aspects to, on the one hand, the concept of 'brotherly love' inherited from different 
religious texts; and on the other, the rationality of its principles and detachment of its 
reasoning from the Stoics, Plato, and Aristotle. The decline of the natural law tradition 
and the emergence of positivism as the means of interpreting law in the modem 
(legal) state reflects a change in the notion of rights, and specifically ‘subjective 
right’.44 The demise of the idealist grounding to law is, according to Habermas, down 
to a growing awareness “that private law could be legitimised from its own resource 
only as long as it could be assumed that the legal subject’s private autonomy had a 
foundation in the moral autonomy of the person”.45 The question that this raises 
concerns the justification of private law once its intrinsic (moral) value has been 
extracted by a positivist interpretation. This awareness, to which Habermas refers, and 
which extends to the development of law in the modem (legal) state beyond the 
German system, has been a reconsideration of rights vis-a-vis law, divesting them of a 
(moral) foundation of private autonomy. Rights are now considered to be “reflexes of
44 J.Habermas Between Facts and Norms op.cit p.85
45 ibid.
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an established legal order that transferred to individuals the powers of will objectively 
incorporated in law”.46 Despite this extraction, however, the notion of rights still 
commands a 'philanthropic/moral' recognition through the discourses of legality in 
‘developed political systems’.
It is claimed that there is a definite and positive use to the ambivalence 
attached to this development. Delmas-Marty picks up on the point of ‘equivalency’ 
and applies it to universality with respect to the worth of human life. He defends the 
principle of abstract indifference as grounding for universal human rights using the 
Kantian distinction between dignity and price to examine what he describes as the 
incompatibility between a ‘market mentality’ and a ‘human rights mentality’.47 But 
crucially “... because it is the very possibility of money, of a price, even the principle 
of equivalency, that also enables us to neutralise the differences to reach a pure 
singularity such as dignity or universal law”.48 Without actually putting a price on it, a 
human life is deemed to be of equal exchange-value with any other. Recognition of 
equivalent worth in each individual in these terms then allows for the recognition of 
equal moral worth, and therefore entitled to all the considerations that underwrite 
human rights discourse.
However, its ideological premises notwithstanding, the trans-cultural 
universalism to which human rights discourses refer cannot be dismissed simply as a 
form of bourgeois rhetoric that masks reality. It is true to say that ‘human rights’ have 
been appealed to in the moral cloaking of economic-corporate motivated action by 
governments of ‘developed political systems’ for decades. Nowhere is the notion of 
rights deployed to greater political effect than as part of the discourse on human 
rights. The language is taken from the main text, the United Nations Universal
46 B.Windschield cited in Habermas Between Facts and Norms op.cit p.87
47 M.Delmas-Marty op.cit pp 162-7
199
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The universal inclusion of individuals is the 
proclamation of Article 1: ‘All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood’. The pre-amble to this is written in the language of 
legality: ‘equal and inalienable rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘peace in the world’ 
capturing the essential norms of legality as unproblematically compatible and of 
singular interpretation. This ‘legalistic’ discourse on human rights makes universal 
claims premised on ontological assumptions of individual rational agency and 
conscience. But so grounded, it is a false universality insofar as this agency is 
insupportable. However, this does not dismiss entirely a universality (as a public 
power); certain elements to the discourses of legality may accommodate an ethico- 
political system not grounded in rational agency.
Where the theoretical framework for the concept of human rights may be 
criticised on the grounds of formalised abstraction as their probable limit, it must be 
recognised, as a fundamental understanding to civil society, that the notion behind it 
has an ethico-political dimension to it. It transcends the economic-corporate 
boundaries of identity to embrace a universality that recognises the integrity of self- 
governance and the despotism of identity and exclusion. The objective of human 
rights discourse, that of its own obsolescence (however utopian this might be 
dismissed as) must be the notional embrace of the ethico-political development of 
social movement. It must also be made clear, however, that this objective is a socio­
political improbability given the criteria of a ‘developed political system’. By 
definition the priority of the political agenda that determines the central characteristic 
of ‘developed political systems’ denies both the application of ‘justice’ (as the
48 Derrida cited in M.Delmas-Marty op.cit p i65
200
socially redistributive principle it must be understood as in terms of theorising civil 
society) and the exercise of ‘freedom’ in the manner described in Chapter 3, where it 
is understood in terms of the association as subject rather than object.
The 'Eurocentrism' of human rights discourses in the public domain of 
developed political systems mitigates against their effect. Derived from abstracted 
principles of rationalist Enlightenment, they represent not an assumption of 
democracy but an imposition of values - predominantly rationality, whose ethical 
agency is 'the individual'. Human rights merely translates as 'individual rights'. A 
universalist discourse based upon the rights of 'the individual' is a paradox. The 
hegemonic status of 'the individual' is effectively anti-democratic in its denial of the 
culturally specific complexities of democratically organising social relations. As such, 
the humanism that underpins human rights discourse is not effected.
Underlying both norms of liberty and justice, is the first characteristic of 
legality - neutrality. This is non-specification of what constitutes the 'good life', but 
'private life' is both the foundation and effect of the development of rights and their 
installation as part of the subjective aspect to law in the modem (legal) state. The term 
'neutrality' is itself an ideological attachment whose precise meaning is lost among 
notions of impartiality and uniform legal and bureaucratic application. But this is only 
part of the examination of neutrality.
It can be viewed from at least two different levels. The first corresponds to the 
formalistic approach referred to above. The question of neutrality from this 
perspective makes the assumption of an objective relation to society, composed of 
partially surrendered rational agency. In this analysis, the question of neutrality is 
only raised as a reduced concern over the impartiality of the processes of legality. The 
second level, as the (Marxist) instrumentalist approach to 'law', considers the question
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of netrality in law to be a systemic problem of property relations. Another possible 
level of investigation sees the question as inherently ungrounded. That is to say, value 
neutrality is conceptually impossible to any society.
The neutrality of law in the modem (legal) state rests upon uniformity and 
predictability. Political (governmental) power is exercised within the rule of law; 
administrative (bureaucratic) power applies the law uniformly and predictably. Thus, 
in this legal ideal, the state, as the apparatus of the implementation and enforcement 
of these constraints in the executive and administration, is perceived as a neutral 
institution. However, at both the conceptual level and at its point of application, 
‘neutrality’ can be seen to be a fiction. There is no logical or necessary step from a 
uniformity of subjection (formal equality) to (morally) neutral, objective frameworks 
and institutions.
The proposition here that ‘neutrality’ is a spurious foundation to law in the 
modem (legal) state, is not just as a favourably tendentious application toward various 
factions of property interest in society, but conceptually invalid in its ideal form. Law 
in the modem (legal) state provides a framework and order that is most amenable to 
the morally specific life practices that are an inescapable condition of the centrality of 
property to the legal order. Society is sutured by interlocking discourses on the 
impartiality of legal objectivity, certainty, and rationality. At its most basic, neutrality 
implies the moral indifference of law itself rather than just an impartiality and 
regularity of its procedure. But this is a spurious claim. It is premised on (individual) 
rational agency, whose legally enjoined 'subject' exercises property relations legally 
framed in a language of right, and the individual. This is in itself the acceptance of a
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specific value. It is, in the final analysis, the arbiter of property relations; as Jeremy 
Bentham wrote: “Property and law are bom together and die together”.49
The most vigorous examination of ‘neutrality’ as a systemic problem of the 
state legal order in its protection of private property comes from Marxism. In his 
Critique o f Hegel’s Doctrine o f the State, Marx denies the universality of the 
bureaucratic class as agents of a neutral state. Rather, “private property is the 
universal bond of the state”.50 Marx’s analysis of the property relation to the state 
does not conclude that formal reasoning and impersonal authority, and the logic of 
calculable interest therein is in itself inherently contradictory to neutrality as moral 
indifference. But this is not of course read as a ‘malfunctioning of the legal order’. 
Here the problem is diagnosed as (materially) systemic, and it is the specific relation 
to property that undermines all claims to neutrality by the modem state.
Marx compares the relation of property to the constitution of Rome and that of 
primogeniture in the modem state. In a way that private property was not the 
dominant character of Roman law and constitution, the German case, to which he 
refers in the Critique, has its law rooted in private property and its political 
constitution. Where property in the political constitution of Rome “asserts itself as 
public property, ... in the form of grand display on the part of the republic, or else 
luxurious forms o f general welfare for the benefit of the mob In the system of
primogeniture, however, it appears that private property is the relationship to the 
state which makes the state into an inherent characteristic or an accident of immediate 
private property of landed property”.52 The modem state is the effect of private
49 J.Bentham The Collected Works o f  Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles o f  M orals and  
Legislation  Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1996 p.203
50 K.Marx 'Critique o f Hegel's Doctrine of the State' in Early Writings London Penguin 1971 p. 178
51 ib id p .\1 9
52 ibid  p. 180
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property. All claims to neutrality of state, and the impartiality of law, are therefore 
unfounded.
To further clarify the conceptual impossibility of neutrality within human 
society, the Weberian concepts of ‘purpose-rational’ action and ‘value-rational’ action 
can be employed in a focus on the subjective aspect of law. What these two types of 
action can help illustrate is the spurious objectivity (moral indifference) that the ‘legal 
ideal’ is founded upon. These actions are defined as the essentially self-interested and 
privatised action that is ‘purpose-rational’, and ‘value-rational’ action that follows 
imperatives external to the subject. But if these two actions cannot be sustained as 
(conceptually) different types then there is no bridge to a transcendent secularised law 
that is disconnected to any specific value. Insofar as it pre-supposes an attribute of 
autonomy, the proposition that the ‘legal’ form of domination commands its 
allegiance through the ‘purpose-rational’ action of the individual is problematic 
before we even consider the exclusion of ‘value-rationality’. The exclusion of a value 
to the rationality of action that is correlative to an ideal-typical legal form of 
domination is a conceptual impasse regarding an understanding of the nature of 
legality in developed political systems. The obvious point to make, as others have 
made, is that the acceptance of legal domination is an acceptance itself of a value.53 
The value orientation is its rationality and, by extension the contractual nature of 
property. The identification of a value-rational action as one that is determined by 
some ideological principles and imperatives derived from a source other than the law 
itself is merely pointing out different sources of value (and bases of authority) in 
which legality must be included. Whilst it is possible to sustain the division of action
53 R. Bendix Max Weber: An Intellectual P ortrait London Methuen 1966; D. Beetham Max Weber and 
the Theory of Modem Politics London George Allen & Unwin 1974; W.J. Mommsen The Age o f  
Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology o f Max Weber Oxford Blackwell 1974; J. 
Habermas Legitimation Crisis (T. McCarthy, Trans.) London Heinemann 1976}
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types on the basis of a perceived autonomous action that is purpose-rational, it does 
not follow that the form of law to which this instrumental action is best suited is 
qualitatively different to the extent that it stands alone as a form of law indifferent to 
the social relations it orders. The nature of instrumental rationality (which provides 
the rationale of privacy as privatism), rather than being relative to morality, is an 
embrace of the specific morality of the privatised ‘rational individual’.
Legality presents law in the modem (legal) state as a ‘transcendental’ sphere 
of neutrality, as representative of the 'public power' of law, and compromises the 
differentiation between ‘formally- rational law’ and ‘substantively rational law. Mere 
acceptance of any difference between these Weberian ideal-types becomes an 
assumption of the ‘superiority’, and consequently the desirability, of the former over 
the latter. It would be to accede to its ideologically established position as a unique 
form of law based upon objectivity, a point of unity that represents merely, in Karl 
Renner’s words, ‘a subjective, nebulous existence of the mind’.54 Less explicitly than 
‘substantively rational law’, ‘formally rational law’ represents a coded prescription 
for what kind of life practices have value, intrinsic or instrumental. There is a definite 
continuum of systems of order characteristic of societies based on different (non- 
rational) forms of legitimate authority.
On different grounds, Hirst's critique of Pashukanis discussed above can be 
further supported insofar as the law of 'developed political systems' is not essentially 
different to those systems not constructed on capitalist political economy and the 
'legal ideal'. The more refined and technically developed system of law that aspires to 
the ‘legal ideal’ shares the same basic code (if not content) as systems of order 
derived from religious, ethnological or historical imperatives. The legal ideal (as a
54 K.Renner op.cit
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‘system of general rules’) in developed political systems maintains social relations no 
less morally specific (than forms of substantively rational law) in its provision of the 
architecture around which the philosophy of the individual can most effectively be put 
into practice. Historically the sphere in which the ‘living the life of the philosophy 
espoused’ has been the market. It is where ‘rational autonomous individuals’ can 
exercise greatest freedom without (by prohibition of law) impeding the freedom of 
others, and (by way of legality) acquire a definite moral justification for actions 
designed to further nothing more than individual or private (economic-corporate) 
interest.
The discourse of rights maintains the priority of the individual and is inscribed 
on the consciousness of the subject as being the (irreducible) ethical entity. But the 
common-sense of the subject of a ‘developed political system’ will tell him that it is a 
system that champions both individual liberty and social justice in terms laid down by 
liberal political philosophy but without any contradiction. The two ideas are 
interwoven, as part of the norm of legality, into a 'legal consciousness' that views law 
as 'public power' rather than as specific rules. The collapse of conceptual divisions in 
the general principles at certain discursive levels asserts the human subject as the 'unit 
of law' despite legal subjectivity ascribed to corporate bodies, and maintains the 
culture of individualism characteristic of ‘developed political systems’.
It is the interconnected relations between morality and law that have blurred 
into synonymy within the discourses of legality that is problematic for the 
development of civil society democracy. 'Humanist action' can become 
indistinguishable from the more 'self-regarding' calculating reasoning. Although laws 
in the modem legal state do explicitly instruct the subject in specific courses of action 
to be taken, predominantly they prevent certain courses of action and are there only to
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facilitate chosen and permissible actions. They nevertheless promote the general 
guide to action as received by a ‘rational autonomous individual’.
The ‘legal ideal’ assumes its subjects to be rational and autonomous agents of 
action. This rationality and autonomy is formally extended to the subject who through 
the discourses of legality, accepts as binding the basis of self-identity of individual. 
The discourses of legality propagate a self-perception of ‘autonomy’ and 
‘individuality’ through investing such intangibles as ‘rational-choice’, ‘rights’, and 
‘equality before the law’ in the subject. Such axioms of legality, the reference points 
of its legitimacy as 'public power', reflect this individual rational agency in the 
rationality of law itself, as detached from the human condition just as other forms of 
law are set above it.
The ideological weight to these discourses in the public domain serves against 
any democratic pretensions to the norm of legality. The abstraction of the human 
subject into an (individual) rights bearer is an undemocratic projection. The 
universality that is foundational to legality as a public power or authority is lost in 
abstraction, and is ideologically anti-thetical to the solidarism necessary for a civil 
society based democracy. Where legality could claim to represent a positive element 
in the development of democracy is in its universality that has no theoretical 
exclusion. It is a matter of the content of 'law' as to how this inclusion is recognised in 
terms of a 'public power'. To further the possibilities of democracy, there must be a 
greater emphasis on legality as the discursive aspect of public power in 'developed 
political systems', and not as a 'given' or condition.
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Concluding Chapter
The promise that 'civil society1 held two decades ago for the expansion of democracy 
against the compulsion of 'the state', and domination by 'the economy', has not 
materialised and developed. Indeed it seems to have disappeared altogether in its central 
European nursery. We can recall Walesa's remark that "there is no freedom in solidarity" 
to get some idea of how the ethic of civil society was blown away by economic 
liberalisation. If the fragmentation of this historical movement was so swift in coming 
after the demise of the states that spawned it, in the sense that they determined the nature 
of their opposition, then, as was pointed out in the Introductory Chapter, there seems, on 
the empirical face of it, little point in a continued theorisation of this protean and 
sometimes contradictory concept. But it is incumbent upon all theories of democracy to 
recognise clearly the reasons why this 'promise' was never kept. The actual development 
of the east and central states of Europe in the post-communist era indicate that certain 
‘shibbolethic’ principles of liberalism are in fact barriers to this development.
The most effective theoretical and methodological framework for capturing the ethic 
of civil society as a democratic ideal is a neo-Gramscian conception of civil society 
distinct from both the state (as political society) and 'the economy'. However problematic 
analytical distinctions are in this tri-partite system, civil society cannot be left to a 
collection of institutions that although not directly under the compulsion of the state are,
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nevertheless, as dominating under different forms of power relations. Two immediate 
inclusions that undermine the conceptual validity of civil society are 'the family' and the 
capitalist corporation. A tri-partite model does not necessarily exclude 'the family'. Cohen 
and Arato's model is deficient, as has been shown, on a number of grounds, but one of its 
biggest mis-identification is 'the family' and civil society. But even less likely to capture 
this ethic of solidarity as a democratic basis to society are the dualist models that, rooted 
in the dichotomous opposition of state and civil society, include alongside organisations 
like Amnesty International and The Global Coral Reef Network corporations like Sony, 
and News International.1 But however the democratic promise of civil society was to be 
actualised, it was not to be by way of an individualist conception of freedom through 
(private) property accumulation and a market orientation of the ethic that underpins liberal 
society.
The question that is most often asked of civil society is: Is it relevant? The question 
that must be asked of it by those interested in democracy is: How is it relevant? It might 
seem a little late in the argument to refer back to the chequered history of the term 'civil 
society', but where there is a dominant common factor to its theory in the Western political 
tradition, is in its opposition to the state. But keeping the state 'out of social life' does not 
necessarily conclude with a democratic society, even if it is a condition. The relevance of 
civil society following its resurgence in the last quarter of the 20th century lies in its 
method of an assumption of democracy as its emphasis, and not as a priority of individual 
rights. It is the only possible theoretical position that can be taken if the worn out 
'representative' systems of the West are to be seriously and critically challenged.
J.Keane Global Civil Society? Cambridge University Press 2003 p.9
209
Civil society is also regarded by some as a purely Western product. But this reflects a 
very narrow conception of civil society; as a composite of institutions that reflected the 
values of the Western political tradition. This is alright if we are content with democracy 
being 'expressed' through representative government and that democratic theory therefore 
confines itself to this framework. There is even less problem with identifying the value of 
property rights attached to civil society as a Western value, in the Western political 
tradition. Historically, it is difficult to argue anything other than that this is the case, and 
that civil society cannot be 'exported'. Apart from the little sense that the related 'export of 
democracy' makes, this horizon of civil society and its 'application', is unnecessarily 
limited.
Contemporary resurgence in civil society bears out the democratic impulse that is 
concealed within the institutional specificity that characterises civil society theory. We can 
take as the cue for contemporary and democratic interpretations of civil society outside the 
Western political tradition, the Democratic Opposition to the communist states of East and 
Central Europe in the events leading up the demise of both. (The sudden collapse of the 
latter was swiftly followed by the disappearance of the former in the wake of the impact of 
economic liberalisation). The conception of civil society held by this social movement was 
one grounded strongly in the democratic element of solidarity.
It is important for democratic theory not to bind itself to the empty concepts of 
liberalism's contribution to democracy. Theorising democracy from a centred position of 
the 'politics of the existing', and proceeding from existing frameworks of 'representation' 
limits the understanding of democracy to formal procedure and due process. This 
effectively disregards the historical resurgence of civil society as a methodological means
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of conceiving democracy as an assumption by society 'in society', a development beyond 
its 'representation somewhere else'. Social movement in the last two decades in systems 
'undeveloped', (in Latin America, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa) has been 
marked by, albeit for different contextual reasons, a solidaristic (democratic) conception 
of civil society. I do not intend to introduce a comparative analysis of civil society here in 
the concluding chapter. But reference to certain historical instances of civil society around 
the world in the last two decades supports the thesis of an underlying democratic 
continuum to ‘civil society’, in contrast to the variegated conceptual history of the term.
The discourses of Latin American civil society sets it up against 'universalism'. The 
suffocating homogeneity and universalism of the Comintern inspired Marxism of the 
region represented a threat to the cultural fabric of Mexican society. The same threat now 
comes from the homogenising universalism of commercial society and a world economy.2 
In Latin American political thought '...civil society is seen as an alternative to 
conventional politics, expressed as a social process governed by the activities of actors 
and agencies, all of which are located outside the scope of the state. In its most extreme 
form, it has also become a narrative in which society is set against the state'/ These 
'actors' and 'agencies' in Mexico in the 1980's were fairly well co-ordinated movements. A 
National Co-ordinating Committee was responsible for connecting each of the loose 
associations of social movement of the National Urban Popular Movement and of the 
National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Association. In all the areas
T his 'world econom y' is often inaccurately equated with g lobalisation . W hilst it m ay account for its dom inating  
spect it does not amount to the w hole o f  actual or possib le  processes o f  globalisation . N either d oes it m ean ‘free 
■ade ’.
L.C. L eiva and A .Pagden 'Civil Society  and the future o f  the m odem  republics o f  Latin Am erica' in S.K aviraj and 
.K hilnani (eds.) Civil Society History and Possibilities Cam bridge U niversity Press 2001 p. 179
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'undeveloped' politically, where civil society has become central to democratic discourses, 
it is in the Latin American region where the radical anti-statist interpretation has been 
most in evidence. The implication is “the redirection of politics into the social and 
cultural. It has resulted in the awareness of the need to redraw the ordinary boundary of 
the political in such a way that the state is no longer the natural centre of all political 
activity”.4 Furthermore, “...civil society has also come to be seen as the only domain in 
which true political experience and hence real solidarity is possible”.5
Theorists of civil society in the Middle East similarly tend to emphasise forms of 
association (non-state institutions) and certain social formations as the basis of what is 
conceived as civil society. There is a significant disagreement, however, on whether 
certain of these formations based on the ascriptive identities of tribe and family can be 
included in civil society. There is a reluctant acceptance on the part of some ' liberal 
Islamic' theorists of civil society that, rooted in authoritarian and patriarchal power 
relations as most of these 'neo-traditional' formations undoubtedly are, they are, 
nevertheless, the only plausible social category that can provide the agency of a civil 
society - even if it cannot meet the ethico-political criteria of inclusion and the principles 
of volitional membership and contingent identity.6 Whether or not these social formations 
do promote democracy is not a question that can be answered simply. They are extremely 
varied in their receptivity to change: “under the right conditions,...,some groups, starting
ibid. p.201 
ibid.
See: Saad Eddin Ibrahim 'Civil Society and democratic transformation in the Arab homeland'. Pamphlet issued by 
he Ibn Khaldun Centre, Cairo. 1991
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] from a traditional basis can be institutionalised as modem associations with 'universalistic'
orientations and open membership”.7
A clear example of the emphasis on democracy in Middle Eastern civil society 
discourse comes from Al-Azmeh.8 The 'democratist discourse' that he attacks posits that 
democracy is concerned with the relation (as direct correspondence) between the people 
(as an historical formation whose identity is Islam) and the state (as the expression of this 
identity). The civil society that is imagined by Al-Azmeh rejects this statist conception of 
democracy and the underlying commitment to Islamist discourses that cannot contribute to 
a democratised civil society. What becomes apparent in just a cursory look at the 
comparisons between very different historically conditioned civil societies is that there is a 
democratic impulse against the state. (Rather than representing a strategy for power within 
I the 'political realm' of the state as the democratic objective. It is also, importantly, a
democratic struggle against the foundationalism of Islam and the 'umma' of Marxism-
! Leninism',9 and the universalism of commercial society.
However the successes of civil society in these and all other parts of the globe have 
been modest to say the least. Its inability to establish itself in its contemporary central 
I points of resurgence (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) is, to reiterate the point at the
beginning of this thesis, perhaps reason enough alone to dismiss civil society. But its 
relevance to this region particularly, is perhaps greater than ever if civil society is 
| understood to be the means by which a radical democracy can be assumed. The urgency of
S.Zubaida 'Community and democracy in the Middle East' in S.Kaviraj and S.Khilmani (eds.) op.cit p.24 
A.Azmeh 'Populism Contra Democracy: Recent Domocratist Discourse in the Arab World' in G.Salan6 (ed.) 
emocracy without Democrats ?The Renewal o f  Politics in the Muslim World London IB. Taurus 1004 
Ernest Gelner op. cit refers to Marxism as this. Umma refers here to the monism that Marxism represents, and its 
itithesis to pluralism.
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democracy in the former communist states is palpable where disillusionment with the new 
liberal regimes is widespread. Concentrations of this disillusionment with representative 
government are to be found, predictably, among the poor; poorly educated, poorly housed, 
poorly occupied etc10. Adam Przeworski speculates that the disillusionment with 
; representative government lies in "the absence of collective projects, of socially
' j
j integrating ideologies, of clearly identifiable political forces, of crystallised structures to
be represented".11 What makes the urgency of democracy even greater in a vacuum of 
social solidarities and the lack of 'public ethos' of society that Przeworski intimates, is the 
presence of right wing factions who articulate the disillusionment into the basest form of 
'the politics of identity'.
The relevance of civil society remains whilst there is an 'urgency to democracy'. As 
civil society refers to the means by which the will to become democratic is exercised, and 
as a democracy of no horizons which is never fully achieved, the question of whether 
| there is any theoretical relevance to civil society should never really be raised. To dispense
with 'civil society' is to more or less accept that, give or take a bit of constitutional and 
| electoral reform, the limits to democracy have been reached. Certainly the contemporary
conditions of 'developed political systems' indicate an exhaustion of democracy in its 
I liberal representative and procedural form. Yet it is legitimised further in its 'export', by
political rhetoric in the public domain, to 'developing countries'. Any theory of democracy 
that is state-centric in this respect confines its own field of investigation to the procedural 
tinkering that contributes little to furthering its conceptual reconstruction and 
radicalisation. For imaginative insight into what it is a theory of, democratic theory must
0 A.Przeworski Sustainable Democracy Cambridge University Press 1995
1
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be critical theory. If it is to be taken seriously as the political empowerment of society, 
democracy requires that it is conceived as an integral part of social relations and not that it 
is epiphenomenal of actual life and confined to a rarefied political realm.
The urgency that democracy finds itself in arises from a growing disillusionment with 
the effectiveness of its institutions, compounded by its veiled and complicated 
governmental procedures. The representative system that predominates (but not 
necessarily provides the political order of) 'developed political systems' can no longer 
present itself as an effective and satisfactory means of expressing the will to create the 
conditions of one's own existence. In other words, of facilitating the will to become 
democratic.
Through the hegemonic discourses and cultural production of the public domain, this 
will is re-rooted from its effective (public) expression into a realm of privatism. 
'Representative democracy' cannot accommodate any democratic expansion in society (it 
barely reflects its sexual division let alone its different ethnic components), but privatism 
effectively accommodates the faults and deficiencies of 'representative democracy' 
effecting its acquiescent legitimacy. This re-rooting of the will of the self to form and 
control the conditions of its existence is ineffective in its political application, unless we 
are to consider 'consumer power' as effective political agency. This would make no sense 
at all. It is the very culture of consumption that is central to the problem of privatism, and 
consequentially democracy. It is unsatisfactory in its limiting developmental space for the 
self Arguments for the public conception of privacy were made in Chapter 1 as basic to a 
democratic society (as opposed to a representative political system).
ibid p.57
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It now seems a gross mis-employment of the prefix 'developed'; having so consistently 
attached it to the political systems of the richest and most powerful states of the world. 
Reconsideration of the term must follow when one considers the essentially privatised 
nature of the self\ and how such a condition maintains a system that can only remain far 
from politically developed. A development of the radical democratisation of society must 
entail a fluidity of identity and a public exposure of the contingency of that 'identity' to the 
organic cultural processes that are the momentum of this development. Political 
development along these lines can only be initiated outside the formal political realm of 
constitutional and bureaucratic procedure. But it is the cultural 'certainties' of a privatised 
life that bring meaning and identity to the self as (almost) 'natural' in 'developed' political 
systems, that pose the most problematic obstacle to political development.
This crisis of democracy, however, does not amount to a threat to the legitimacy of 
these systems. An important factor in this, is the relation between these systems and the 
rest of the world, so perhaps we should be talking in terms of those states whose 
populations comprise 14 per cent of the world population and who enjoy three quarters of 
the wealth.12 The focus throughout this thesis has been on the ‘cultures of contentment’ 
(Galbraith) in the societies of the 14 per cent that afflict the development of democracies 
within these societies and beyond. When one looks at the incredible global discrepancies 
that these statistics point at, and the calculated greed that has brought them about, a 
number of concerns should be raised. The most basic of these is the relation between 
‘developed political systems’ and the other 86 per cent of the world’s population, and the
2 Figures at September 2003. Source: World Development Movement, http://www.wdm.org.uk
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implications for democracy both within and without the exclusive club of the states of the 
14 per cent.
In the context of this thesis, perhaps the first question to ask is ‘what is the actual 
meaning of ‘developed’ (as prefixed here) in all its social, economic, and political 
implications?’ The real meaning of ‘developed’ in this context can be found in the global 
consequences of its maintenance. The agenda of contentment that dominates the politics of 
these systems is directly implicated in these inequalities. They are the realities of an 
inequality to the very value of life, where the principle of equivalency, mooted in Chapter 
4 as a basis for human rights, does not apply.
For any political system to be ‘developed’ there must be the foundation of the material 
conditions of life, although according to the criteria used by Schopflin, not necessarily 
extending universally to the society of that system. The relativity of wealth in ‘developed 
political systems’ makes it difficult to establish that this foundation is firmly in place. But 
the accumulation of wealth in global terms, however, ensures that the political agenda is 
secured to matters of domestic private concerns of economic-corporate interest. What is of 
particular concern is the consent given by the 14 per cent to the governance that has been 
created by design and maintains this gulf in life conditions and value. For instance, how 
could the grossly destructive farming subsidies in North America and Europe be 
sanctioned by an ethically disposed and democratically empowered civil society?13 It is a
I
i
i question that needs to be taken seriously by theorists of a democratic civil society, if
i
| democracy in the affluent societies of these continents is to be theorised effectively. How
iii___________________________
3 The governments o f the 14 per cent spend $lbn  a day on subsidies to its farmers, an amount six times greater than
he amount spent on aid to the other 86 per cent. Large surpluses (sugar, cotton etc.) are generated in the ‘developed’
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can theorists of civil society in the West mount a serious theoretical challenge when the 
basis of it, the proposed ‘actors of civil society’, are mired in the retreat from politics that 
is privatism?
The relation between (actually existing) ‘developed political systems’, as the minority
j  of richest states, with the rest of the world is objectionable on a number of grounds. It
i
might be argued by pragmatists that it is an intolerable situation because it is insecure or
| unsustainable. That the domination by the richest and most powerful must be checked, is
the logical argument used, to diminish the possibility of these identities becoming 
occupied by others. Humanistic concerns, which have more in common with the 
solidaristic/democratic notions of civil society, regard the relation of inequality as simply 
unacceptable, without much further qualification. All these points of view are of sound 
reasoning -  indeed, no argument in defence of this relation can be maintained by anything 
other than principles of self-interest. The condition of the relation between ‘developed 
political systems’ and the rest of the world reflects the political alienation of societies 
within ‘developed political systems’.
The aggressive foreign policies of these states are, however, necessary for the 
maintenance of this gulf of disparity in life value. To deflect from their real purpose, these 
policies are conducted in the name of ‘the free world’, employing the rhetoric of 
liberalism and legality. Typical of this conceptual confusion of language is the former 
head of the World Trade Organisation, Mike Moore’s reflections on the human condition: 
“This constant struggle for improvement flourishes best in conditions of political and 
economic freedom, which are pre-eminent preconditions for development and social
vorld and are then off-loaded onto world markets at prices less than it costs to produce them. Source: World
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justice. Freedom is growing globally, and democracy is now the best and most 
revolutionary option in places plagued by poverty and failure. Where freedom grows, 
poverty and injustice retreat. Where freedom in all its forms stalls, so does human
! progress”.14 The first thing one notices is the conflation of economic freedom and social
I
justice as unproblematically compatible abstractions. But if we are to assume that freedom 
is more or less identical with economic freedoms (and the political freedom to get on with 
them), and ’injustice’ is understood as social and economic equality, then the global 
perspective explicitly demonstrates the contrary to Moore’s observation that ‘wherever 
freedom grows, poverty and injustice retreat’. Pre-conditional to freedom as espoused by 
those who identify it with freedom of property and exchange relations is an absence of 
social justice. Injustice is here determined by the impediment to the freedom of these 
relations. The axiom that the primary condition for freedom of self-development is the 
freedom to engage in property relations is preserved in the discourses in the public 
domains of the rich and powerful states. It annuls any culpability on the part of the 
societies of these systems for the lack of development (political, economic and social) in 
the ‘places plagued by poverty and failure’. The root causes of the crisis of and 
implications for the expansion of the democracy are to be located in this relation. The 
material conditions that are pre-conditional for political development, as an expansion of 
democracy, in the poor states of the world is itself dependent on the expansion of 
democracy in ‘developed political systems’.
)evelopment Movement
4 M.Moore A W orld Without Walls. Freedom, Development, Free-Trade and Global Governance Cambridge 
Jniversity Press 2003 p.9
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The condition of democracy in the richest states of the world is not only critical 
internally, it denies its development elsewhere. The development of democracy anywhere, 
as contextual and organic processes, is paradoxically dependent on its initiation in these 
states. This, however, cannot mean an 'export' of a political system proselytising on behalf 
of a specific (private) way of life. That would be to contradict the bare meaning of 
democracy. But this contradiction is not a recent phenomenon. It has been used in political 
discourse, (in the public domains of 'developed political systems'), as the condition of 
political recognition and economic aid set by governments since the end of the Second 
World War and the collapse of the colonial empires. The reality has been very different. 
Capitalism does not rely on a constitutional democracy, merely political stability. Some of 
the thugs who have not the remotest connection to what we could consider as even 
reasonably democratic have been, and are still being, installed and propped up by 
governments that profess this rhetorical and 'politically commercial' idealism. But part of 
the self-maintenance of the 'most developed political system' is, as Terry Eagleton aptly 
puts it: "its cynical reliance on the ignorance and forgetfulness of its own people".15
The place that civil society occupies in political and social theory is justified by the 
urgency of the question of democracy. To dispense with the notion of civil society, as an 
idea, is to resign oneself to an atrophying democratic procedure. The renewed interest in 
civil society in Western leftist academic discourse has been largely its adoption by those 
on the left who have dispensed with the notion of class as political agency, or at least the
5 T.Eagleton. The Guardian Review  6/9/03 p. 14 This is a reference to Noam Chomsky's method o f denying the U.S.
[ovemment this form of support.
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[ political agency.16 Paul Hirst poses the question: If Marxist critiques of representative 
democracy are redundant - how do you criticise it? He then answers it with :.. .to raid the
17storehouse of Western liberalism and democratic theory". But radical democratic theory 
must be wary of such a raid. The dangers are that this will obscure the idea of civil 
society, and its ethico-political tendencies will become subsumed by liberal (individualist) 
conceptions.
Any enhancement of democracy within the formal structure of developed political 
systems is of little democratic development in itself. Expansion of democracy in these 
formal systems is an expansion also of the bureaucratised procedures that are necessary to 
any constitutional and electoral reform. Devolved government in a developed political 
system like the United Kingdom, for instance, has done more for the legitimacy of the 
'representative' system than it has done for democracy. The power that is devolved is 
limited, but the increased levels of government consolidates what is an already attenuated 
form of democracy and expands its bureaucratic and legal (legitimating) apparatus.
The limited conceptual horizons of theories of democracy that espouse the political 
application of the public sphere, are evident in their failure to recognise it as an (ethico-) 
political sphere. Emphasis on the idea of civil society and an analysis of the praxis of 
social movement opens up democratic theory to the possibilities of 'extra-parliamentary' 
conceptions and removes the state as its 'natural' locus. A basic requirement of a 
distinctive theory of civil society then is a fundamental review of the received conceptual 
1 language of 'developed political systems'. Following any 'raid of the storehouse of
I
6 J.L.Cohen Class and Civil Society op.cit J.Keane Democracy and Civil Society London. University o f Westminster 
te s s  1981
7 P.Q.Hirst: Representative Democracy and its Limits Cambridge, Polity Press. 1990 p.2
2 2 1
liberalism', there must be a radical reconstruction of what is taken. It is crucially important
f
j for the preservation of a distinctive theory of civil society that interpretation of its precepts
j
are not confused as terms of reference drawn from the philosophy of the individual.
It is perhaps worth recalling at this point, Havel's account of 'Western intellectuals' 
failure to understand the growth of civil society as a solidarity of dissidence (in 
Czechoslovakia and elsewhere before 1989). The question he recounts as an example of 
this lack of understanding to the form of democratic empowerment imagined by dissidents 
is: 'What can we do for you'.18 The good intention was noted by Havel but he also 
recognised 'a built-in misunderstanding'.19 Apart from making the obvious point about 
'first and foremost helping ourselves' by expressing the will to democracy, Havel talks of 
the 'solidarity' of civil society as an ethic beyond comprehension by the liberal imaginary 
"in the deepest sense something else is at stake." The civil society here conceived was not 
acquainted with the rationally based individualism that informs the consciousness on the 
self in the Western tradition. Its trajectory was certainly not toward an embrace of this 
tradition; indeed the differences between the two systems of capitalism and communism 
are obscured by the similarities in some of Havel's writing: "this totalitarian power is a 
great reminder to contemporary civilisation. Perhaps somewhere there may be some 
generals who think that it would be best to dispatch such systems from the face of the 
earth and then all would be well. But that is no different from a plain girl trying to get rid
| of her plainness by smashing the mirror which reminds her of it".20 When civil society 
appeals to the principles of liberalism, it no longer claims the distinctiveness to which
8 V.Havel 'Anti-political politics' in J.Keane (ed.) Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives. London.
Jniversity o f  Westminster Press. 1998. P.391
9 ibid
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Havel posits in the passage above. The ideals must be consistently separated from the 
actual practice of these principles in economic, social and political terms in 'developed 
political systems'.
This thesis has been concerned with critical analysis of what are the four basic norms 
of liberalism. For their adoption as the fundaments of a radically democratised civil 
society, they cannot be ascribed an inherent normative value. Certainly their liberal 
interpretation can assume an unproblematic desireability in all four bases. For the 
purposes of the 'deepened and expanded democracy', however, the norms of privacy, 
publicity, plurality and legality can be as ideologically threatening to civil society as any 
of the 'enemies' identified by Hall.21
The necessary reconstruction of the these norms is most demanding in the 
understanding of privacy, and the reified position that 'the private' holds in the 
consciousness of subjects of 'developed political systems'. As a central tenet of any theory 
of civil society, and as any normative conception of democracy, privacy can only be 
interpreted according to the ethical projections of such a society, as an essentially public 
process. That this might seem a paradox is because 'the private' as the sphere of moral 
preserve in its liberal form, accentuates not the development of the self but the 
(moral/private) choice of that self as a rational, autonomous and private individual. Such a 
consciousness cannot readily imagine the possibilities of a democratised and fluid civil 
society. 'Identity' becomes more or less fixed as a 'given' that the limits to autonomy are 
the limits to the self as an individuated entity. Anything beyond these limits is considered, 
correctly, beyond the control of the individual. The political implication of this is that
!0 ibid. p.390
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representative democracy has lost its case for being the means by which this control can 
be extended. Institutions turn 'inward' in their quest for greater control over the conditions 
of existence. As 'the private' becomes more deeply ingrained as an essential part of the 
human condition, the further away democracy is pushed as an empty (and derisory) 
concept. As a corollary of this, a privatised existence sanctions all manner of state action 
including violence (<elsewhere) through its own disinterest and self-limitation.
Inextricably linked to how we conceive privacy is the factor of 'identity'. Far from the 
fluidity suggested by the liberal emphasis on individualism and autonomy, the 'identity' 
that forms under the conditions of a privatised life is fixed as an individuated self whose 
development is measured by accumulations of various aspects of 'the private'. The self is 
essentially 'private', but it must be exposed to the cultural processes of an intellectual and 
moral reform that can accommodate a certain 'modularity' of subject.22
A reconsideration of privacy was made by Cohen and Arato, as defined in the sub-title 
of Chapter 1 of this thesis. But it does not amount to a conceptual reconstruction. They 
reject the idea that “one can reason from a spatial metaphor or division among institutions 
to designate the boundary between private and public.. .’23 But they do not reconstruct the 
notion of privacy’, an opposition to the private as a spatial metaphor does not entirely 
dispense with ‘the private’. All they are in effect doing is ascribing a rational inherence to 
the self in a similarly uncomplicated manner as those who still try to ‘reason’ from an 
institutional divide. They state that an analytical application of ‘the private’ to institutions 
is inappropriate. Even in ‘the family’, which (representing a certain ‘spatial institution’)
11 J.A.Hall op.cit
12 E.Gellner ‘Modular Man’ in J.A.Hall (ed) op.cit
!3 J.LCohen & A.Arato op.cit p.352
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comes into conflict with the public (in the form of law), the ‘private’ line is blurred by 
legal instrusion. But they retain the concept of ‘the private’ as an autonomous aspect of 
consciousness. Where any argument ‘reasoning’ from a premise of institutionally 
designated aspects of ‘the private’ (totally separated from its opposition of public in 
whatever form -  law, norm etc.) can only be maintained from ideological premises that 
are opposed to their ‘post-traditional civil society’. It can only be the argument of those in 
whose interests it is to maintain the allusion of ‘the private’. Cohen and Arato explicitly 
reject the notion of bourgeois society as part of a theory of civil society, but their retention 
of it as an (ideological) illusory foundation to a contingent self complicates this rejection. 
According to their argument, ‘the private institution’ is not feasible but ‘the private self 
is. For them, it is an aspect of the self that ‘necessarily comes into conflict with law’; 
privacy is a ‘given’ as individual moral autonomy.
Certainly, ineffective and inadequate reconsideration blurs the distinction between 
civil society theory and liberal theory. A reconstruction of privacy is perhaps the most 
basic in theorising a distinctive form of democracy as civil society. Rational choice serves 
well the underlying ethic to liberal society but such individual agency cannot maintain the 
solidarity that founds the democracy of a civil society.
It must be recognised by civil society theories that emphasise democracy as its 
condition of existence, that the self (as regards its ‘identity’/status, values and its overall 
morality) is a social construction. The intention of the discussion of conscience in Chapter 
1 was to undermine the idea of an innate sense of ‘right and wrong’ that is totally divorced 
from the environment of the self If ‘conscience’ is simply a human capacity to 
‘instinctively’ identify the difference, then it is no more than an ability to interpret norms
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and codes that are explicit in the public domain and implicit in the forms of association in 
society.
The culturally specific differences to these norms and codes can, however, be great 
enough to denounce what is a norm in one society as unconscionable in another. The self 
that is a complex of cognitive and affective processes, determines the more specific 
content of what is acceptable or otherwise in a society. Most would claim killing to be 
wrong but few would do so without any qualifying conditions. These conditions may be 
utilitarian, legal, or in the economic-corporate interests of the nation-state. Proponents of 
‘conscience’ could argue that a killing motivated by conscience would be guided by a 
morality intrinsic to the self rather than what are extrinsic (contingent) values. However, 
the conclusions reached in Chapter 1 point to there being no distinction between what 
might be termed extrinsic values and intrinsic values.
The point of concern for democratic theory should be this lack of opposition when 
these extrinsic values (variously utilitarian, legal, economic-corporate) do not present any 
convincing case (therefore any ‘morally legitimate condition’) for deploying the full force 
of the state’s violence (war) ‘somewhere in the middle east’, ‘some place in Africa’, or 
even on ‘an island off Scotland’.
Where democratic theory and civil society merge in their focal point of criticism needs 
to be on the processes of privatism as root cause of the lack of infusion of ‘morality into 
politics’. The urgent question for democracy is why no collective will can be mounted to 
challenge the governments that consistently fail to present convincing arguments for 
killing people, even when an argument that could not persuade those that would consider 
the interests of the economic-corporate nation-state to be a qualifying condition has been
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presented. In the United Kingdom, the case for war with Iraq in 2003 was supported by 
those for whom this condition of ‘the nation-state’, which is itself without condition, had 
been met. Support from such elements as the Conservative Party was secured, but the 
active and vocal support from the public that has historically been granted almost 
unquestioningly, was not there in this particular instance. It was not, however, replaced 
by an active and vocal opposition of the same proportion, it was met with acquiescence 
and ultimately provided the government with its legitimacy.24 Utilitarian rhetoric about 
‘global threat’ and the morality of the violence grounded on its necessity for future non­
violence, did not draw support for mass killing whose reason was in narrow economic and 
strategic interest obscured from the public domain (but not ‘the public sphere’). Not being 
able to prevent the interests of the most powerful factions in society as the same as those 
of society ‘as a whole’ represents a crisis of hegemony in that government. The absence of 
a serious challenge to this inability of government represents a crisis of democracy.
The lack of faith in democracy (as represented) in ‘developed political systems’, and 
its replacement with a faith in the certainty of legality to provide the means of 
accountability where democracy fails, explains in relatively small part the acquiescence 
and consent, toward mass killing. Legal resolution is sought for politics as both moral 
grounding and expediency. The factor of ignorance may account for the consent to a form 
of governance that undertakes mass killing for reasons that are obscured. Reasons for a 
state’s interaction with others is not always obvious and never entirely transparent.
4 An illuminating comparison has been drawn between the surprisingly high popularity ratings o f the Thatcher 
;ovemment of 1986 following the ‘Westland Affair’ and the similar consent held for Blair’s government by ‘the 
>opulace’ in 2003 following an enquiry into whether the case for war with Iraq in that year was presented using 
leception. Michael Brown The Independent 9/9/03. Whilst ‘the econom y’ is alright, then other matters such as that 
vhich The Hutton Enquiry is there to try and establish, do not effect legitimacy o f a government that deceived its
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IHowever, the extent of the coverage of these interactions in the public domains of 
‘developed political systems’, whilst not comprehensive and never entirely ‘neutral’, is 
nevertheless sufficient; and therefore reason to discount ‘ignorance’ as a significant factor 
in this lack of democratic opposition.
The political alienation that characterises the democracies of ‘developed political 
systems’ suggests that political impotence is more likely to account for grudging consent 
to the actions of government. The primary effects of privatism on the political 
consciousness of the self is to make it disinterested, powerless, or both. The two 
perspectives of privatism were seen in Chapter 1 to be in an incorrect opposition to one 
another regarding the question of its cause. Rather, they are complementary processes 
where the ‘disinterested’ position of a consciously chosen form of privatised life, 
compounds the ‘powerlessness’ that arises from inadequate institutional channels and 
spheres through which political action might be taken or expressed. The primary political 
implications are that society loses its faith in representative democracy, specifically in its 
ability to accommodate any sense of control over the decision-making that shapes the 
environment of the self. But, in near contradictory fashion, its legitimacy as a political 
system is maintained. No effective democratic opposition as social movement is 
articulated in privatised spheres of existence. A privatised self cannot become the initial 
will of an ethico-political social movement.
| The ‘self’ is layered with ‘identities’ and economic-corporate concern. What ‘the
private’ does is secure these, effectively impeding its development through the recognition 
of its own contingency by means of (public) cultural and democratic receptivity. The
)wn electorate into backing the state in a war. The privatised existence of British society was not threatened by either
228
processes of intellectual and moral reform are a realisation of the contingency of mind. 
The awareness of, and resolution to ‘cognitive dissonance’ (referred to in Chapter 1) is 
perhaps the nearest thing to ‘acting on conscience’. The self is therefore crucial to a 
democracy that is to be assumed by civil society as an ethical dimension to life.
To keep the focus on the development of democracy, rather than on the optimal 
conditions of the development of the personality, privatism is not being judged here 
(primarily) as an ‘inauthentic mode of existence’ insofar as it directs it from its ‘authentic’ 
concordance with some form of human nature or other. It was proposed in Chapter 1 that 
the only sense in which a (self-)consciousness can be ‘true’ is in its awareness of its own 
contingency, and that of the values and institutions that are composite of that 
consciousness. But what is pre-conditional for the form of democracy that is assumed by 
civil society is a public orientation of ‘the self’.
The agency of civil society, social movement, is dependent upon a development of 
consciousness from its identity. The subject matters dealt with in Chapters 1 and 3 are 
closely related. The self as a 'public' construction allows for vulnerability to cultural attack 
and for re-development. It is the self that forms an integral component to social relations 
that are represented as the subject of freedom. For an ethically disposed and radically 
democratic civil society, it is not a matter of a privatised self choosing social formations 
with which to associate, and therein locating 'freedom'. Rather, it is an indivisible relation
| between a contingent consciousness and an inclusive formation that provides the
|
j  flexibility of freedom of association. In other words, relations that are appropriate to a
i
j civil society and distinct from liberal society.
i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
)f these political crises, “neither hurt the voters where it matters -  in their daily lives or in their pockets.” (Brown)
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The same processes as those of privatism that condition the development of the self in 
’developed political systems' account for the development of social movement terminating 
at a formal inclusion in a 'politics of identity'. In the same manner that intellectual and 
moral reform is largely precluded by prioritised considerations of 'the private', the 
economic-corporate restraint that 'identity' places on social movement denies it any ethico- 
political development.
There are more than mere parallels between the development of the self and 
development of social movements, their projections are ultimately mutually dependent. 
Just as the self must ‘sink itself’, rather than rationally transcend its (material-cultured) 
existence into an abstracted instrumental rationality, social movement must also open 
itself to the discourses of other social instances of social movement, rather than adopting 
the strategic rationality by fixing its identity to an economic-corporate political 
consciousness. All political movement by the very fact of what it is, exposes itself to 
critical attack. What is crucial to the political development of social movement is the 
receptivity to this critical attack and an amenability and tendency to transform itself by its 
recognition of common, but not always obviously so, objects of protest.
The paradigm of the ‘New Social Movement’ cannot allow for any theoretical 
development and restricts the democracy of civil society to a rights-based form of a 
‘politics of influence’, formally recognised and institutionalised into a ‘politics of 
identity’. The problem of theorising democracy using the concepts of civil society in this 
way, that is without adequate critical analysis, is that it restricts its scope. It restricts 
democracy, not just in the way of tyrannical majority rule but, as a political empowerment 
of social relations ‘fluid’ enough to prevent the crystallisation of majorities as fixed and
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certain categories of identity. In the context of Cohen and Arato’s analysis of the ‘New 
Social Movement’, its primary distinction and reason for the prefix ‘new’ is that it has 
internalised its own principle of identity, or in their terms, ‘thematising its own newness’. 
In the wider theoretical context of civil society theory, this translates into the principle of 
‘self-limitation’.
This tightly held principle is as problematic as the concept of ‘the private’ to which it 
is inextricably related. ‘The private’ informs ‘self-limitation’ in a number of ways, none of 
which have an immediate obvious contribution to make to democracy as an incremental 
process with no horizons or limits. ‘Self-limitation’ can only be contributory in this way as 
a tactically applied political action, not the principled restraint of democracy in society.
If ‘self-limitation’ is set as a principle of civil society theory then it cannot escape the 
influences of liberal theory. To maintain its own democratic emphasis and distinctiveness, 
‘self-limitation’ can only be viewed as action determined by the strength of the opposition. 
It is therefore a strategy, not a principle. Nor should it be an inevitable strategy concluded 
from the inevitability of systems. The ‘new evolutionism’ (Michnik) that originated in the 
European nursery of contemporary civil society was determined by the power of the state 
and not by way of recognition of its legitimacy. Nor can it have been a principle derived 
from a perceived inevitable continuation of its opposition (indeed this opposition proved 
to be short-lived).
In its Western adoption, ‘self-limitation’ is problematic because it becomes confused 
with the liberal conception of civility which demands a certain self-restraint. But this 
notion is more appropriate as a general code of behaviour rather than a political strategy 
that was necessary for the continued existence of the social movement in the former states
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of communist Europe. Where the legitimacy of the opposition is (more or less) intact, as it 
is in ‘developed political systems’, the Western transplant of civil society, the ‘political 
edge’ (or active opposition) is to be found in ‘civil disobedience’.
It is the notion of ‘civil disobedience’ that Cohen and Arato identify as that aspect of 
their theory of civil society that retains the democratic ‘core’: “ ...reflection on civil 
disobedience can provide an answer to this question by showing that there is indeed an 
alternative to the choice between ‘soulless reformism’ and revolutionary fundamentalism, 
between civil privatism and the total politicisation of society”.25 It is important to consider 
civil disobedience as an expression of the constant unrest of society in its evolution, 
directed against the public power that contains it. It is not necessarily a ‘principled action’ 
because it respects the limits of its brief and the integrity of its opposition, it is so because 
it is an action based on a value. Of what exactly this value consists or represents is a 
contingent matter. But importantly civil disobedience, as part of political action in civil 
society, represents (potentially) a threat to the legitimacy of the order and not just one 
aspect to its rule or one specific law.
The reconstruction of one concept to allow for greater room for the theoretical 
expansion of democracy alters its relation to, and thus the understanding, of others. For 
example, if the concept of ‘the private’ is reconstructed as a domain of ‘self’-development
| (and moral choice) and then reconsidered as a public conception, then ‘self-limitation’ has
| obvious consequences for privacy. It is impossible to separate the principle of ‘self-
I
! limitation’ from a self as the subject of development and as the politically applied
i
! principle of social movement. ‘Self-1 imitation’ applied to privacy narrows its possibility
i
5 J.L.Cohen & A.Arato op.cit p.565
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by maintaining the economic-corporate layers of identity, and securing it to a culture of 
privatism. It is contradictory to the processes of intellectual and moral reform.
‘Self-limitation’ applied to plurality is similarly restrictive. The principled ‘self­
limitation’ of New Social Movements consolidates an identity that on the one hand 
enables greater political representation and organisation, and on the other denies more 
inclusive and fluid social movement and subsequent political development.
The (public) development of the self and the development of social movement as a 
paradigm of social relations that are ethic-political are inextricable, and are dependant 
upon and impeded by the same factors. Crucial to the development of the self as a 
‘subject’ of civil society is a receptivity to the cultural fluidity of society and the 
contingency of its own consciousness. Similarly, the ethico-political development of 
social movement turns on its receptivity to the discourses of inclusive movement and 
democratic link. In other words, these {self and social movement) developments are 
dependent upon the discourses of the public sphere.
This receptivity is then the maintenance of a public sphere; an openness to reform and 
fluidity of identity is its reproduction. It is, in some version, the basic criterion set by 
theorists of the public sphere as the court of some form of reason or reasoning. Habermas 
describes the communicative processes of the public sphere as necessarily proceeding 
from the recognition of the possibility that ones own argument may be wrong. In the 
Kantian language of the categorical imperative, the communicative principle is not “a 
maxim that I will to be general law, [but] I have to offer my maxim to everyone that the 
aim of discursively testing its claim to universalisability. The emphasis shifts from what
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all can will in agreement to be a universal norm”.26 The public sphere then corresponds to 
discursive formations of reform and conclusions, and hybrid developments that are 
socially inclusive in their constituent and politically inclusive in their concern. It is 
therefore distinct from the public domain, whose hegemonic discourses in ‘developed 
political systems’ demonstrate all the characteristics of ‘willing particular maxims’ as the 
interests of one faction or identity as ‘general laws’. It is in the commercially dominant 
institutions of the public domain that can be found the anti-democratic and causal 
processes of privatism. A distinct conception of the public sphere is essential to a 
distinctive theory of civil society. If it blurs into the public domain, as a normative 
category of publicity, then the only democracy that will arise out of it will be a 
representative system of private interest. Cultural production compounds the condition of 
political alienation by manipulating the concerns of the subjects of ‘developed political 
systems’. The freedom of expression that the norm of publicity is specifically concerned 
with becomes a freedom of access to the product of cultural industries, and succumbs to 
the homogenising effects this has on privacy.
Parallel to the commercial-cultural production of the public domain is the ‘political- 
cultural production’. The political discourses in the public domain are full of references to 
political idealism through, largely, the vocabulary of liberalism and the norms of legality.
I
| In the contemporary conditions of ‘developed political systems’ political discourse is met
I
; with the cynicism of the politically alienated and disillusioned. The language of rights,
rationality, neutrality etc. is the moral appeal for politicians in ‘the free world’. An 
amalgam of these norms, discursively shrouded as legality, then provides a moral
i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 J.Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Cambridge.Mas. The MIT Press 1990 p.67
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authority to actions that would be considered, by those who subscribe to a ‘politics of 
conscience’, as unconscionable. The finality that legality presents, not merely as ‘law’ (or 
public power), but as being a unique form of law whose authority is internal, contradicts 
the idea of civil society. However, legality (as a public power) claims a theoretical 
universality that a democratised civil society must maintain. There are therefore certain 
ambivalences with regard to the ‘norms’ explicitly laid down by Cohen and Arato and 
embraced by all theory sympathetic to civil society.
Although civil society represents the only feasible locus of democracy, it carries with 
it a number of conditions and qualifications. It cannot, first and foremost be placed in a 
dualistic social theory of state and society. Inclusion of economic institutions, including 
private corporations, as agencies of civil society loses all claim to any difference to liberal 
society of any theoretical foundation. Civil society must by theorised as distinct from all 
economic-corporate categories which includes both ‘state’ and ‘economy’; it can only be a 
useful tool for democratic theory if it is. Reclaiming some control over the conditions of 
existence of a ‘publicly oriented self, whose recognition of its own contingency is an 
awareness that this control can only be reclaimed publicly or democratically, means an 
antagonistic relation to the powers of ‘the state’ and ‘the economy’.
For reasons applicable to both state and economy, ‘the private’ cannot be retained by 
civil society theory. It is the first point of departure from the philosophy of the individual 
to a distinctive radical democratic theory. Cohen and Arato’s locating of ‘the private’ in 
the consciousness of the self is no less problematic than the inclusion of the (private) 
commercial institutions in civil society. ‘The private’ is still retained in their theory. It 
prevents a distinct notion of democracy from that of liberal representative institutions, its
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central point remains within this formal political sphere (of state) not in society. Their idea 
of democracy seems to be little more than an attempt at a more effective version of the 
representation of private interest. This and their analysis of social movement are the two 
fundamental flaws of their theory of civil society, if it is to be read as democratic theory 
which is their intention.
The cultural phenomena of privatism, their production and reproduction in the public 
domains of ‘developed political systems’ are a necessary part of the analysis for 
democratic theory. Privatism should be one of the primary concerns political and social 
theory, and not hived off into media and cultural studies that miss the full political 
implications. The processes of privatism are inextricably and unavoidably related to 
politics. If democracy is to be anything, there cannot be a disconnection between a 
privatised self and the privileges of choice that it enjoys, and the legitimate use of state 
violence (which it in part pays for) in areas of the world that are of no apparent relevance 
to that self It is incumbent on the democracy of civil society to question such action, and 
disclose the relevance of some of these areas around the world to the preservation of the 
privatised life of ‘developed political systems’. Theories of democracy that identify the 
area of primary concern as the state, overlook this problem of legitimacy without 
accountability (but which is conditional on preserving the private orientation of political 
agenda). For those theories of democracy that emphasise the involvement of a demos, as 
an assumption of democracy or political empowerment, the problem of privatism must be 
the first and foremost to be considered.
Civil society is, however, not bounded by the concerns of the nation-state, it 
transcends this economic-corporate entity. Its trajectory is ‘global’, representing the
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democratic will among the multi-form processes of globalisation. It links trans-national 
networks that can articulate an opposition, in global terms to the expansion and 
entrenchment of commercial society. The opposition to the dominant processes of 
globalisation (those of commercial expansion, economic exploitation and cultural 
homogeneity), arises from movement of culturally specific forms of democracy (as the 
will to create the conditions of ones own existence) but also claims a universality. 
Discourses that propose a re-establishment of the ‘sovereignty of the nation-state’ or hold 
an atavistic yearning for some romantically conceived form of existence, contradicts the 
developmental condition that civil society must be. Neither would be desirable, even if 
either were possible. However, both elements represent a threat to civil society, by 
offering ideological alternatives to the politically alienated self that is also then alienated 
from its own possibility. Rather, the opposition of civil society to the dominant processes 
of globalisation is derived from common bases of struggle that includes protest against 
economic exploitation in Mexico and violence in the Middle East.
If the feasibility of political development is doubted or dismissed, then as the privatism 
effected by political alienation shows, the doubt would then become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Moreover, democratic theory would not be able to drag itself sufficiently far 
away from the liberal representative form to analyse any such developments, and then 
address the problem of continued consent for systems that are in democratic crisis. 
Democracy must become a form of praxis in society, and only a radically reconstructed 
notion of civil society can provide the theoretical element to the fluidity of its social 
formations and the absence of any terminal point to its objectives. Civil society is, as 
Cohen and Arato put is ‘normatively necessary’ and ‘empirically possible’, it is perhaps
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even ‘politically necessary’. A democratised civil society is the political development 
necessary to prevent a slide into catastrophe under a political leadership that is itself 
directed by an increasingly well defined ‘black and white’, ‘with us or against us’ world 
view.
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